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Is Russia assisting North Korea in restarting the Victory Oil Refinery?

Dynamic Assessment of Key Facilities in the Rason Area of North Korea Based on Annual Satellite Imagery and Analysis—Focusing on the Impact of Energy Cooperation on Sanctions Effectiveness and Peninsula Security

Detail

Published

23/12/2025

Key Chapter Title List

  1. Current Status of DPRK-Russia Cooperation in Other Fields
  2. Distribution of Key Facilities in the Rason Region
  3. Basic Information and Operational History of the Victory Refinery
  4. Function of the Victory Oil Terminal and Crude Oil Transportation Link
  5. Analysis of the Possibility of Restarting the Victory Refinery
  6. Observation of Refinery-Related Facility Activities (February 2025)
  7. Assessment of the Correlation Between Rail Transport Activity and Restart Preparations
  8. Timeframe and Constraints for Refinery Restart
  9. Potential Impact of Comprehensive Russian Support on the Restart Process
  10. Application of AI-Enabled Geospatial Intelligence in DPRK Analysis

Document Introduction

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has long faced fuel shortages. As one of its two major refineries, the Victory Refinery has been suspended since 1994 due to UN sanctions. Whether it restarts or not consistently influences the energy landscape and security situation on the peninsula. The core issue of this report revolves around "whether Russia is assisting the DPRK in restarting the Victory Refinery," exploring through professional analysis the potential multifaceted impacts should such cooperation materialize.

The report first outlines the layout of key facilities in the Rason region, clarifying the geographical connection and functional positioning of the Victory Refinery and its supporting Victory Oil Terminal. It details the former's 2 million tons/year Russian crude oil processing capacity, the background of its suspension, and the latter's operational mechanism of transporting imported Russian crude oil from Nakhodka to the refinery via a dedicated pipeline. Simultaneously, it provides a comparative introduction to the basic situation of the DPRK's other operational refinery, the Bonghwa Refinery (which relies on Chinese crude oil imports).

Based on Pleiades satellite imagery (PleiadesNEOSX1) from January-February 2025 and AI analysis technology, the report presents the latest dynamics of the Victory Refinery and surrounding facilities: In February 2025, rail activity was observed for the first time since July 2024, including at least 5 tank cars and 1 freight car. Combined with meteorological data, it is judged that the train most likely arrived in the early morning of the observation day; snow removal operations have been prioritized in the refinery's administrative and support areas, and cargo ships have been continuously berthed at the dedicated terminal since October 2024.

The report points out that there is currently no direct evidence of the refinery restarting. However, the scale of rail transport exceeds what would be needed for mere facility maintenance, and the possibility of preparatory work for a restart cannot be ruled out—the tank cars might be used to transport heavy fuel oil required for heating crude oil. If crude oil supply, interrupted by sanctions, is restored with Russian support, the DPRK would be able to produce various petroleum products such as lubricants, diesel, kerosene, and gasoline, alleviating energy shortages and boosting related industries, while potentially weakening the effectiveness of sanctions targeting its nuclear program.

Furthermore, the report analyzes the practical constraints of the restart process: aging issues from 30 years of facility idleness and a shortage of skilled technical personnel could mean the restart takes months or even years. However, comprehensive Russian support could significantly accelerate this process. From a security impact perspective, improved fuel supply could enhance the training levels of the DPRK's mechanized units, naval vessels, and fighter aircraft, posing a greater threat to the Republic of Korea and US forces stationed there. This report relies on an AI-enabled geospatial intelligence analysis method, integrating machine learning technology and professional expertise to provide timely and reliable intelligence assessments for understanding DPRK activities in the economic, diplomatic, and military spheres.