Hamas's Foreign Policy: Ideology, Decision-Making, and Political Hegemony ()

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. Hamas and Israel: Reconciliation and Confrontation
2. Hamas and the Rest of the World
3. Syria, Iran, and Egypt
4. External Objectives: Seeking Recognition and Acquiring Resources
5. Internal Objectives: Self-Strengthening and Rivalry
6. Ideology and the Defense of External Interests
7. Internal Interests and Ideology
8. Collective Decision-Making vs. Unilateral Decision-Making
9. Causes of Dissent
10. Introduction: The Formation and Conceptual Framework of Hamas's Foreign Policy
11. Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood: Friendly but Non-Organizational Relationship
12. Palestine, Foreign Policy, and Political Islam

Document Introduction

This report is the first academic monograph to systematically and thoroughly analyze the foreign policy of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). The study adopts a theoretical perspective from international relations, particularly "linkage theory," placing Hamas within a unique category distinct from both sovereign states and classic non-state actors—analyzing it as a "quasi-state actor" or "state-like actor." The report challenges the stereotype of Hamas as simply driven by rigid religious ideology, revealing how it strategically balances between the "historical solution" (liberating all of Palestine) and the "interim solution" (accepting the 1967 borders), and how it utilizes ideological tools to serve practical political interests.

The report's structure revolves around four core sections: The first part outlines the general orientation of Hamas's foreign policy, focusing on its dynamic relationship of "violent dialogue" with Israel, its interactions with other countries worldwide, and its complex, shifting alliances with three key regional actors: Syria, Iran, and Egypt. The second part delves into the dual interests driving Hamas's foreign policy: externally seeking international recognition and material resources to break the blockade, and internally aiming to strengthen its rule over the Gaza Strip while competing with Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization for domestic political legitimacy.

The third part focuses on the function and adaptation of ideology in foreign policy. The report points out that ideology is not an immutable dogma but a resource that can be strategically mobilized and redefined. Hamas tends to emphasize Islamic discourse when confronting Israel to highlight its distinctiveness and challenge its opponent. However, when engaging with other countries (especially Arab states), it downplays religious rhetoric, instead resorting to nationalist discourse, principles of international law (such as UN resolutions), and classic diplomatic norms like "non-interference in internal affairs" to gain recognition and support.

The fourth part analyzes Hamas's decentralized decision-making mechanism and its impact on foreign policy. The report details the geographically dispersed leadership structure (Gaza, West Bank, external leadership, and imprisoned leadership) resulting from occupation, exile, and imprisonment, and examines the disagreements and compromises on foreign policy approaches among these different leaderships. The study finds that the external leadership historically dominated foreign policy decision-making for a long time. However, since the 2006 electoral victory, the 2007 takeover of Gaza, and especially after the 2011 Arab Spring, the power of the Gaza leadership has significantly increased, leading to a shift in decision-making weight.

The empirical foundation of this study is exceptionally solid, including in-depth interviews with dozens of Hamas leaders across Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Switzerland, and Cyprus, as well as systematic analysis of the movement's original documents (such as the 1988 Charter, internal documents like the "Hamas Interim Policy and Its Political Relations" from the early 1990s, and the 2017 "Document of General Principles and Policies"). The report covers four key turning points in the evolution of Hamas's foreign policy: the 2006 electoral victory, the 2007 takeover of Gaza, the 2011 Arab Spring, and Israel's 2014 "Operation Protective Edge." It provides a highly valuable academic contribution to understanding the survival and development strategies of this complex actor within a turbulent regional environment.

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. Hamas and Israel: Reconciliation and Confrontation
2. Hamas and the Rest of the World
3. Syria, Iran, and Egypt
4. External Objectives: Seeking Recognition and Acquiring Resources
5. Internal Objectives: Self-Strengthening and Rivalry
6. Ideology and the Defense of External Interests
7. Internal Interests and Ideology
8. Collective Decision-Making vs. Unilateral Decision-Making
9. Causes of Dissent
10. Introduction: The Formation and Conceptual Framework of Hamas's Foreign Policy
11. Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood: Friendly but Non-Organizational Relationship
12. Palestine, Foreign Policy, and Political Islam

Document Introduction

This report is the first academic monograph to systematically and thoroughly analyze the foreign policy of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). The study adopts a theoretical perspective from international relations, particularly "linkage theory," placing Hamas within a unique category distinct from both sovereign states and classic non-state actors—analyzing it as a "quasi-state actor" or "state-like actor." The report challenges the stereotype of Hamas as simply driven by rigid religious ideology, revealing how it strategically balances between the "historical solution" (liberating all of Palestine) and the "interim solution" (accepting the 1967 borders), and how it utilizes ideological tools to serve practical political interests.

The report's structure revolves around four core sections: The first part outlines the general orientation of Hamas's foreign policy, focusing on its dynamic relationship of "violent dialogue" with Israel, its interactions with other countries worldwide, and its complex, shifting alliances with three key regional actors: Syria, Iran, and Egypt. The second part delves into the dual interests driving Hamas's foreign policy: externally seeking international recognition and material resources to break the blockade, and internally aiming to strengthen its rule over the Gaza Strip while competing with Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization for domestic political legitimacy.

The third part focuses on the function and adaptation of ideology in foreign policy. The report points out that ideology is not an immutable dogma but a resource that can be strategically mobilized and redefined. Hamas tends to emphasize Islamic discourse when confronting Israel to highlight its distinctiveness and challenge its opponent. However, when engaging with other countries (especially Arab states), it downplays religious rhetoric, instead resorting to nationalist discourse, principles of international law (such as UN resolutions), and classic diplomatic norms like "non-interference in internal affairs" to gain recognition and support.

The fourth part analyzes Hamas's decentralized decision-making mechanism and its impact on foreign policy. The report details the geographically dispersed leadership structure (Gaza, West Bank, external leadership, and imprisoned leadership) resulting from occupation, exile, and imprisonment, and examines the disagreements and compromises on foreign policy approaches among these different leaderships. The study finds that the external leadership historically dominated foreign policy decision-making for a long time. However, since the 2006 electoral victory, the 2007 takeover of Gaza, and especially after the 2011 Arab Spring, the power of the Gaza leadership has significantly increased, leading to a shift in decision-making weight.

The empirical foundation of this study is exceptionally solid, including in-depth interviews with dozens of Hamas leaders across Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Switzerland, and Cyprus, as well as systematic analysis of the movement's original documents (such as the 1988 Charter, internal documents like the "Hamas Interim Policy and Its Political Relations" from the early 1990s, and the 2017 "Document of General Principles and Policies"). The report covers four key turning points in the evolution of Hamas's foreign policy: the 2006 electoral victory, the 2007 takeover of Gaza, the 2011 Arab Spring, and Israel's 2014 "Operation Protective Edge." It provides a highly valuable academic contribution to understanding the survival and development strategies of this complex actor within a turbulent regional environment.