Strategies for Imposing Effective Sanctions on Belarus ()

Key Chapter Title List

1. Background: Sanctions Against Belarus to Date
2. Objectives of the Sanctions
3. Impact of Sanctions on the Belarusian Economy
4. Financial Sanctions
5. Trade Sanctions
6. Border Closure Issues
7. Conclusion

Document Introduction

In November 2024, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Centre for Financial Crime & Security Studies and RUSI Europe, in collaboration with the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies and with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, held a roundtable in Brussels on effective sanction strategies against Belarus. The meeting brought together officials from the European Commission, the United Kingdom, and experts on Belarus and Central and Eastern Europe. This report is based on the anonymous contributions of the participants.

Western sanctions against Belarus began with the controversy surrounding the August 2020 Belarusian elections. They were subsequently escalated due to events such as the 2021 Ryanair flight diversion incident and the use of migration to pressure the EU. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the scope of sanctions was further expanded in light of Belarus's support for Russian aggression. These sanctions include individual designations and restrictive economic measures. While related to sanctions against Russia, they possess distinct characteristics in terms of objectives and implementation.

The report delves into the core objectives of the sanctions, noting that traditional goals such as regime change or altering its behavior are currently unrealistic. A more practical objective is to constrain the regime's aggressive and oppressive behavior. Sanctions also serve a signaling function, pressuring the targeted elites, expressing support for the opposition, and conveying norms and values to third countries. Economically, sanctions have caused an estimated 4.5% loss in Belarus's GDP. Without the potential for 1.5% annual growth in a non-sanction scenario, the cumulative loss has reached 12%. However, Russia has partially offset this impact through direct financial support and market access, thereby deepening Belarus's economic dependence on Russia.

Regarding financial sanctions, financial settlements and transfers between the EU and Belarus have been largely disrupted, with some banks excluded from the SWIFT system. However, Belarus has established alternative channels through intermediary countries such as Russia, China, and Georgia. The offshore assets of Lukashenko and his elite have also undermined the effectiveness of the sanctions. Trade sanctions cover 70%-80% of the original EU-Belarus trade, significantly impacting key export industries like potash. Although some production capacity has been maintained through Russian transshipment, revenues have sharply declined. Furthermore, sanctions have produced unintended consequences, such as weakening the economic foundation of the pro-democracy middle class, affecting the lives of ordinary citizens, and being exploited by the Belarusian regime for propaganda purposes.

Finally, the report proposes potential pathways for optimizing sanctions. These include expanding sanctions on oil exports and strengthening sanctions targeting Belarusian business elites and Belarus-Russia military-industrial links. Simultaneously, it is necessary to enhance enforcement and strategic communication, seeking a balance between pressuring the regime and supporting the opposition to prevent Belarus from further aligning with Russia.