Virtual Manipulation: The Role of Generative AI in Russian Propaganda

Key Chapter Titles List

1. Executive Summary
2. Hostile Information Dissemination Targeting NATO
3. Core Anti-NATO Narratives
4. The Evolution of Manipulation Techniques: Practical Applications of Artificial Intelligence
5. How to Collaboratively Respond to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference
6. The Rise of AI-Driven Networks
7. Crocus City Hall: A Case Study in Russian Propaganda
8. The "Disinformation Economics" of the Telegram Platform
9. Research Methodology

Document Introduction

More than two years after the full-scale outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, coordinated account groups on social media still pose a significant threat, and the application of generative AI content has further exacerbated this situation. This report, based on collaborative research between NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and the AI information environment assessment platform Osavul, focuses on the period from November 2023 to May 2024. It provides an in-depth analysis of how the Russian propaganda system integrates coordinated accounts, automated cross-referencing, and AI-generated content to carry out targeted information manipulation operations.

The research identified 17 coordinated account groups covering 344 information sources. Their activities are mainly concentrated on platforms such as Telegram and Twitter (now X), involving multilingual dissemination in Russian, English, French, Finnish, and others. Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used to generate meaningless noise, scrape and repost political news. Through automated dynamic account cross-referencing, they significantly expand the reach and influence of information threats without requiring additional financial investment. AI-generated comments simulate political discussions on sensitive topics on social media, and there have already been cases successfully responding to visual content, posing a severe challenge to users' information discrimination capabilities.

The report focuses on analyzing the core narrative frameworks targeting NATO, including the "NATO Weakness Theory" (promoting the inferiority of Western weapons and organizational incompetence), the "NATO is Not a Threat Theory" (reinforcing perception through Moscow's "captured equipment" exhibition), "NATO is the Aggressor" (blaming global instability on NATO expansion), "NATO Colonialism Theory" (hijacking anti-colonial discourse to link to the Gaza issue), and the "Ukraine War Has Failed Theory" (questioning the effectiveness of military aid to Ukraine). These narratives erupted intensively at key time points (such as NATO's 75th anniversary, the release of Trump-related statements, the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack), forming a multi-dimensional public opinion offensive.

The case study of the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack shows that the Russian propaganda system rapidly fabricated a false narrative of "Ukrainian and Western involvement" after the event. Through over 10,000 cross-platform messages, it successfully controlled the direction of public opinion and avoided domestic questioning of the security system. Furthermore, Telegram's advertising revenue-sharing mechanism provides economic incentives for disinformation dissemination. The potential revenue from related NATO-themed content could reach approximately 115,000 euros, far exceeding that of the Twitter platform, making it the preferred battleground for hostile actors.

The research also evaluated the application value of the two major anti-disinformation frameworks, DISARM and RESIST, emphasizing the importance of building a collaborative response system similar to a cybersecurity framework through standardized information exchange and integrated defense capabilities. Through rigorous data analysis and case study breakdowns, this report provides key references for defense researchers, policymakers, and intelligence practitioners to understand Russia's new tactics of information manipulation and assess the application of AI technology in hybrid warfare.