Annual Strategic Posture Commission Report: Challenges and Strategies for the United States in Countering Russian and Chinese Nuclear Deterrence from a Japanese Perspective

Key Chapter Title List

1. Strengthening the Hardware of U.S. Extended Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific Region
2. Balanced Forward-Deployed Ballistic Missile Submarine Patrols
3. The Complementary Role of Bomber Air Patrols and the Limitations of Dual-Capable Aircraft Options in the Indo-Pacific
4. Developing Sea-Launched Nuclear Cruise Missiles or Other Theater Nuclear Options
5. Nuclear-Conventional Integration with Allies
6. Supporting the Enhancement of U.S. Homeland Defense Capabilities
7. Upgrading the Software of U.S. Extended Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific Region
8. High-Level and Multi-Tiered U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue
9. Formulating Seamless U.S.-Japan Joint Action Plans and Clarifying Japan's Support Roles and Capabilities in U.S. Nuclear Operations
10. Conducting Globally Integrated Operational Exercises for Multi-Theater Crisis Scenarios
11. Providing Allies with Educational Opportunities on U.S. Nuclear Operations and Planning Processes
12. Conclusion

Document Introduction

Against the backdrop of addressing the challenge posed by the "dual nuclear adversaries" of Russia and China, the U.S. 2023 Strategic Posture Commission report comprehensively examines its nuclear posture. This report provides a supplementary analysis from the perspective of Japan, a key ally, aiming to explore how to more effectively strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. The report argues that while the Commission's recommendations are generally positive, there remains room for deepening and adjustment in specific implementation pathways, integration of ally roles, and crisis management mechanisms.

The report first focuses on strengthening "hardware" capabilities. The author points out that the U.S. lacks theater-focused nuclear capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, which is a critical shortcoming. The report elaborates on the strategic value of forward-deployed ballistic missile submarines, arguing that their patrols in waters around Guam can significantly shorten strike times against potential targets, thereby enhancing the immediacy and credibility of deterrence. Simultaneously, the report analyzes the vulnerability of dual-capable aircraft and forward-deployed bombers in the Indo-Pacific environment, concluding that their military utility is limited and that demonstrating presence through increased air patrol frequency is more advisable. Addressing the existing capability gap, the report strongly advocates for accelerating the development of sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles or similar theater nuclear weapon systems with high survivability, flexibility, and low-yield options, to provide a more credible limited nuclear use deterrent option.

Secondly, the report delves into upgrading the "software" aspect, namely the coordination mechanisms and joint planning between the U.S. and Japan. The author emphasizes that the credibility of extended deterrence relies not only on military capabilities but also on deep political and military integration between allies. To this end, the report proposes establishing a higher-level, more institutionalized U.S.-Japan extended deterrence dialogue mechanism, including regular ministerial-level "2+2" meetings incorporating tabletop exercises on nuclear weapons use. The report also advocates for formulating seamless U.S.-Japan joint action plans, clarifying potential support roles for the Japan Self-Defense Forces in U.S. nuclear operations (such as aerial refueling, airspace security, etc.), and enhancing the synergy between conventional forces and nuclear operations through models similar to NATO's SNOWCAT mode in exercises like "Steadfast Noon".

Finally, the report expands its perspective to global strategic resource allocation and alliance network building. The author notes that in a context of constrained resources and potential simultaneous multi-theater crises, the U.S. needs to conduct globally integrated exercises with allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and NATO to test cross-theater resource competition and supply chain resilience. Furthermore, strategic trust and operational interoperability should be deepened by establishing multilateral consultation tracks (e.g., U.S.-Japan-ROK, U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Japan-NATO, etc.) and providing allies with systematic education on U.S. nuclear planning processes. The report concludes that in the face of adversaries' accelerated efforts to undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, the U.S.-Japan alliance must promptly take concrete actions, advancing both hardware deployment and software coordination in parallel to maintain an effective strategic balance.