Russia's Nuclear Weapons: Force Structure, Nuclear Doctrine, and Strategic Impact

Key Chapter Title List

1. Force Structure
2. Nuclear Doctrine and Employment Plans
3. Nuclear Deterrence Signaling Operations Since 2022
4. Arms Control and Strategic Stability
5. Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization
6. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons Posture
7. Dual-Capable System Development
8. Development of New Nuclear Delivery Systems
9. Nuclear Declaratory Policy Revision (November 2024)
10. U.S.-Russia Nuclear Force Comparison
11. Developments Related to Nuclear Force Deployment in Belarus
12. Nuclear Testing-Related Developments and Implications

Document Introduction

According to the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, Russia poses a "serious threat" to the United States and its allies. Its unique combination of strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces allows its nuclear employment spectrum to range from large-scale strikes against the U.S. homeland to limited strikes supporting regional military operations in the Euro-Atlantic area. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, President Putin has repeatedly issued threats regarding nuclear weapon use, announced the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, and suspended compliance with certain obligations under the New START Treaty, raising significant international concern about the risk of nuclear conflict.

The report first provides a detailed analysis of Russia's nuclear force structure: According to non-governmental organization estimates, Russia currently deploys approximately 1,710 nuclear warheads. These are supported by a "triad" of strategic delivery platforms—including 326 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 12 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) carrying 192 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 58 strategic bombers—maintaining a rough parity with the United States' approximately 1,770 deployed warheads. Russia is completing the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces, focusing on the development and deployment of the SS-X-29 ("Sarmat") heavy ICBM, the SS-27 Mod 2 ("Yars") ICBM, and the Borei-class SSBNs. Most of its ICBMs and SLBMs are capable of carrying multiple warheads. Furthermore, Russia possesses various dual-capable systems not limited by arms control agreements, which can be used as non-strategic nuclear weapons. Its estimated number of non-strategic nuclear warheads ranges between 1,000 and 2,000.

Regarding nuclear doctrine, the revised Russian nuclear deterrence policy document from November 2024 clarifies that nuclear forces will be maintained at a "sufficient" level to ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity, deter aggression, manage escalation, and terminate enemy military operations. The document outlines five scenarios that could authorize the use of nuclear weapons, including ballistic missile attacks, the use of weapons of mass destruction, hostile actions threatening nuclear retaliatory capabilities, conventional aggression endangering sovereignty, and large-scale aerospace attacks. It also considers "aggression by a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear state" as a "joint attack" against Russia. Russia's "strategic deterrence" concept integrates non-military means, non-nuclear capabilities, and nuclear weapons, constructing a multi-stage escalation "ladder" through dual-capable systems to provide flexible options for deterrence and conflict management.

Since 2022, Russia has conducted nuclear deterrence signaling operations through various means: including raising nuclear alert levels, conducting nuclear force exercises, and performing missile tests. In April 2024, Belarusian President Lukashenko confirmed that Russia had deployed "dozens" of nuclear weapons to Belarus, including nuclear-capable "Iskander" short-range ballistic missiles, and had trained Belarusian pilots to operate nuclear-capable aircraft. Additionally, Russia withdrew from the ratification process of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in November 2023 and maintains testing capabilities at its Arctic nuclear test site, further exacerbating strategic stability risks. The U.S. intelligence community assesses that while Russia has no intention of direct military conflict with the U.S. and Europe, unfavorable battlefield progress and strikes within Ukraine could increase its risk of using nuclear weapons.

In the field of arms control, Russia has suspended its participation in the New START Treaty since February 2023. While claiming it will adhere to the treaty's limits, it has halted on-site inspections and data exchanges. The U.S. and Russia have not held strategic stability dialogue since January 2022. Although the U.S. has expressed willingness to resume negotiations without preconditions, Russia has refused, citing U.S. military aid to Ukraine as an attempt to inflict "strategic defeat" on Russia. With the treaty's expiration in 2026, whether Russia will expand its strategic nuclear force size becomes a key uncertainty. The report also notes that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has depleted Russian ground forces, potentially leading to greater future reliance on nuclear forces and counterspace capabilities for strategic deterrence. Furthermore, Russia's plans to launch nuclear-armed satellites have raised concerns in the United States.

This report, based on assessments from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, NORTHCOM commander testimonies, and non-governmental organization data, provides a comprehensive and objective analytical basis for Congress to review U.S. deterrence and risk reduction policies towards Russia. It holds significant reference value for understanding the current global nuclear security landscape and the nuclear dimension of the geopolitical conflict in Europe.