USAID Gaza Response Assessment: Maritime Corridor Humanitarian Aid Distribution Blocked

Key Chapter Title List

1. Summary
2. Introduction
3. Background
4. External Factors Hindering USAID's Distribution of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza via JLOTS
5. DoD and IDF Requirements Prioritized Over Humanitarian Response Needs in JLOTS Planning
6. Weather, Security, and Access Constraints Weakened USAID's Ability to Distribute Aid via JLOTS
7. USAID Relied on Existing Controls to Oversee Humanitarian Aid Distribution in Gaza
8. Conclusion
9. Appendix A: Scope and Methodology
10. Appendix B: Key Contributors to This Report

Document Introduction

On October 7, 2023, Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, invaded southwestern Israel, resulting in over 1,200 deaths and 253 people taken hostage. Israel subsequently declared war on Hamas and imposed a comprehensive blockade on Gaza, plunging over 2 million residents into a crisis of severed access to food, medicine, and other supplies. Within ten months of the war's outbreak, nearly 40,000 Gazans had died, with approximately 96% of the population facing severe food insecurity and a high risk of famine.

To alleviate the humanitarian crisis, the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) began collaborating with the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) in October 2023 to provide aid to Gaza via land crossings from Israel and Egypt. In March 2024, President Biden ordered the Department of Defense to establish a temporary maritime corridor as a supplement to land-based aid, known as the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) system. This system transports aid to Gaza via ships, floating platforms, and a temporary beach pier from Cyprus. Planned to operate for 90 days, aiming to assist 500,000 people per month at a cost of approximately $230 million, the project was completed on May 16, 2024.

This report presents an evaluation conducted by the USAID Office of Inspector General. Its core objective was to review USAID's planning, execution, and oversight of humanitarian aid distribution via the JLOTS maritime corridor. The evaluation was conducted in June-July 2024 based on relevant quality standards, through analysis of USAID planning documents, risk assessment reports, project updates, and interviews with BHA and WFP officials.

The evaluation found that external factors were the primary reasons the JLOTS aid did not achieve its intended results. During the planning phase, the operational and security requirements of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were prioritized over humanitarian response needs, requiring USAID and WFP to adjust their plans accordingly. During operations, severe weather in the Mediterranean caused structural damage to the pier, which operated only intermittently for 20 days before being shut down on July 17, 2024. Security risks within Gaza (including looting of aid vehicles and attacks on warehouses), community misconceptions about the neutrality of aid, and restrictions on overland transport routes further hindered aid distribution. Ultimately, JLOTS delivered only enough aid to feed 450,000 people for one month, falling far short of the goal of assisting 1.5 million people cumulatively over three months.

Although JLOTS represented a new method for USAID to deliver aid to Gaza, it still relied on existing risk assessment and monitoring mechanisms for oversight. Due to the unstable environment in Gaza, USAID could not conduct direct on-the-ground monitoring and primarily exercised oversight by receiving WFP project updates and incident reports and holding regular meetings. These practices align with internal guidance for aid monitoring in non-permissive environments. While the report does not make specific recommendations, it emphasizes that USAID should draw lessons from the JLOTS experience regarding coordination, stakeholder collaboration, and contingency planning in conflict environments.