Thinking on the Battlefield: What Can Cognitive Science Bring to the Military Lessons Learned Process?

Key Chapter Title List

1. Introduction
2. Cognitive Biases on the Battlefield
3. Battlefield Analysis from a Cognitive Perspective: Two Case Studies
4. The Yehiam Convoy Battle
5. The Chinese Farm Battle
6. Conclusion

Document Introduction

The tactical decision-making ability of military commanders is central to modern military operations. The traditional Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) has long been based on rational thinking. However, numerous "incomprehensible" decision-making failures in actual combat indicate that a single rational framework can no longer fully explain the complexity of battlefield decisions. This study focuses on the intersection of cognitive science and military history. The core question is how cognitive science can provide a new analytical dimension to the military lessons-learned process.

The study selects the Yehiam Convoy Battle from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the Chinese Farm Battle from the 1973 October War as cases. Both were led by experienced Israeli commanders, yet resulted in catastrophic consequences due to decision-making errors, and their decision-making logic has long been questioned in military and civilian research.

The analysis process first excludes traditional explanations such as lack of experience and insufficient information proposed by Naturalistic Decision-Making (NDM) theory. Instead, it employs cognitive bias theory to systematically examine the mechanisms of 12 types of cognitive factors—including availability bias, overconfidence bias, optimism bias, and high-level priority bias—in tactical decision-making. Research data comes from declassified combat records, multi-party post-war briefings, literature, and firsthand interviews collected by scholars.

Key findings indicate that even seasoned commanders, under conditions of battlefield pressure, ambiguous information, and time constraints, are still susceptible to cognitive biases. This leads to decision-making failures such as distorted risk assessment, neglect of conflicting intelligence, and adherence to existing plans. This cognitive perspective not only provides a novel explanation for the decision-making logic of historical battles but also offers theoretical support for improving decision-making skill training in military education and optimizing the lessons-learned system.