Readjusting U.S. Strategy Toward North Korea

Key Chapter Titles

1. Introduction: Current Situation and Future Direction
2. The Foundation Has Collapsed
3. A Room Filled with Gasoline Vapors and Too Many Matches
4. U.S. Interests in the New Environment
5. Policy for the Future
6. Policy Recommendations
7. Organizing for Success
8. Laying the Groundwork
9. Building Positive Momentum
10. Alternatives to "Maximum Pressure"
11. About the Author
12. Acknowledgments

Document Overview

This report, written in May 2025 by Joel S. Wit, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center and co-founder of 38 North, aims to conduct a systematic reassessment of U.S. policy toward North Korea against the backdrop of a potential second Trump term. The report argues that the four major strategic assumptions underpinning U.S. policy toward North Korea over the past 35 years—namely, that North Korea is internationally isolated, its nuclear and missile programs can be contained through sanctions, normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations holds significant geopolitical value, and there exists a tipping point to force North Korea to denuclearize—have all failed in the current geopolitical reality. By providing comprehensive support to Russia's war against Ukraine, North Korea has ended its political, technological, and economic isolation and secured economic backing from China, granting it unprecedented room for maneuver under the "umbrella" formed by the two major powers of Russia and China.

The report provides an in-depth analysis of the extreme danger of the current East Asian security environment. North Korea has developed into a nuclear-armed state with reliable weapon systems, doctrine, and a considerable number of nuclear warheads. Simultaneously, actions by the United States and its allies to strengthen deterrence and North Korea's countermeasures have created a vicious cycle. Coupled with Russia's predicament in Ukraine prompting it to form a "coalition of the sanctioned" with North Korea and Iran and abandon its long-held non-proliferation stance, the Northeast Asia region has become a flammable environment akin to "a room filled with gasoline vapors where everyone holds a match." In this context, the risk of conflict, even nuclear war, triggered by miscalculation, misjudgment, or accident has significantly increased.

Based on this, the report proposes three major strategic objectives for the United States in the new environment: the primary goal is to deter the outbreak of a second Korean War; the second is to prioritize reducing the risk of nuclear war in the region over achieving denuclearization in the short term; and the third is to construct a peace architecture on the Korean Peninsula through diplomatic means. To achieve these goals, the report advocates revitalizing "summit-driven diplomacy" but must overcome four major challenges: changing the U.S. decision-making culture that focuses only on hotspots while neglecting nuclear risks on the peninsula; improving relations with China and Russia to alter their positions toward North Korea; changing North Korea's strategic calculus by offering new incentives; and demonstrating stronger leadership within the alliance to coordinate the positions of South Korea and Japan.

The core section of the report puts forward a series of specific, pragmatic policy recommendations. Regarding "Organizing for Success," it emphasizes the need to establish an effective decision-making mechanism, consult expert groups with frontline experience on North Korea, and maintain consistency in policy messaging. "Laying the Groundwork" requires rebuilding great-power consultations with China and Russia, restarting direct leader-to-leader diplomacy and communication between Trump and Kim Jong Un, and establishing regular working-level U.S.-North Korea contact channels. Under "Building Positive Momentum," it recommends prioritizing the initiation of "stability talks" aimed at reducing nuclear war risk, advancing diplomatic cross-recognition, conditionally suspending large-scale U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, using sanctions relief as a positive lever, achieving initial confidence-building measures such as a freeze on weapons-grade nuclear material and missile testing, and encouraging South Korea to advance engagement with the North.

The report concludes by noting that the traditional "maximum pressure" strategy is no longer viable in the current context where China and Russia do not support new sanctions and assist North Korea in circumventing them. Instead, a feasible direction for pressure should target North Korea's increasingly rampant cybercrime activities involving the theft of billions of dollars through cryptocurrency, addressed by strengthening international cooperation between governments and the private sector. The conclusions of this report are based on multiple expert workshops held between 2023 and 2024 under the Chatham House Rule, incorporating insights from over forty former officials, scholars, and practitioners. It provides policymakers with a comprehensive strategic roadmap based on a realistic assessment, aimed at managing risks and seeking incremental breakthroughs.