Predicting whether the Ukraine war will end in 2024?

Key Chapter Title List

1. Introduction: Trump's Promise and the Complexity of Ending the War
2. Core Prediction: A Possible Ceasefire in Early 2025 and Its Limitations
3. Current Battlefield Trends and the Evolution of the Balance of Power
4. Fatigue in the Western Support Coalition and Domestic Political Pressures
5. Strategic Objectives of the Belligerents and the Stalemate
6. Trump's Role as an External "Game Changer"
7. Dynamics of Ceasefire Establishment and the Calculations of All Parties
8. Complexity of the Political Settlement Process and the "Gordian Knot"
9. Negotiation Deadlock and the Waning of Trump's Interest
10. Ukraine's "Dilemma": The Dual Predicament of Security and Reconstruction
11. Winner Analysis: The Strategic Gains for Trump and Putin
12. Conclusion: The Unfinished War and the Persistence of a Liminal State

Document Introduction

This report addresses a core question of significant international concern: Could the ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine potentially come to an end in 2025? The report does not offer a simple yes-or-no answer. Instead, it provides an in-depth analysis of the multi-dimensional, multi-layered dynamics that will determine the course of the war, with a particular focus on the geopolitical shifts at the critical juncture of 2025, especially the potential direct impact of the change in US leadership.

The report begins by noting that although the US President-elect Donald Trump has promised to end the war quickly, the complexity of the war is far from something that can be easily dictated by the will of a single nation's president. The report's core thesis is: Through strong mediation by the Trump administration, a ceasefire in early 2025 is possible, and fighting will significantly de-escalate and nearly stop. However, this is only the first step in conflict management. The subsequent diplomatic process aimed at achieving a lasting political settlement and stability is highly likely to become deadlocked, leaving Ukraine in a "no man's land" between war and reconstruction.

The analysis first reviews the battlefield situation as of the report's writing. Russian forces are making incremental gains, striving to improve their positions before winter limits frontline activity. Ukraine is severely constrained by troop shortages, and nearly three years of war, particularly Russia's sustained attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure, have caused immense attrition. This has intensified war fatigue within Ukraine, weakening the will to continue resistance. Simultaneously, the Western support coalition also faces fatigue. The new US administration came to power partly due to domestic sentiment favoring a focus on domestic affairs over foreign wars; in Germany, the coalition government collapsed over issues related to Ukraine aid funding. These factors collectively undermine Ukraine's ability to secure sustained Western military aid and financial support, while Russia's manpower and equipment supplies are projected to peak in 2025.

Although the war exhibits characteristics of a war of attrition, neither Kyiv nor Moscow has abandoned its initial strategic objectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's "victory plan" emphasizes joining NATO, obtaining unconditional Western weapons, and enhancing deterrence capabilities, but is vague on reclaiming all lost territories. Russian President Vladimir Putin's goals have consistently been the recognition of annexed territories and Ukraine's permanent neutrality and demilitarization. Neither side's strategy has been fully successful, yet both remain entrenched, creating conditions for an external force to act as a "game changer."

The report argues that peace efforts initiated by Trump around his inauguration will be tactically welcomed by both sides. For Zelenskyy, public pressure from the US could serve as an excuse to dial back unrealistic goals and instead focus on stabilizing the current front lines to seek military and economic recovery. For Putin, it would allow him to consolidate control over the approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory already occupied, interpret it as Western acquiescence to Russian gains, and validate his narrative about great powers dominating the world and dictating the pace of proxy wars.

However, establishing a ceasefire is relatively easy; the subsequent political settlement process is the true challenge. This involves complex negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, between Ukraine and the West, between Russia and the West (especially the US and Russia), and even with other external actors, with vastly different goals and expectations among the parties. The report predicts that Trump, as a "self-proclaimed dealmaker," is likely to lose interest during these protracted and complex negotiations. Without high-level political impetus, the talks will be prolonged and unlikely to yield substantive results.

For Ukraine, this will lead to an extremely unfavorable "dilemma": with direct fighting halted, Western war fatigue will intensify, weapon supplies will gradually dry up, and its long-term self-defense capabilities will be concerning. Simultaneously, due to the lack of a final settlement, investment will only trickle in slowly, national reconstruction will be hindered, and the risk of war reigniting will persist. Ultimately, the report points out that the winners in this scenario would likely be Trump (who could claim the achievement of "ending the war") and Putin (who, by prolonging negotiations, further weakens Ukraine and essentially achieves his strategic goals in a context where Ukraine cannot join NATO, its economy is struggling, and its military power is diminished). Therefore, 2025 may witness not the definitive end of the war, but the solidification of an unstable, low-intensity "liminal state."