Missile and Air Defense Requirements: The UK's Integrated Air and Missile Defense System Construction Strategy
Geostrategic Threat Assessment, Capability Gaps, and Policy Pathways—Focus on the Russian Northern Fleet and Global Missile Proliferation Challenges ()
Detail
Published
23/12/2025
Key Chapter Title List
- What is the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) System
- Analysis of the Missile Threat Landscape
- Missile Strike Potential of Russia's Northern Fleet
- Threat Prioritization for the UK Homeland and Overseas Bases
- Synergy Between Deterrence Mechanisms and Missile Defense
- Construction Path for the UK's Integrated Air and Missile Defense System
- Strategy for Enhancing Situational Awareness Capabilities
- Plan for Strengthening Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Capabilities
- Building Suppression/ Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (S/DEAD) Capabilities
- Command and Control (C2) Network Integration
- Optimization of Defense Coverage and Interceptor System Tiers
- Missile Stockpile and Infrastructure Protection Measures
Document Introduction
With the development and proliferation of missile technology, the air and space threats facing the UK are becoming increasingly complex and diversified. In particular, the growing risk of missile strikes from Russia's Northern Fleet is prompting the UK to re-examine the urgency of its air and missile defense capability development. However, there remains a lack of clear consensus within the UK regarding the core requirements, capability priorities, and development path for its air and missile defense system. This strategic ambiguity has become a potential shortcoming in national security assurance.
This report uses the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) system as the core analytical framework and, based on a threat-oriented assessment methodology, systematically reviews the historical evolution, current challenges, and future needs of UK air and missile defense. The report first clarifies the core essence of the IAMD system, emphasizing its fundamental characteristic of achieving efficient coordination in Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) by integrating sensors, soft-kill measures, and hard-kill systems through a Command and Control (C2) network, distinguishing it from traditional decentralized air and missile defense models.
In the threat assessment section, the report focuses on analyzing the composite threat posed by Russia's dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and conventional cruise missiles. It provides a detailed breakdown of the missile configurations of the Russian Northern Fleet's 26 submarines and 11 major surface combatants (totaling over 800 offensive missiles) and addresses the medium-to-long-term challenges posed by the development of missile capabilities in countries like Iran and China. Simultaneously, the report establishes a threat priority ranking for the UK's core military infrastructure at home, its overseas bases, and deployed forces.
The report delves into the capability gaps of the UK's current air and missile defense system, including insufficient situational awareness, atrophied anti-submarine warfare capabilities, lack of Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) capabilities, inadequate missile stockpiles, and a fragmented command and control architecture. Based on this analysis, it proposes a strategic path of "combining offense and defense, with precise investment": on one hand, suppressing enemy launch platforms by enhancing situational awareness in the Arctic region, upgrading anti-submarine warfare equipment, and developing hypersonic anti-radiation weapons; on the other hand, constructing a layered interception system, optimizing the command and control network, expanding missile stockpiles, and strengthening the protection of critical infrastructure.
The report emphasizes that the UK's geographical characteristics determine the uniqueness of its air and missile defense requirements, and it should not blindly copy models from other countries. An effective Integrated Air and Missile Defense system must achieve organic synergy between strategic deterrence and defensive capabilities, maximizing strategic advantages while controlling defense budget costs, thereby contributing core capabilities to the security of the UK homeland, the protection of its overseas interests, and NATO's collective defense.