Overview of Sanctions Against Russia by Third Countries

Key Chapter Title List

1. Overview of Sanctions Evasion
2. Efforts to Counter Sanctions Evasion
3. Countries Providing Military Support to Russia
4. Belarus
5. Iran
6. North Korea
7. China
8. Russian Oil and Gas Trade
9. India
10. Other Countries
11. Further Reading

Document Introduction

This briefing is based on a research report published by the UK House of Commons Library in October 2025. It aims to systematically review and analyze how the sanctions regime against Russia extends to third countries, as well as the effectiveness and challenges of this system in addressing evasion, curbing military support, and impacting energy trade. The report points out that the current sanctions against Russia do not originate from a United Nations Security Council resolution but are unilaterally implemented by a coalition led primarily by the Group of Seven (G7) and the European Union, encompassing over 30 countries globally (representing over 50% of the global economy). However, several countries, including China, India, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, explicitly do not support such unilateral sanctions, while Turkey and Serbia have also refused to implement them. This fundamentally calls into question the global uniformity and effectiveness of the sanctions.

The report has a clear structure. First, it examines in detail the primary methods Russia uses to evade sanctions. This includes using Middle Eastern, South Caucasus, and Central Asian countries that have close ties with Russia and maintain a neutral stance in the Ukraine conflict as trade transit hubs, significantly increasing bilateral trade with Russia, particularly in components and dual-use goods and technologies. Furthermore, to counter sanctions, especially global oil and gas trade restrictions, Russia has developed new evasion methods, such as extensively utilizing a "shadow fleet" of vessels with unclear ownership registered in non-sanction-supporting countries to transport sanctioned Russian crude oil, thereby circumventing the G7-imposed oil price cap. The report notes that as the sanctions regime evolves, the G7 and the EU are increasingly focusing their efforts on preventing evasion and plugging existing loopholes. To this end, they have introduced the Common High Priority Items List (CHP) to prevent key military goods from being re-exported to Russia via third countries, and have targeted individuals and entities in third countries, as well as parties supporting the operation of the "shadow fleet," for sanctions.

Secondly, the report provides an in-depth analysis of countries accused of directly providing military support to Russia's war efforts in Ukraine, namely Belarus, Iran, North Korea, and China. The report assesses in detail the specific forms and extent of support from each country, as well as the international community's sanctions responses. For example, Belarus is identified as a "co-aggressor," providing military staging grounds, logistical support, and missile launch sites; Iran has supplied drones to Russia and is accused of transferring ballistic missiles; North Korea has sent significant quantities of ammunition, missiles, and possibly even deployed military personnel to Russia; while China, although not directly providing lethal weapons, is said to have played a "decisive" role in sustaining Russia's defense industrial base through the provision of dual-use items and technologies. The report also notes that the focus of U.S. sanctions has shifted between different administrations (particularly between the Biden and Trump administrations), and its sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and China have not consistently focused on their support for Russia's war.

Finally, the report explores issues concerning third countries involved in Russian oil and gas trade, using India as a focal case study. India has significantly increased its imports of Russian crude oil since the outbreak of the conflict, drawing criticism for undermining the effectiveness of Western sanctions. The report mentions the controversy surrounding Indian refineries processing Russian crude and re-exporting its products to European and American markets, as well as the "origin-switching" loophole in relevant sanctions rules. In August 2025, the U.S. Trump administration imposed additional tariffs on Indian goods due to India's imports of Russian oil, marking the first time a country faced such secondary sanctions for this type of trade. However, as of the report's writing, the UK, the EU, and other G7 members had not taken similar tariff measures against India, although they had sanctioned some Indian companies suspected of exporting CHP-listed items to Russia or assisting in circumventing oil trade bans. The report also points out that China and the EU itself are also significant importers of Russian energy, highlighting the complexity and inconsistency within the sanctions coalition regarding energy trade sanctions.

Overall, this briefing, based on detailed official documents, statements, sanctions lists, and think-tank research data, presents readers with a multi-dimensional and dynamic picture of how sanctions against Russia are implemented, evaded, and countered at the international level. It not only reveals the coordination challenges and policy divergences faced by the sanctions coalition but also reflects the restructuring of global geo-economic relations and the inherent limitations of sanctions as a policy tool. The report concludes with a further reading list, providing authoritative sources for in-depth researchers to extend their analysis.