Independent Progress: Advancing the Australia-Japan Defense Agenda

Key Chapter Title List

1. Executive Summary
2. Policy Recommendations
3. Introduction
4. Chapter 1: The Logic for Expanding Defence Cooperation
5. Chapter 2: Matching Words with Deeds: The Step Change in Australia-Japan Defence Cooperation
6. Chapter 3: Implementation Progress
7. Chapter 4: Challenges to the Bilateral Agenda
8. Conclusion and Recommendations

Document Introduction

This strategic report, published by the University of Western Australia's Defence and Security Institute, aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the transformation and deepening of the Australia-Japan defence cooperation relationship in recent years. Based on a systematic review of official policy documents, high-level statements, signed agreements, and actual military cooperation activities from both countries, the report explores the logical basis, cooperative progress, inherent challenges, and future pathways for Australia and Japan viewing each other as the "most important defence partner" after the United States, against the backdrop of a rapidly changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

The report begins by noting that although Australia-Japan relations have continued to develop since the establishment of the "Special Strategic Partnership" in 2014, their shared assessment in recent years of the deterioration in regional strategic order, and the consensus on elevating "deterrence" as the primary task of their respective defence forces, has injected new purpose and urgency into defence cooperation. The core driver of this strategic convergence is the mutual recognition that, in the face of changes in the regional balance of power, short, medium, and long-term challenges must be addressed by strengthening their own capabilities, elevating the level of defence cooperation, and supporting a durable and credible US military presence. The signing of the 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and the release of the new Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) are seen as completing the legal and strategic framework for practical bilateral defence cooperation, marking a new phase in the relationship shifting from "laying the groundwork" to "practical action."

The main body of the report systematically analyzes the multi-dimensional manifestations of deepening cooperation. At the operational level, through bilateral platforms such as the "Nichi Gou Trident" naval exercise and the "Bushido Guardian" air force exercise, as well as joint participation in multilateral and trilateral exercises like "Talisman Sabre," "Yama Sakura," and "Keen Edge," the two countries have significantly enhanced the complexity of joint operations, achieving substantive progress particularly in areas such as anti-submarine warfare, aerial refueling, and the exchange of fifth-generation fighter aircraft. In the realm of defence industry and technology, both sides have identified long-range guided weapons, integrated air and missile defence, undersea warfare, and cross-domain autonomous systems as key cooperation areas, and have signed new arrangements for research, development, testing, and evaluation. Particularly noteworthy is the report's emphasis that trilateral cooperation with the United States (the Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, TSD) has become a core mechanism for advancing the bilateral defence agenda, with the integration process of trilateral military activities in some aspects even outpacing bilateral cooperation.

However, the report also soberly points out a series of structural challenges facing the Australia-Japan defence agenda. The primary challenge lies in how to coordinate with their respective alliance modernization agendas with the United States, avoiding a "fusion gap," and addressing potential defence trade control barriers brought by mechanisms like AUKUS. Secondly, the bilateral relationship must avoid becoming entirely subordinate to trilateral cooperation; it must develop a bilateral agenda with independent practical value, especially in "grey zone" or low-intensity conflict scenarios where direct US participation may not be required. Furthermore, both countries need to set realistic expectations, fully considering the impact of Japan's domestic political and economic changes on the pace of reform, as well as the potential constraints on bilateral interaction posed by their long-standing mindset of prioritizing cooperation with the United States.

Based on the above analysis, the report's conclusion section puts forward specific policy recommendations aimed at providing operational pathways for decision-makers. These recommendations include: exploring joint maritime surveillance operations in key Southeast Asian waterways; establishing a bilateral rotational deployment mechanism for Japanese amphibious forces in northern Australia, modeled on the "US Marine Rotational Force – Darwin"; accelerating negotiations to facilitate greater Japanese use of Australian missile testing ranges; and exploring the possibility of Japanese industry participation in Australia's "Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance" enterprise, including co-production, maintenance, and sustainment of Japanese-sourced missiles. The report ultimately concludes that, despite concurrent challenges, with a solid strategic consensus and institutional framework, the Australia-Japan defence partnership is facing unprecedented opportunities and holds the potential to provide stronger operational capabilities for achieving shared strategic objectives.