Military and Democracy: The Military Politics of Pakistan

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. Introduction
2. Waging War, Building the State
3. Moving Towards Martial Law
4. From "Revolution" to Rebellion
5. Regaining Control of the State
6. From Zia to Musharraf
7. Musharraf and Military Professionalism
8. The Military and Democracy
9. Conclusion

Document Introduction

This study delves deeply into the core role of the Pakistani military in domestic politics and its profound impact on democratic development. The report's central argument is that the custodial beliefs and norms developed by the Pakistani military during its formative period—specifically within the context of geopolitical insecurity and nation-building challenges in the early years of the state—have profoundly shaped and continuously legitimized the authoritarian expansion of its role in the state and society.

Through the lens of historical institutionalism, the report systematically traces the roots of the imbalance in Pakistan's civil-military relations since its independence in 1947. The analysis points out that the persistent conflict with India, internal contradictions during the early nation-building process (particularly the ethno-linguistic rift between East and West Pakistan), and the rapid modernization of the Pakistani military through U.S. security assistance during the Cold War collectively contributed to the military's institutionalized advantage over weak civilian institutions. This advantage is not only reflected in resource allocation but has also been internalized as a belief within the officer corps that it holds a privileged role in governance and defining national interests.

The analysis of this study is based on extensive military materials, including interviews with officers, military professional publications, as well as curricula, research papers, and strategic documents from the National Defence University of Pakistan. These internal perspectives provide crucial insights into the mindset of the officer corps, their perception of their appropriate role, and their conditional acceptance of democratic institutions. The report examines in detail successive military regimes and transition periods from Ayub Khan to Yahya Khan, and then to Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf, revealing the institutional logic behind military interventions and the continuity of the "custodial" mentality.

The study finds that the professionalization of the Pakistani military has not distanced it from politics; instead, it has stimulated its interest in solving political problems through military methods and skills. This norm of "custodial professionalism" is reinforced through continuous socialization processes (such as National Defence University education) and promotion/selection mechanisms, leading the officer corps to generally view itself as the ultimate arbiter of national interests and a temporary governor when necessary. The report concludes by assessing the prospects for democratizing civil-military relations in Pakistan against the backdrop of rising new power centers like the media and judiciary, and discusses the comparative significance of this research for other countries, such as Egypt and Myanmar, undergoing transitions from military authoritarian rule.