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Analysis of Russia's Three-Year Information Operations and the Impact of the Ukraine War

Based on the comprehensive report of the French Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM) from [year] [month], this analysis systematically examines the tactics, structure, and effectiveness evaluation of Russia's series of information manipulation campaigns (IMCs) targeting France, Europe, Ukraine, and Africa since [year] [month].

Detail

Published

22/12/2025

List of Key Chapter Titles

  1. Background
  2. Information Manipulation Campaigns Targeting France
  3. Information Manipulation Campaigns Targeting Europe
  4. Information Manipulation Campaigns Targeting Ukraine and Occupied Territories
  5. Information Manipulation Campaigns Targeting the African Continent
  6. RRN: A Persistent but Limited-Effect Information Manipulation Campaign
  7. Matryoshka: Information Manipulation Campaign Targeting Media and Fact-Checking Organizations
  8. Voice of Europe and Euromore: Media Created to Circumvent European Sanctions
  9. Stop Erdogan and Fake Anti-Ukraine Protests
  10. Portal Kombat: An Information Manipulation Campaign Initially Targeting Ukraine, Later Extended to Europe
  11. Mriya: Media Associated with a Ukrainian Separatist Political Party
  12. Project Lakhta and the Campaign to Send African Citizens to the Ukrainian Front

Document Introduction

This report is a comprehensive analytical document published by the French Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM) in February 2025. It aims to systematically review and assess the large-scale information operations launched by Russia's information influence ecosystem since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The core of the report lies in analyzing how Russia, through a series of information manipulation campaigns, conducts coordinated propaganda and interference activities worldwide, particularly in France, Europe, Ukraine, and Africa. These activities are designed to rationalize its aggression, weaken international support, and undermine internal unity within target countries.

The report first defines the background and scope of the study. From the outset of the invasion, Russia's information operations have been positioned as a continuation of its "information confrontation" strategy since the early 21st century. The core objective is to frame its "special military operation" as a defensive act against what it calls "Ukrainian aggressiveness supported by the Western collective." The European Union's sanctions in March 2022 against Russian transnational media outlets RT and Sputnik prompted a partial "underground" shift in Russia's information ecosystem and gave rise to new information manipulation campaigns. In accordance with its legal mandate, VIGINUM initiated research into digital foreign interference related to the Russia-Ukraine war and has characterized the activities of several Russian information manipulation campaigns as digital foreign interference.

The main body of the report categorizes and elaborates on the primary information manipulation campaigns and their operational patterns based on geographical regions and target audiences. Regarding France, the report focuses on two campaigns: "RRN" (also known as Doppelgänger) and "Matryoshka." RRN operates through a large number of websites impersonating media outlets/institutions and pseudo-media networks, promoted via a massive volume of inauthentic accounts. While its activities are persistent, their effectiveness is assessed as limited. It is linked to the Russian Presidential Administration and several Russian digital marketing companies. Matryoshka specializes in creating and disseminating false content aimed at disrupting and discrediting the work of media and fact-checking organizations. Its methods have been analogized to "meta-level online provocation."

At the European level, the report tracks newly established media outlets "Voice of Europe" and "Euromore," created to circumvent sanctions, and exposes their connections to Russian official bodies and sanctioned individuals. Simultaneously, the report documents actions such as "Stop Erdogan," which aimed to drive a wedge between Turkey and the EU/Ukraine by organizing fake protests and creating provocative content. Despite the significant resources required for such actions, their online impact has been minimal.

Concerning Ukraine and the occupied territories, the report analyzes two campaigns: "Portal Kombat" and "Mriya." Portal Kombat relies on a vast network of over 200 websites, acting as an "echo chamber" for pro-Russian information. Its creation and management are closely linked to web development companies in Crimea, and the network continues to expand to target the entire EU and even countries in Africa and Asia. "Mriya" is revealed as the media front for the Ukrainian separatist political project "Representative Office of the Ukrainian People." Its Telegram channel was used by Russian information operators as a dissemination channel.

On the African continent, the report focuses on "Project Lakhta," created by the late businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin. This organization conducted information operations in several African locations, falsely accusing France and Ukraine of attempting to recruit African citizens to fight in Ukraine. Its activities combined online disinformation dissemination, paid media articles, and offline fake protests. While the methods were sophisticated, VIGINUM assessed their actual impact as low.

Comprehensive analysis concludes that although the Russian state has invested considerable technical, financial, and human resources into its information influence ecosystem, the effectiveness of the information manipulation campaign battles covered in this report is relatively limited. This is primarily attributed to numerous technical errors by the operators, low-quality content, and the fact that their objectives are more focused on amplifying political polarization related to the war and exploiting existing controversies, rather than fundamentally shaping the views of the target audience. The report ultimately emphasizes that these activities reveal the evolution of Russia's information warfare strategy and its enduring intent to create saturation and chaos in the global information space.