"'...": Rakhine State has become a de facto competing power center.
Based on the evolution of the annual war situation and strategic analysis, this report provides an in-depth assessment of the Arakan Army's ( ) military expansion, alliance network construction, governance challenges, as well as its role, limitations, and future prospects as a de facto power center in western Myanmar.
Detail
Published
22/12/2025
List of Key Chapter Titles
- Summary: Rakhine State – A De Facto Rival Power Center
- Events: Escalation of Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis Since 2025
- Preliminary Analysis: The Strategic Characteristics and Power Projection of the Arakan Army
- The Three Key Challenges Facing the Arakan Army
- Advancement Beyond Rakhine Borders: Map of Military Control Areas
- Post-Coup Alliance Network: The Patronage Role of the Arakan Army
- Heating Up of the Western Battlefield: Analysis of Conflict Data Trends
- Scenario Forecast: Myanmar's Future with Multiple Parallel Paths
- Appendix I: Profile of Arakan Army Leaders
- Appendix II: Three Major Tactical Innovations of the Arakan Army
- Appendix III: The Challenge of the Rohingya Issue
- Appendix IV: The Socio-Economic Landscape of Rakhine State
Document Introduction
This report was published by the Institute for Strategy and Policy - Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar) in July 2025, serving as the final installment of its trilogy "Conflict Resolution and Future Prospects for Myanmar Requiring Guardrails." The report focuses on the sharply escalating armed conflict in Rakhine State in western Myanmar since early 2025. Its core argument is that, under the military success and effective control of the Arakan Army (AA), Rakhine State has evolved into a "de facto rival power center," posing a substantive challenge to Myanmar's state power structure.
The report first outlines the current severe battlefield and humanitarian situation. Since February 2025, intense fighting between the Arakan Army and Myanmar's State Administration Council (SAC) in Rakhine State has caused massive displacement, with over 700,000 people becoming refugees, accounting for nearly 23% of the state's population. Concurrently, seasonal flooding has exacerbated food shortages, while the plight of nearly one million Rohingya refugees continues to deteriorate, with relatively limited international attention and aid. The report also mentions the controversy sparked by the Arakan Army's incorporation of the Paletwa area in Chin State into Rakhine's administrative divisions, as well as the internal disagreements accompanying preliminary discussions between Bangladesh and the AA regarding the establishment of a humanitarian corridor.
In the strategic analysis section, the report points out that the Arakan Army is the only Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) in Myanmar capable of projecting power from its base in Rakhine State into the Bamar heartland "dry zones" such as Ayeyarwady, Magway, and Bago. Its strategy is summarized as "expanding the courtyard, building high fences, and securing reliable gatekeepers." This means relying on the Rakhine stronghold, using rugged terrain and strategic alliances with numerous young armed groups as "fences" to extend its influence into Chin State, Magway, and other areas. The Arakan Army tends to establish action-oriented, militarily-focused "younger brother" alliance networks rather than engaging in politically binding "empty talk" alliances, which has allowed it to build the most extensive armed alliance system in post-coup Myanmar.
However, the report emphasizes that the Arakan Army's long-term political goals maintain "strategic ambiguity." Its ultimate demands—independence, confederation, or participation in building a federal democratic state—remain unclear. While this ambiguity provides flexibility, it also presents fundamental challenges. The report systematically elaborates on the three core challenges facing the Arakan Army as a de facto power center: First, the normative challenge of how to handle the historically entrenched Rohingya and Chin issues justly and inclusively, which directly relates to its governance legitimacy. Second, the strategic challenge of whether it can translate military victories into sustainable political outcomes by establishing effective governance, public services, and economic systems, especially while carefully formulating its China policy in the face of China's geostrategic considerations regarding the Two Oceans Strategy. Third, the tactical challenge of multiplied logistical and supply pressures due to extended frontlines and tightening external (particularly Chinese) restrictions on the flow of weapons and resources, while also needing to counter the military government's advantages in air and naval power and conscription.
The report uses a series of maps and data charts (ISP Mapping No. 103, 104; Data Matters No. 163, 164) to visually demonstrate the Arakan Army's control over more than 93% of Rakhine State's territory, its military infiltration into surrounding areas, and the activity network of at least 23 armed groups it supports across 61 townships nationwide. Conflict data indicates that although conflict frequency in Rakhine State saw a short-term decline after the capture of the military government's Western Command at the end of 2024, Myanmar's overall conflict risk remains high.
Finally, the report provides a scenario forecast for Myanmar's future, suggesting that in the foreseeable future, the northeastern, southeastern, and western corridors of Myanmar, due to their differing political objectives, will find it difficult to jointly pressure Naypyidaw or unite around a unified new national vision. Myanmar's political landscape will continue to exhibit characteristics of "multiple parallel paths." The Arakan Army needs to maintain balance and clarity in navigating three major "external relationship temptations": its relations with Bamar actors (whether the military government or democratic forces), other EAOs, and India, Bangladesh, and Western governments. These relationships can serve as "guardrails" for its position but may also lead to strategic overextension.
This report is based on ISP-Myanmar's Conflict, Peace, and Security Studies (CPSS) project. It comprehensively employs methods such as event tracking, data analysis, strategic assessment, and geographic information visualization to provide a deep, professional analytical framework for understanding the dynamics of conflict in western Myanmar, the rise of the Arakan Army, and its profound implications for Myanmar's national future.