Analysis of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Policies and Their Impacts

Key Chapter Title List

1. Current Status of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing and the Voluntary Moratorium
2. Restrictions on U.S. Nuclear Testing
3. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the U.S. Position
4. Foreign Nuclear Testing Activities and Compliance
5. Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program and Subcritical Experiments
6. U.S. Test Readiness Status and Timeline
7. Potential Impacts and Policy Debate on Resuming Nuclear Testing
8. Disclaimer

Document Introduction

This report, based on professional analysis from the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), systematically examines U.S. nuclear weapons testing policy, alternative technical pathways for maintaining the reliability of the nuclear arsenal, and the ongoing strategic debate surrounding whether to resume nuclear testing, since the implementation of the voluntary moratorium on explosive nuclear testing in 1992. The report focuses on multidimensional factors including domestic legal frameworks, international treaty obligations, technical readiness status, and geopolitical interactions, providing an authoritative perspective for understanding the evolution and current challenges of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy.

The report first outlines the voluntary moratorium status adhered to by the United States since 1992, although it retains the capability to resume testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The core alternative is the "Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship" program implemented since 1993, which aims to ensure the "safety, security, and effectiveness" of the nuclear arsenal through computational simulations, subcritical experiments, and other non-explosive means. The report mentions rumors in 2020 that Trump administration officials discussed conducting a nuclear test, but notes that subsequent administrations have reaffirmed the moratorium stance.

In the section on legal and treaty frameworks, the report details the multiple layers restricting U.S. nuclear testing: including the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (prohibiting atmospheric, outer space, and underwater tests), the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (prohibiting underground tests exceeding 150 kilotons), and the 1992 Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment with domestic legal effect. This amendment mandates a moratorium on underground nuclear testing but includes a "retaliatory" clause allowing the U.S. to resume testing if another state conducts a test. The report also provides an in-depth analysis of the status of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), pointing out that while the U.S. has signed it, it has not ratified it, and the treaty has not entered into force due to non-ratification by specific states. The report pays particular attention to Russia's withdrawal of its ratification in 2023, as well as the U.S. government's ongoing questioning of whether China and Russia are complying with the "zero-yield" standard.

At the technical and management level, the report explains the specific measures taken by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to maintain readiness through the Stockpile Stewardship Program, including formulating the annual Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), and maintaining "readiness to conduct an underground nuclear explosive test if necessary." According to policy settings, the U.S. goal is to resume testing within 24-36 months after a presidential decision, but the actual timeline is significantly affected by compliance with environmental, health, and safety regulations, which the President can waive in a national emergency.

Finally, the report comprehensively assesses the broad strategic impacts that resuming nuclear testing could trigger. Proponents argue that testing could be used for negotiation leverage or to maintain a technological advantage over China and Russia; opponents warn that it could stimulate adversaries to restart testing, trigger an arms race, damage the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and pose risks to the environment and public health in Nevada. These debates highlight the fundamental policy trade-offs between maintaining nuclear deterrence reliability, adhering to international norms, and managing potential escalation risks.

The information contained in this report is derived from original analysis provided by CRS to Congress. The content is professional and objective, providing indispensable in-depth reference for defense policy researchers, arms control analysts, and geopolitical observers.