Detection and Containment of Iran's Weaponization Process: U.S. Policy Responses

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. Executive Summary
2. Key Activities for Manufacturing Nuclear Weapons
3. Iran's Weaponization Program: History and Background
4. The Post-"Amad Plan" Era
5. The 2010s, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and the Trump Administration
6. The Biden Administration's Iran Policy
7. Current Status of Iran's Nuclear Program
8. Weaponization Progress
9. Fuel Production
10. Missile Delivery
11. Policy Recommendations

Document Introduction

This research report was authored by Andrea Stricker, Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and published in February 2025. The report focuses on the urgent threat of Iran's accelerated nuclear weaponization, noting that intelligence collected during the final phase of the Biden administration indicates a secret team of Iranian scientists is working to shorten the country's path to acquiring nuclear weapons. The report argues that with Iran having produced enough highly enriched uranium to fuel multiple nuclear weapons, a potential second Trump administration faces a historic opportunity to reverse the "failed policies" of the previous administration and prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability through a comprehensive approach.

The report first systematically reviews the historical trajectory of Iran's nuclear weaponization efforts, primarily based on the Iranian nuclear archive obtained by Israel in 2018. This archive revealed Iran's "Amad Plan" implemented from the late 1990s to 2003, which aimed to produce five nuclear weapons and establish large-scale production facilities by 2003. Although Iran suspended the plan in 2003 due to international pressure and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, dispersing its activities to military sites and civilian institutions, it retained core knowledge and capabilities. In subsequent years, Iran continued weaponization-related research and development activities under the guise of civilian research through entities such as the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND).

The report provides an in-depth assessment of the current progress of Iran's nuclear program. During the Biden administration, Iran significantly expanded its nuclear capabilities, including enriching uranium to 60% purity, producing uranium metal usable for nuclear weapon cores, adding thousands of advanced centrifuges, and restricting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight. As of November 2024, Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium could provide weapons-grade fuel for up to 16 nuclear weapons within five months. Concurrently, the U.S. intelligence community, in a July 2024 assessment, shifted from its previous denial of Iranian weaponization activities, acknowledging that Iran had "undertaken activities that would position it better to produce a nuclear device should it decide to do so." The report cites expert analysis suggesting Iran could complete the entire process from producing weapons-grade fuel to detonating a crude nuclear device within six months.

Based on this analysis, the report proposes a detailed policy roadmap for a potential second Trump administration. The primary recommendation is to enhance U.S.-Israel joint intelligence operations to detect and disrupt Iran's weaponization activities, including through cyber attacks and physical sabotage. Second, mobilize the IAEA for in-depth inspections, specifically demanding "special inspections" of sites related to the nuclear archive and civilian or military locations suspected of conducting weaponization research. Third, rebuild a credible military threat by demonstrating the capability to strike Iran's deeply buried and hardened nuclear facilities (such as Fordow) through U.S.-Israel joint military exercises (e.g., "Juniper Oak") and considering providing key weapons like Massive Ordnance Penetrators to Israel. Finally, the report warns against engaging in any nuclear negotiations that could allow Iran to delay consequences or evade substantive constraints. Any agreement must be predicated on the verifiable dismantlement of Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities and unrestricted IAEA access to all suspicious sites.

The analysis in this report synthesizes open-source academic literature, satellite imagery, IAEA reports, U.S. government documents, and expert interviews. It aims to provide policymakers, intelligence analysts, and regional security researchers with a comprehensive, timely, and evidence-based assessment of the threat posed by Iran's nuclear weaponization.

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. Executive Summary
2. Key Activities for Manufacturing Nuclear Weapons
3. Iran's Weaponization Program: History and Background
4. The Post-"Amad Plan" Era
5. The 2010s, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and the Trump Administration
6. The Biden Administration's Iran Policy
7. Current Status of Iran's Nuclear Program
8. Weaponization Progress
9. Fuel Production
10. Missile Delivery
11. Policy Recommendations

Document Introduction

This research report was authored by Andrea Stricker, Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and published in February 2025. The report focuses on the urgent threat of Iran's accelerated nuclear weaponization, noting that intelligence collected during the final phase of the Biden administration indicates a secret team of Iranian scientists is working to shorten the country's path to acquiring nuclear weapons. The report argues that with Iran having produced enough highly enriched uranium to fuel multiple nuclear weapons, a potential second Trump administration faces a historic opportunity to reverse the "failed policies" of the previous administration and prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability through a comprehensive approach.

The report first systematically reviews the historical trajectory of Iran's nuclear weaponization efforts, primarily based on the Iranian nuclear archive obtained by Israel in 2018. This archive revealed Iran's "Amad Plan" implemented from the late 1990s to 2003, which aimed to produce five nuclear weapons and establish large-scale production facilities by 2003. Although Iran suspended the plan in 2003 due to international pressure and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, dispersing its activities to military sites and civilian institutions, it retained core knowledge and capabilities. In subsequent years, Iran continued weaponization-related research and development activities under the guise of civilian research through entities such as the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND).

The report provides an in-depth assessment of the current progress of Iran's nuclear program. During the Biden administration, Iran significantly expanded its nuclear capabilities, including enriching uranium to 60% purity, producing uranium metal usable for nuclear weapon cores, adding thousands of advanced centrifuges, and restricting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight. As of November 2024, Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium could provide weapons-grade fuel for up to 16 nuclear weapons within five months. Concurrently, the U.S. intelligence community, in a July 2024 assessment, shifted from its previous denial of Iranian weaponization activities, acknowledging that Iran had "undertaken activities that would position it better to produce a nuclear device should it decide to do so." The report cites expert analysis suggesting Iran could complete the entire process from producing weapons-grade fuel to detonating a crude nuclear device within six months.

Based on this analysis, the report proposes a detailed policy roadmap for a potential second Trump administration. The primary recommendation is to enhance U.S.-Israel joint intelligence operations to detect and disrupt Iran's weaponization activities, including through cyber attacks and physical sabotage. Second, mobilize the IAEA for in-depth inspections, specifically demanding "special inspections" of sites related to the nuclear archive and civilian or military locations suspected of conducting weaponization research. Third, rebuild a credible military threat by demonstrating the capability to strike Iran's deeply buried and hardened nuclear facilities (such as Fordow) through U.S.-Israel joint military exercises (e.g., "Juniper Oak") and considering providing key weapons like Massive Ordnance Penetrators to Israel. Finally, the report warns against engaging in any nuclear negotiations that could allow Iran to delay consequences or evade substantive constraints. Any agreement must be predicated on the verifiable dismantlement of Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities and unrestricted IAEA access to all suspicious sites.

The analysis in this report synthesizes open-source academic literature, satellite imagery, IAEA reports, U.S. government documents, and expert interviews. It aims to provide policymakers, intelligence analysts, and regional security researchers with a comprehensive, timely, and evidence-based assessment of the threat posed by Iran's nuclear weaponization.