European Security and Defense Cost Analysis Report: Russian Threat and NATO Defense Strategy

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. Comparison of Weapons and Equipment
2. Analysis of Personnel and Casualties
3. Military Expenditure and Economic Foundation
4. Analysis of Russian Intentions (Putinology)
5. The Concept of a European Army
6. A Critical Discussion on the "2% Target"
7. What Capabilities Should Military Spending Buy?
8. The More Severe Situation During the Cold War
9. Strategic Stability and Arms Control
10. Europe's Relationship with the Ukraine War

Document Introduction

This report, written by Marco de Andrés in February 2025, aims to provide a systematic assessment of European military security and its costs. Framed against the backdrop of Russia as Europe's only potential military threat since the end of World War II, it focuses on analyzing the comparative posture between NATO Europe and Russia in terms of conventional military forces, personnel structure, and military expenditure. It also delves into the rationality of current European defense policies, issues of internal NATO coordination, and the pathways and challenges for Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy.

The report first compares the quantities of main battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters between NATO Europe and Russia. This comparison is based on the weapon classification framework of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and cites data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' "The Military Balance" 2021 and 2024 editions. The analysis shows that, even excluding the United States and Canada, NATO Europe maintains significant quantitative and qualitative advantages in the vast majority of equipment categories. The war in Ukraine has further consumed a large amount of Russia's active and stockpiled equipment, while NATO's losses have been relatively limited. In terms of naval power, NATO also possesses an overwhelming advantage. Based on this, the report argues that Russia has been significantly weakened by its war of aggression against Ukraine and is unlikely to recover to its pre-war military level before 2030 at the earliest. Its ability to pose a substantive conventional military challenge to NATO Europe is severely overestimated.

The report then proceeds to analyze from the perspectives of personnel casualties, economic support, and military expenditure. Russia has suffered its heaviest personnel losses since World War II in Ukraine, placing severe pressure on its active and reserve forces. In contrast, NATO Europe holds an advantage in the number of active personnel, and its collective GDP and military spending (even calculated by purchasing power parity) far exceed Russia's. In 2024, NATO's actual defense spending increased by 11%, with the European portion growing by 18%, further widening the gap with Russia. However, the report criticizes the current discussion within NATO surrounding the "2% of GDP" spending target as being detached from actual military needs, degenerating into political posturing and a resource competition, and lacking a clear definition of "what specific military capabilities need to be purchased."

Addressing the issue of European defense autonomy, the report points out that the most fundamental disadvantage of NATO Europe currently lies in its fragmented structure composed of numerous sovereign states, which lacks unified political will and a military command system. If the United States gradually or completely withdraws from European defense, Europe would struggle to maintain the existing security architecture. The report proposes the establishment of a "European Army" as a fundamental solution. By emulating the creation path of the Eurozone, it would gradually integrate military budgets, equipment procurement, operational command, and the industrial base. This would achieve economies of scale in the long term, eliminate "free-riding," and ultimately attain genuine strategic autonomy. However, this concept faces profound political divisions within the EU between the "pro-American, anti-Russian" camp (represented by Baltic states, Nordic countries, and some Eastern European nations) and the "moderate integration" camp (represented by founding Western European countries like France, Germany, and Italy).

Finally, the report reviews the more severe military posture NATO faced during the Cold War, emphasizing that Europe's current security environment is actually far more favorable than it was then. The author calls for Europe to prioritize promoting stability with Russia through arms control and establishing a "structural defense" posture after the Ukraine war ends, rather than falling into an endless arms race. The report criticizes NATO's handling of the Ukraine issue in 2008 and between 2021-2022, arguing that Europe, driven by the United States, became entangled in an avoidable crisis, leading to severe economic and political costs for itself.

This report comprehensively utilizes open-source military force data, economic indicators, political statements, and historical comparative analysis. It provides a data-based critical perspective for professional readers to understand the true balance of Europe's defense posture, its cost-effectiveness dilemmas, and future strategic choices.