Current Status and Impact of Russia's Control over EU Nuclear Power: Annual Update Report

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. Overview of Fuel Suppliers in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia, and Ukraine (as of April 2025)
2. European Utility Companies and Rosatom
3. Rosatom Reactor Exports and Subsequent Fuel and Services
4. The Lingen VVER Fuel Plant – A Source of Independent VVER Fuel or a Kremlin Outpost in Europe?
5. Company Ownership Structure
6. Licensed Fuel Manufacturing
7. Development of Framatome's Proprietary Fuel Design
8. Framatome's Fuel Design Development Utilizing Euratom Funds
9. Market Prospects for Framatome Fuel
10. Security Issues

Document Introduction

This report is the 2025 update to the research series "Russian Control over EU Nuclear Power," authored by Patricia Lorenz, an expert with long-term involvement in anti-nuclear movements and nuclear policy research. The report focuses on the current situation where Russia continues to exert influence on the nuclear energy sectors of some EU member states through nuclear fuel supply and reactor construction. The core of the research lies in analyzing the efforts, progress, and underlying obstacles faced by countries within the EU using Russian VVER-type reactors in diversifying their nuclear fuel supply, against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and EU sanctions on Russia.

The report has a clear structure, beginning with a country-by-country review of the current status of nuclear fuel supply contracts in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The study finds that different countries have adopted varied diversification strategies: Bulgaria's Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant has begun using Westinghouse's VVER-1000 fuel; the Czech ČEZ company is collaborating with European VVER operators to develop a "fully European sovereign" nuclear fuel product; while Finland's Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is testing Westinghouse's VVER-440 fuel, its supply contract with TVEL extends until 2030; Slovakia, despite signing memoranda of understanding with Framatome and Westinghouse, recently extended its contract with TVEL until 2030; Hungary, while persisting in advancing the Paks II project with Rosatom, has also signed a fuel supply agreement with Framatome; Ukraine, except for the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, has fully switched to using Westinghouse fuel. These cases demonstrate that the process of decoupling from Russian fuel supply is complex and uneven, intertwined with economic considerations, technical feasibility, and political will.

The second part of the report delves into an analysis of the Framatome nuclear fuel plant project located in Lingen, Germany, which is seen as key to Europe's ability to establish a VVER fuel supply chain independent of Russia. The plant plans to produce VVER fuel through a joint venture between Framatome and Rosatom called "European Hexagon Fuel GmbH," with Framatome holding a 75% stake and Rosatom 25%. The report questions whether this move essentially achieves genuine "supply chain independence," or instead allows Russia to maintain long-term influence in the core of Europe's nuclear energy sector through technology licensing and the supply of key components (such as fuel rod cladding). The report details the legal disputes, public participation, and expert hearings during the plant's licensing application process, revealing serious safety concerns held by German federal and local environmental authorities regarding this project.

The analysis in this report is based on publicly available expert opinions, media reports, official documents, and consultations with experts and officials in the field. The report does not presuppose fixed conclusions but, by presenting facts and multiple perspectives, guides readers to consider a fundamental question: Against the backdrop of highly tense geopolitical circumstances in Europe, does maintaining deep technical cooperation with Rosatom, which is directly controlled by the Kremlin, contradict the EU's goals of energy sovereignty and security? Expert opinions cited in the report (such as Professor Roller's legal assessment for the German Federal Ministry for the Environment) clearly point out that such cooperation could pose multiple security risks, including misuse of nuclear materials, infrastructure sabotage, information leakage, and the exertion of influence by foreign governments. Ultimately, the report reveals the triple challenges—technical, economic, and geopolitical—faced by the EU on its path to reducing dependence on Russia in the nuclear energy field. This process is far from over, and its prospects remain significantly uncertain.