Observation of the Three Carriages: Analysis Report on Russia's Military Operations

Key Chapter Title List

1. Acknowledgments and Project Background
2. Introduction: How Russia Fights
3. Command and Control
4. Maneuver and Movement
5. Intelligence
6. Fires
7. Appendices and Chapter Endnotes

Document Introduction

This report originates from an initiative by General Christopher G. Cavoli, former commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa. Facing a gap in the U.S. military's understanding of the Russian military post-2014, General Cavoli convened three Russian-speaking retired Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) in 2020 to form an expert group codenamed "Troika." Together, they developed the flagship training course on Russian methods of warfare—"The Russian Way of War" (RWOW). Following Russia's launch of its "Special Military Operation" (SMO) against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Troika immediately began real-time tracking and analysis of the conflict, sending daily unclassified observation reports to senior leadership. By the end of 2024, these reports reached over 3,500 recipients. This report is the final product of a systematic analysis and compilation of over two years and thousands of pages of these raw observation records, produced at the request of General Cavoli, now Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

The report's core analytical framework employs the six "Warfighting Functions" defined in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0—Command and Control, Maneuver and Movement, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, and Protection—to deconstruct the performance of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It is noteworthy that the Russian military itself does not use the concept of "warfighting functions," but this American taxonomy is adopted for ease of understanding and application by U.S. commanders and staff. The report covers observations from February 24, 2022, to May 1, 2024, primarily focusing on ground operations, as this constitutes the main form of Russia's SMO. The analysis reveals variations in Russian performance across different warfighting functions, with some aspects (e.g., Maneuver) deteriorating over time, while others (e.g., Fires and certain intelligence capabilities) demonstrate significant adaptation and improvement.

The "Command and Control" section delves into the fundamental differences in command philosophy between the Russian and U.S. militaries: the Russian military tends to view command and control as a predictable, calculable "science," relying on a highly centralized, hierarchical system; whereas the U.S. military emphasizes the "art" of command, granting subordinates greater decision-making autonomy (mission command). The report points out Russian deficiencies such as the lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps, inadequate training, corruption, and serious errors in initial force generation capabilities. However, it also acknowledges the Russian military's resilience and adaptive capacity as a learning organization within the brutal war of attrition. The "Maneuver and Movement" chapter details the Russian military's strategic mobility advantages, the role of airborne and naval infantry in seizing key terrain, and the evolution of ground forces from the disastrous mechanized assaults of 2022 to achieving limited tactical breakthroughs in 2024 through combined arms infantry-artillery tactics and exploitation of terrain and weather (e.g., dawn fog infiltration in the Battle of Avdiivka). The conclusion is that the Russian military failed to achieve synergy between "fires and maneuver," with its pattern resembling "fires, then maneuver."

The "Intelligence" chapter assesses the Russian military's serious intelligence failures at the strategic and operational levels, rooted in systemic misjudgment of Ukrainian will and capacity to resist, corruption, and the ineffectiveness of human intelligence (HUMINT). However, the report strongly emphasizes the revolutionary role of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) technology in compensating for Russian intelligence shortcomings and even catalyzing the realization of its "Reconnaissance-Strike Complex" (RUK) concept. Through improved drone Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), the Russian military significantly enhanced its ability to acquire actionable intelligence from operational depths and guide the precise coordination of various fires. The "Fires" chapter is a focal point of the report, clearly stating that by May 2024, Russian tactical and operational fires underwent a "dramatic improvement." They evolved from an early reliance on artillery mass and a crude model into a "joint" fires network capable of integrating Army artillery groups, Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Aerospace Forces' UMPK glide-guided bombs, and other means to conduct precise, coordinated strikes at operational depths exceeding 120 kilometers. Drones (especially the Orlan-30 and ZALA 421-16E2 series) played a central role in this process for target reconnaissance, fire correction, battle damage assessment, and communications relay.

In summary, this report is not a history of the war but a dynamic capability assessment based on sustained frontline observation. It aims to help U.S. and Western military professionals move beyond stereotypes of the Russian military, understanding its weaknesses exposed, resilience demonstrated, and alarming capacity for rapid learning and adaptation in this high-intensity conventional conflict. The report concludes by emphasizing that, despite numerous deficiencies, the Russian military remains an organization with a powerful learning capacity, and its ability to overcome difficulties and adjust its methods of warfare should not be underestimated. This compilation is based entirely on open-source and unclassified information, with all analysis stemming from the Troika's collective over 200 years of experience working on Russia and their close daily tracking of the conflict's developments.