Competition in the Shadow of Technology

Key Chapter Title List

1. Introduction
2. The Shadow of Competition
3. Concealment/Disclosure Dynamics
4. Modeling Contemporary Great Power Crises
5. Conclusion: Intentional Disclosure
6. About the Authors
7. Technology and Deterrence
8. Key Technology Areas
9. Disclose to Substitute
10. Disclose to Reduce Risk
11. Disclose to Offset Disadvantage
12. Policy Implications: Institutional Reform and Capacity Building

Document Introduction

In a new era where technological competition is reshaping great power relations, the art of military deterrence has moved beyond traditional force deployment and power projection, shifting towards gaining strategic advantage through the selective disclosure of disruptive military capabilities. This report focuses on a core question: During an international crisis, when should a state disclose sensitive military technologies? This question has not been adequately addressed in existing research—while studies have confirmed the importance of military signaling, they have not delved deeply into the strategic considerations for states disclosing new capabilities during the escalation phase of a crisis.

As a specialized study by the CSIS Futures Lab, the report views interstate interactions as complex bargaining processes, breaking through the limitations of traditional case studies by employing a formal modeling approach to replicate the logic of coercive bargaining, thereby revealing the core trade-offs in military capability disclosure. The report first reviews the evolution of deterrence theory and the current state of technological competition, clarifying the central role of 14 key technology areas—such as biotechnology, quantum science, and hypersonic technology—in great power competition. It then presents the practical diversity of military capability concealment and disclosure through historical case analysis.

The formal crisis bargaining model constructed by the report identifies three rational disclosure scenarios: First, "Disclose to Substitute," where demonstrating new military capabilities substitutes for direct military pressure, forcing an adversary to reassess the balance of power. Second, "Disclose to Reduce Risk," which targets the brinkmanship of risk-acceptant adversaries, using technological demonstrations to correct their irrational perceptions. Third, "Disclose to Offset Disadvantage," leveraging disruptive technology demonstrations to counter battlefield setbacks in peripheral conflicts. Each scenario includes clear applicable conditions and implementation logic, and is analyzed concretely in conjunction with potential crisis scenarios such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Based on the model's insights, the report proposes three key policy implications: The United States needs to optimize its national security system design and strengthen strategic planning coordination; expand the application of artificial intelligence and machine learning in crisis response to build interconnected cross-departmental systems; and broaden the intelligence community's analytical methods to develop new analytical techniques. The report emphasizes that in the context of technology reshaping the military balance, decisions regarding military capability disclosure must be embedded within a robust intelligence assessment and strategic planning framework to avoid counterproductive consequences and maintain strategic stability in great power competition.