Russian Military Performance and Prospects

Key Chapter Title List

1. Command and Control
2. Personnel Status
3. Casualty Situation
4. Recruitment and Mobilization
5. Equipment and Ammunition
6. Current Military Performance and Outlook
7. Defense Industry and Production
8. Tactical Adjustments and Combat Operations
9. External Support and Supply Chain
10. U.S. Policy and Congressional Considerations

Document Introduction

This report was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to provide a professional assessment for legislative debate on Russia's military performance and future capabilities in the war in Ukraine. Based on developments from the full-scale invasion in February 2022 to early 2025, the report systematically analyzes the structural and tactical reasons why the Russian military, despite its advantages in troop numbers and defense industrial potential, has failed to decisively defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The report provides an in-depth analysis of the multi-dimensional challenges faced by the Russian military. At the command and control level, despite attempts at reform, the Russian military maintains a Soviet-style centralized command system, leading to tactical rigidity and high casualties. In May 2024, President Putin's appointment of former economic official Andrey Belousov as Defense Minister is seen as a key signal of treating the war as a long-term challenge and emphasizing the management of economic and defense industrial resources. Regarding personnel, the report cites U.S. estimates as of April 2025, suggesting Russian military casualties may be as high as 790,000 to 900,000, with significant losses of experienced soldiers and junior officers, having an erosive effect on the force's long-term effectiveness.

In terms of troop replenishment, Russia maintains a monthly recruitment rate of approximately 30,000 through high signing bonuses, coercive measures, and "stop-loss" policies, but the problem of insufficient training is prominent. Equipment losses are similarly massive, with over 3,000 tanks destroyed. In response, Russia has mobilized its economy to a wartime footing, planning to allocate 40% of its 2025 federal budget to military and security sectors, with defense spending expected to account for 7.2% of GDP. Its defense production primarily focuses on refurbishing old equipment rather than manufacturing new models, and heavily relies on critical components, drones, and ammunition supplies from China, Iran, and North Korea.

Currently, Russian combat operations remain concentrated in eastern Ukraine, relying on firepower and numerical superiority to wage a war of attrition. However, the artillery advantage ratio has decreased from 10:1 in early 2024 to 1.5-2:1 in early 2025. Tactically, the Russian military has made adjustments, including focusing on small-unit assaults, upgrading communication systems, improving artillery targeting, and increasing the use of drones, glide bombs, and electronic warfare. It has also repeatedly adapted its logistics to the enhanced long-range strike capabilities of Ukrainian forces following Western aid.

The report concludes by noting that despite the Trump administration's efforts to promote negotiations to end the war, Russian military operations and long-range strikes continue. Some members of the U.S. Congress are calling for further sanctions on Russia's defense industry and military leadership, and express concern about the Russian military's potential for reconstitution and the long-term threat it poses to U.S. and European security interests. This assessment provides a critical basis for policymakers to analyze the battlefield situation, evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions, and consider further assistance to Ukraine.