Analysis of the Escalating Risk Environment for Global Submarine Cables

Key Chapter Title List

1. Executive Summary
2. Core Findings
3. Background
4. Submarine Cable Fundamentals
5. The Escalating Global Risk Environment
6. The Evolving Production and Ownership Landscape
7. New Possibilities for Physical Security Attacks and Exploitation
8. Eavesdropping Threats on the Information Superhighway
9. Network Management Vulnerabilities
10. Future Outlook

Document Introduction

Submarine cables, serving as the "information superhighway" that underpins the global economy and facilitates international communication, carry approximately 99% of intercontinental internet traffic, data, and voice communications. They support over $10 trillion in daily financial transactions, transmit sensitive government communications, and ensure overseas military operations, making them indispensable critical infrastructure for modern society. However, with the surging data demands of mobile users, the development of cloud computing, and the business expansion of hyperscale technology companies, the rapid expansion and evolution of the submarine cable network expose it to multiple intertwined challenges of geopolitics, physical security, and cyber threats.

This report systematically outlines the global risk environment for submarine cables, with a focus on analyzing the evolving trends in ownership patterns: the participation of Chinese state-owned enterprises in cable laying, ownership, and operation continues to increase, expanding their global footprint through projects like the "Digital Silk Road." Concurrently, hyperscale tech companies such as Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft are transitioning from bandwidth purchasers to direct owners, reshaping the market landscape and raising concerns about digital sovereignty and monopolies. This changing landscape is deeply intertwined with geopolitical dynamics, where Russia's war against Ukraine, China's preparations related to unification with Taiwan, and the deterioration of U.S.-China relations have become core drivers of the recent risk environment.

Based on authoritative data sources such as TeleGeography, combined with case studies and capability assessments, the report provides a detailed analysis of various threat vectors: state actors, with their professional capabilities and strategic motivations, pose the primary threat of deliberate sabotage and espionage; the threat from non-state actors, while limited in capability, should not be ignored; accidental damage from ship anchoring, fishing operations, etc., is frequent but has a relatively minor impact. Furthermore, while the widespread use of remote network management systems has improved operational efficiency, it also creates opportunities for cyber attacks due to third-party vulnerabilities; the low-security state of cable landing stations increases the risk of intelligence gathering.

Through an analysis of the capabilities and actions of relevant countries such as China and Russia, and a comparative study of historical attack cases and the current risk landscape, the report concludes that the risk of state-sponsored physical and cyber attacks on submarine cables will continue to rise in the future. This report provides a comprehensive risk landscape and decision-making reference for defense researchers, policy analysts, geopolitical practitioners, and others, aiding in understanding the profound impact of submarine cable security on national economic, security, and foreign policy objectives.