Balance of Peril: The Political Landscape and Policy Direction After Japan's House of Representatives Election
In-depth analysis focusing on the core controversies of the year and month elections, the dilemmas faced by the ruling coalition, the challenges of coalition integration, as well as the constitutional amendment process and adjustments in foreign policy.
Detail
Published
23/12/2025
Key Chapter Title List
- Election Core Focus: Political Donation Scandal
- Election Results and Seat Distribution Trends
- Possible Political Landscape: LDP-Komeito Minority Government
- Realistic Challenges in Integrating an Opposition Alliance
- Freeze in the Constitutional Amendment Process
- Policy Priorities of the Ishiba Administration
- Cautious Adjustments in Security and Foreign Policy
- Key Observations on Japan-China and Japan-US Diplomatic Interactions
- The Decisive Significance of the 2025 House of Councillors Election
- Governing Risks and Critical Test Period for the Ishiba Administration
Document Introduction
The October 2024 Japanese House of Representatives general election, centered on the political donation scandal, became an "electoral judgment" by the opposition and media against the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), ultimately reshaping Japan's political landscape. In this election, 28 implicated lawmakers from the Abe faction lost their seats. The ruling coalition of the LDP and Komeito failed to reach the 233-seat majority threshold; even with the support of six like-minded independent lawmakers, their total seats amounted to only 221.
The largest opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), saw its seats significantly increase to 148. However, its proportional representation votes increased by only 70,000. This phenomenon reflects a punitive voting tendency among the Japanese public towards the ruling LDP, while also indicating no clear intent to hand power to the CDP. Despite the LDP's severe defeat, mainstream media polls showed nearly 60% of voters believed Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba did not need to resign, confirming that voters' core demand was accountability for those involved in the scandal, not a rejection of the newly formed Ishiba administration.
The report analyzes possible post-election political scenarios, pointing out that the CDP faces multiple obstacles in forming a "pan-opposition alliance"—it would need to integrate almost all opposition party seats to achieve a stable majority. Divergences among parties on constitutional amendment stances and the issue of involving the Japanese Communist Party (66 seats) make it difficult for parties like Nippon Ishin no Kai and the Democratic Party for the People to join. In contrast, the LDP-Komeito coalition only needs to secure support from more than 12 opposition lawmakers to expand its governing base, or it could continue governing with support from some opposition parties in prime ministerial votes. Furthermore, the coalition holds a majority of 140 seats in the House of Councillors (out of 248 total seats). Even if the CDP formed a cabinet, it would struggle to pass policies. Therefore, an LDP-Komeito minority government is the most likely political outcome.
Regarding policy directions, the constitutional amendment process is frozen because pro-amendment parties secured only 290-295 seats, falling short of the 310-seat legal threshold. It is highly likely to remain merely a topic of discussion until the next House of Representatives election. As a minority government, the Ishiba administration prioritizes policy focus on political reform bills, domestic economic issues, youth employment, rural revitalization, disaster prevention, and other social system areas, while also working to reshape the LDP's image to solidify its governing foundation. Security and foreign policy will tend to be cautious. Many of Ishiba's security proposals require seeking intra-party consensus first. Japan-US, Japan-China, and Taiwan policies are not expected to see major changes. His interactions with Chinese and US leaders at APEC and G20 meetings, as well as relationship-building with the next US administration, become focal points.
The July 2025 House of Councillors election becomes a critical test for the Ishiba administration: excessively low support rates before the election could trigger intra-party disputes and calls for an early general election. If the coalition suffers another defeat in the Councillors election, the ruling coalition will face the risk of being held accountable and stepping down. The next six months become a "period of precarious balance" for this administration.