Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, –

Key Chapter Titles

1. Biological Warfare and Scientific Expertise
2. Bacteriological Warfare as a Public Health Threat
3. Hankey's "Further Measures"
4. The Expansion of Biological Warfare Research
5. The "Red Admiral" Plan
6. Biological Warfare Trials
7. The Evolution of Biological Weapons Policy
8. New Threats
9. Manufacturing Threats

Document Introduction

This report, based on recently declassified top-secret government committee documents, memoranda, and correspondence records from The Public Record Office in the UK, systematically reconstructs for the first time the complete historical trajectory of British biological warfare (BW) policy from the 1930s to the mid-1960s. The core focus of the report is to analyze how scientific experts provided advice to their government in an environment of "secret fear" characterized by extreme information scarcity and highly uncertain threat nature, and how they interacted with policymakers and military planners in the process, collectively shaping the definition, assessment, and corresponding research and defense policies regarding the BW threat.

The research began in the 1930s when the British government first became concerned due to public rumors about German spies conducting BW tests in the London Underground. A small expert panel was convened, led by Medical Research Council (MRC) scientists such as John Ledingham and William Topley. At this stage, the experts constructed a unique "public health" definition of biological warfare, arguing that the primary threat came not from deliberately designed biological weapons, but from epidemics caused by the collapse of sanitation systems and water contamination resulting from conventional bombing. This definition directly led to the establishment of the UK's Emergency Public Health Laboratory Service and dominated pre-war defensive policy.

The outbreak of World War II marked a major turning point in policy. Driven by figures such as Lord Maurice Hankey, Britain bypassed the skeptical Biological Warfare Committee and secretly authorized the establishment of a Biology Department at Porton Down, led by Paul Fildes. This initiated an offensive research program under the guise of "defensive research," which was actually aimed at developing a "like-for-like retaliation" capability. Research during this phase focused on anthrax, successfully developing an economic warfare weapon using contaminated cattle cakes and an anthrax bomb prototype, with secret field trials conducted on Gruinard Island. The course of the war, the ambiguity of intelligence, and cooperation with the United States and Canada collectively reinforced an offensive threat perception centered on the "bomb" and a policy logic of "defense through offense."

After the war, biological warfare research was not terminated; instead, it was elevated to the highest priority level alongside the atomic bomb within the Cold War context, categorized as a "weapon of mass destruction." A complex network of interdepartmental committees (such as the Biological Warfare Sub-Committee, the Biological Research Advisory Board) was established to coordinate policy and R&D. The "Red Admiral" plan aimed to develop strategic biological bombs for the Royal Air Force, while also planning a large-scale pathogen production pilot plant and a series of sea-based pathogen trials. However, despite significant investment and ambitious plans, a policy "drift" began in the early 1950s. The Air Force canceled specific biological bomb requirements, the pilot plant project was repeatedly delayed and ultimately shelved, and the priority of offensive research gradually gave way to defense.

The report provides an in-depth analysis of the multiple factors behind this shift: including reliance on American production capacity, the squeeze on the defense budget due to the rise of nuclear deterrence strategy, the persistent uncertainty regarding the actual effectiveness of biological weapons, and the ambiguous handling of policy decisions made "by proxy." Ultimately, Britain de facto shifted to a defensive policy without a clear, formal Cabinet resolution. However, the research establishment at Porton Down survived and was reshaped through conceptual "opportunism." Scientists proposed the "area coverage" concept as a new primary threat paradigm, shifting the focus from bombs to large-area aerosol spray attacks. This provided a new theoretical basis for continued outdoor trials (using inert and live simulants), early warning, and detection method research, injecting new vitality into biological warfare research within a defensive framework.

This report is not only a technical history of the British biological warfare program but also a case study in the "politics of expertise" and the "sociology of risk." It reveals the complex process of mutual construction between scientific advice, policymaking, institutional interests, international alliances, and evolving threat assessments under conditions of high secrecy. It holds significant historical reference value for understanding contemporary biosecurity, weapons of mass destruction control, and the role of scientific advisors in national security decision-making.