Europe and the Second Cold War in Submarine Cable Networks

Key Chapter Title List

1. The Second Cold War Beneath the Seabed
2. Europe's Challenge in the Cable Competition
3. Cooperation of European Companies and the Dilemma of Strategic Autonomy
4. The Multiple Roots of Europe's Vulnerability
5. Sabotage Operations in the Baltic Sea
6. The "Xin Xin Bei Ji Xiong" Incident
7. The "Yi Peng 3" Incident and the Shift in EU Response
8. The "Eagle S" Incident: Europe's Firm Response
9. Subsequent Measures by NATO and the EU
10. Conclusion: The EU in Communication Infrastructure

Document Introduction

As the competition between China and the US over global infrastructure networks intensifies, submarine cables—the invisible critical infrastructure carrying 97% of global data traffic—have become a new frontier in geopolitical rivalry. This report focuses on a series of suspected deliberate sabotage incidents targeting submarine cables and energy pipelines in the Baltic Sea between 2023 and 2025. It provides an in-depth analysis of how these events have exposed Europe's strategic vulnerabilities in the field of digital infrastructure and reveals how, against the backdrop of the so-called "Second Cold War," Europe is evolving from a traditional geopolitical battleground into a focal point of digital infrastructure competition and a target of hybrid threats.

The report first traces the two waves of development in the global submarine cable network and the economic and technological drivers behind them. It then outlines the competitive landscape where China and the US are reshaping the global cable supply chain and network layout through means such as state subsidies, sanctions, and market access restrictions. Against this backdrop, the report analyzes the unique dilemma faced by Europe: on one hand, as a global cable hub (e.g., Marseille, Sicily, Canary Islands), Europe is deeply embedded in the transatlantic digital network dominated by US tech giants; on the other hand, driven by complex considerations of economic interests and strategic autonomy, European countries have not fully aligned with the US position and continue to selectively support projects involving Chinese companies. The EU's dependence in cable manufacturing (with only four major suppliers), concerns over potential surveillance risks, and its geographical characteristics of numerous islands and interwoven maritime areas together form the basis of its vulnerability.

The core of the report is a detailed case study of three landmark incidents between October 2023 and December 2024: the damage to Estonia-Sweden and Finland cables and a natural gas pipeline involving the Chinese container ship "Xin Xin Bei Ji Xiong"; the cutting of cables connecting Finland-Germany and Sweden-Lithuania by the Chinese vessel "Yi Peng 3" and the subsequent EU diplomatic and law enforcement responses; and the damage to the Finland-Estonia power and fiber optic cables by the oil tanker "Eagle S," flying the Cook Islands flag and suspected of belonging to Russia's "shadow fleet." The report details the course of events, national investigation processes, diplomatic engagements (including communications with the Chinese government), and particularly emphasizes that the "Eagle S" incident marked a turning point in Europe's response strategy—the Finnish Coast Guard's first interception and boarding inspection in international waters, demonstrating a more assertive posture.

Based on these events, the report further discusses policy adjustments at the European and NATO levels. These include calls from Finland, Sweden, and others to invoke NATO's Article 4 for collective consultation, NATO's announcement of enhanced air and sea patrols in the Baltic Sea, and the European Commission's adoption of the "Recommendation on Security and Resilience of Submarine Cable Infrastructure" and increased investment in cable projects through the digital component of the "Connecting Europe Facility." These measures aim to enhance network resilience by building redundant routes (including new paths connecting Asia via the Arctic) and strengthening stress tests. The report concludes by noting that although the EU is aware of the threats and has begun to act, uncertainties in transatlantic relations, internal competition among member states over cable market interests, and the fact that security policy remains primarily a national competence severely hinder the EU's ability to form a unified and coherent submarine infrastructure strategy. This strategic deficit not only limits its ability to influence future network development but also leaves it persistently exposed to hybrid threats in its surrounding waters, reflecting the violent edge of the "Second Cold War" on Europe's frontier.