Can "Collaborative Combat" Break the Deadlock? – A Comprehensive End-to-End Assessment of the U.S. Air Force Program

Key Chapter Title List

1. Abstract: Framework, Evidence, and Key Findings
2. Chapter 1: From Vision to Program: An Overview of Collaborative Combat Aircraft
3. Chapter 2: The End-to-End Process Cycle: A Universal Framework
4. Chapter 3: Assessment of the CCA Program
5. Chapter 4: Ten Unanswered Questions
6. Appendix A: Supporting Budget Data
7. List of Acronyms

Document Introduction

This report, published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, provides a comprehensive and systematic end-to-end assessment of the U.S. Air Force's emerging Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. The CCA is viewed as a critical component of the next-generation air superiority architecture, designed to serve as "loyal wingmen" to manned fighter aircraft. Through autonomous collaboration, they are intended to perform missions such as forward sensing, air-to-air attack, and electronic warfare, aiming to counter the numerical disadvantage posed by China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) network in the Indo-Pacific region with an "affordable mass." The core of the report lies in evaluating the complete process of this program from concept to operational deployment.

To conduct this assessment, the report's author, Travis Sharp, developed an original analytical framework called the "End-to-End Process Cycle." This framework consists of seven sequential steps: Define the Problem, Generate Resources, Develop Capability, Prepare the Organization, Deploy Capability, Employ Capability, and Adapt Practice. The framework synthesizes insights from multiple domains, including the Department of Defense's Capability Integration and Development System, military innovation theory, military force generation studies, and kill chain models. It aims to provide a more comprehensive and integrated perspective than traditional program assessments, such as those conducted by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office.

The assessment is based on six primary sources of evidence: publicly available information, briefings from Air Force officials, confidential interviews and exchanges with over 30 industry experts, a confidential survey of 38 experts from the Department of Defense, industry, and think tanks regarding "affordable mass" systems, a historical case study of the Vietnam War-era AQM-34 "Lightning Bug" drone, and a supporting analytical report titled "Strategy Without Air Superiority," which examines CCA employment, deployment, and sortie generation in a Taiwan Strait scenario. The report uses a "traffic light chart" format to visually display the progress ratings of the CCA program across the current seven steps.

The report's key findings indicate that the CCA program has made significant progress in the "Define the Problem" and "Generate Resources" steps, with key stakeholders broadly agreeing on the problem of the Air Force's numerical disadvantage in manned aircraft and the program receiving strong initial budget support from Congress. However, progress has been relatively limited in steps such as "Develop Capability," "Deploy Capability," and "Employ Capability." The report specifically points out that the Air Force's public discourse tends to emphasize the CCA's versatility across multiple mission types. This obscures the necessary design and employment trade-offs required to optimize for specific tasks (such as persistent forward sensing or rapid return-to-strike missions in the Taiwan Strait), thereby hindering deeper planning for subsequent steps. Furthermore, significant challenges remain in areas such as organizational preparation (e.g., building trust in mission autonomy), deployment (e.g., basing choices and sustainment), and iterative adaptation based on operational experience.

Despite these challenges, the report's author remains optimistic, believing the CCA program can succeed by consistently achieving discrete progress. The report emphasizes that technological sophistication alone is insufficient to guarantee success; the program's ultimate outcome will equally depend on non-technical factors such as organizational integration, sustainment, basing choices, and coordination with allies. The CCA program carries symbolic significance for breaking the mold of the Department of Defense's traditional acquisition patterns, thus enjoying strong implicit political support. The concluding section of the report raises ten unanswered key questions concerning the CCA's relationship with manned aircraft, force structure, logistics, and historical lessons, providing direction for future research and decision-making.