Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for the Navy

Key Chapter Title List

1. Executive Summary
2. Overview of the Mine Warfare Problem
3. Fundamental Cross-Cutting Issues
4. U.S. Navy Mine and Mining Operations
5. Sea (Offshore) Mine Countermeasures Operations
6. Littoral (Inshore) Mine Countermeasures Operations

Document Introduction

This report is an in-depth independent study conducted by the "Mine Warfare Assessment Committee" organized by the Naval Studies Board under the National Research Council, at the request of the Chief of Naval Operations. The study aims to comprehensively examine the operational and technical challenges faced by the U.S. Navy in the field of mine warfare (including mining and mine countermeasures) as it entered the 21st century. Based on nine months of intensive research by the committee from August 2000 to April 2001, including dozens of service briefings, site visits, and expert deliberations, the report systematically assesses the current status, deficiencies, and future development directions of the U.S. Navy's mine warfare capabilities.

The report begins by clearly stating that mines, as a low-cost, high-effectiveness "asymmetric" threat, are posing an increasingly serious challenge to U.S. Navy mobility and power projection in littoral waters through their proliferation and technological advancement. Historical data shows that since World War II, mines have caused more damage to U.S. Navy vessels than missiles, air strikes, and submarine attacks. However, the U.S. Navy has historically underestimated the importance of mine warfare, treating it as a secondary operational domain, leading to long-term underinvestment in related budgets, training, career development, and equipment modernization. As the Navy's strategic focus shifts to "Forward...From the Sea" littoral operations, this capability shortfall has become a core risk that urgently needs to be addressed.

The main body of the report delves into analysis around several key areas. First, it explores the necessity of establishing mine warfare as a "primary naval warfare area" on par with air, surface, and submarine warfare, and proposes a systematic "mainstreaming" implementation path involving doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. Second, the report strongly emphasizes the foundational role of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) for mine warfare, criticizing the severe shortcomings in current ISR mission planning, environmental database development, and utilization of threat mine technology. Third, the report warns that the U.S. Navy's offensive mining capability is rapidly atrophying, with an aging mine inventory and research, development, and procurement plans nearly at zero, losing an option as an important strategic and tactical coercive tool.

Regarding mine countermeasures capabilities, the report distinguishes between two areas for assessment: sea (water depths greater than 40 feet) and littoral (40 feet to the beach). For sea mine countermeasures, the report provides a detailed assessment of existing dedicated MCM forces (such as MCM/MHC class ships, MH-53E helicopters, Explosive Ordnance Disposal units) and the seven organic MCM systems under development at the time (such as the Remote Minehunting System, Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, etc.), pointing out their fatal flaws of lacking a top-level operational concept, system integration architecture, and clearly defined capability requirements. For the more challenging littoral mine countermeasures, the report notes that this area is the weakest link in current capabilities, heavily reliant on a small number of EOD/very shallow water teams, unable to meet the demand for rapid lane clearance in large-scale amphibious assaults, and discusses the potential of alternative forcible breaching options such as "Harvest Hammer".

Finally, the report distills seven high-priority top-level recommendations aimed at comprehensively enhancing the U.S. Navy's mine warfare readiness. These recommendations cover mainstreaming mine warfare, strengthening ISR, rebuilding a credible joint mining capability, modernizing dedicated MCM forces, integrating organic MCM systems, improving littoral MCM capabilities and clarifying service responsibilities, and reducing friendly vulnerability to the mine threat. This report is not only a technical assessment but also a call for necessary change regarding U.S. Navy culture, organizational priorities, and resource allocation, providing decision-makers, planners, and operators with a fact-based, sobering examination and a clear roadmap for action.