In-depth Analysis of the U.S. Asia-Pacific "Eagle of Resistance" Strategy - Detailed Explanation of U.S. National Security Strategy (Part 3)

The document marks a major U.S. military "reform" led by H.R. McMaster. Its core is to abandon the high-end arms race with China and shift towards building an Asia-Pacific "Eagle of Resistance" strategy centered on low-cost drones. This strategy is not only a significant transformation in U.S. military operational philosophy but also reflects the real dilemma of the United States' declining national power to support its global hegemony. This article will provide a comprehensive analysis of this strategy from six dimensions: drone strategic progress, reform advancement and resistance, strategic core logic, Asia-Pacific layout, reform substance, and strategic motivation.

I. Strategic Support: The Development and Deployment Progress of Low-Cost Drones

The construction of drone combat capability is the core support for the implementation of the "Eagle of Resistance" strategy. The U.S. military is accelerating efforts to fill the gap in the low-cost drone field through measures such as replication, upgrades, and large-scale procurement.

(1) Core Breakthrough: Combat Deployment of Drones Replicating Iran's Shahed-136

The United States is putting the vision of a "Drone Superpower" into practice, with its "Eagle of Resistance" strategy being fleshed out with concrete content. A key example is that the U.S. has deployed drones replicating Iran's Shahed-136 to the Middle East as a direct warning to Iran, and the U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCOM) has already deployed such drone units in the region. This marks the first deployment of Shahed-136-like drones by the U.S. military, with the core goal of expanding low-cost combat capabilities and enhancing regional deterrence. From a strategic extension perspective, these low-cost drones, referred to as "Little Mopeds," will ultimately be used to aid Asia-Pacific allies and for U.S. military use, forming a deterrent against potential adversaries like China, Russia, and North Korea.

(2) Development Status: Performance, Plans, and Lag Coexist

The U.S. military's replicated "Little Moped" drones demonstrate significant cost-effectiveness advantages: a maximum range of approximately 2,000 kilometers, with a target unit cost of only $35,000. In contrast, the factory price of a Tomahawk missile is about $5.23 million, which could be exchanged for roughly 150 "Little Mopeds." To enhance combat effectiveness, the U.S. military plans to equip them with data links to achieve "man-in-the-loop" control, enabling them to break through the limitations of striking fixed targets and gain the capability to strike air defense positions, time-sensitive targets, and perform counter-drone missions.

On the procurement front, the U.S. military has initiated an emergency project worth $10 billion, planning to purchase hundreds of thousands of small drones, primarily FPV drones. However, it cannot be ignored that the U.S. military's progress in large-scale deployment of low-cost drones is extremely slow: The PLA conducted FPV drone tactical exercises as early as 2022, while the U.S. military did not conduct its first large-scale FPV confrontation exercise in the Philippines until May 2025. Furthermore, there remains a significant gap between the scale of drone application at the grassroots unit level and global trends.

II. Reform Advancement: McMaster's Transformation Measures and Real-World Resistance

The military reform led by McMaster is the key driving force behind the implementation of the "Eagle of Resistance" strategy. Its core logic is to create space for the low-cost drone strategy through resource reallocation, but the reform process has encountered significant resistance.

(1) Core Reform Measures: Cutting High-Cost Projects, Focusing on Low-Cost Combat Power

McMaster's reform path is clear and radical: on one hand, vigorously advancing the construction of low-cost combat power such as drone units and $150,000-class cheap long-range cruise missiles; on the other hand, decisively cutting multiple traditional high-cost projects, including the next-generation armed reconnaissance helicopter, medium landing craft, M10 Booker light tank, etc., and having significantly slashed the defense budget. More disruptively, he is pushing for a reorganization of the U.S. military command structure, planning to reduce the 11 highest military command agencies to 8, cut 20% of four-star generals, and rename the Department of Defense to the "Department of War," all to improve decision-making efficiency and focus on the Asia-Pacific strategic center of gravity.

His reform logic directly addresses the reality of U.S.-China confrontation: From the perspective of engaging in high-intensity naval and air confrontation with China, cutting expensive but limitedly effective large main warships (such as the Constellation-class frigates, Arleigh Burke III destroyers) and instead procuring large quantities of low-cost drones is a more pragmatic choice. The essence is to engage in a war of attrition with China using "Little Mopeds," competing in societal resilience and industrial production capacity.

(2) Reform Resistance: Impeachment Investigation and Interest Group Games

McMaster's reforms have disrupted the existing interest structure, and he is currently facing severe challenges. Due to conducting a "coup de grâce" style strike on a drug smuggling vessel near Yemen, he has been accused of violating the laws of armed conflict and military ethics, facing impeachment investigation and special oversight from the U.S. Congress (including the Republican Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee). Furthermore, his promoted measures such as institutional reorganization in the counter-drone field and cross-service resource integration, by touching upon the leadership of various services' exclusive projects, may provoke resistance and face systemic obstacles.

III. Strategic Core: The Logic of Attrition - "Inflict Pain, Not Achieve Victory"

The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy document, serving as the programmatic summary of McMaster's military reforms, clarifies the core logic and ultimate goal of the "Eagle of Resistance" strategy, revealing the U.S. military's underlying assessment of U.S.-China military confrontation.

(1) Three Core Logics: Abandoning the Numbers Race, Turning to Attrition and Delay

The core logic of this strategy can be summarized in three points: First, it tacitly accepts the inability to surpass China in the numbers race of large main combat equipment (aircraft, warships), which is the premise of the U.S. military's strategic transformation. Second, based on this judgment, it abandons frontal catch-up, instead using U.S. military bases and drone fleets to "exchange blood" and compete in attrition with China, to buy time waiting for "the situation to change." Third, it leverages battlefield positional advantages to confine the conflict to the Asia-Pacific region—in a U.S.-China fire exchange, China would bear the risk of strikes on its homeland core areas, while the U.S. would only need to bear losses to its Asia-Pacific allies and military bases, thereby reducing the probability of damage to its own core interests.

(2) Ultimate Goal: "Limited Victory" to Force Negotiations

The ultimate goal of this strategy is not to seek the military annihilation of the PLA, but to force China to the negotiating table and sign a ceasefire treaty favorable to the United States by making China bear an "unacceptable cost." In short, the U.S. military's core demand is to "inflict pain" on China, not to "defeat" China. The essence is to maximize strategic interests through controllable military pressure.

IV. Regional Layout: Imitation and Shortcomings of the Asia-Pacific "Axis of Resistance"

To implement the "Eagle of Resistance" strategy, the United States has constructed a layout model in the Asia-Pacific that highly imitates its Middle Eastern adversary's "Axis of Resistance," attempting to create an operational system of "allies holding the front line, the U.S. providing rear support."

(1) Role Division in the "Axis of Resistance": Imitating the Iranian Model

In the U.S. Asia-Pacific "Axis of Resistance" layout, the role division is clear: Taiwan is viewed as the "Asia-Pacific Hezbollah," serving as the forward resistance force; Japan is positioned as "America's Hezbollah," tasked with the frontal "holding the line" mission; the United States itself plays a role similar to Iran's "Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)," positioned in the second line, responsible for coordinating all parties and providing fire support such as long-range missiles and drones. This model of "allies bearing pressure at the front, the U.S. striking from afar" is called the Asia-Pacific version of the "Octopus Tactic," essentially replicating the regional combat experience of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

(2) Fatal Shortcoming: Questionable Ally Combat Capability

The core flaw of this layout lies in the insufficient combat capability of allies: Taiwan's military hard power and will to resist are far inferior to Ukraine, Hezbollah, or Hamas; South Korea, while stronger, has questionable determination to participate fully in confrontation and is considered possibly a "more powerful version of the cheating UAE"; Japan lacks offensive initiative capability and long-range missiles, making it unqualified as a "holding unit" and ineffective as a "shooting unit," struggling to fulfill the strategic role assigned by the U.S. Additionally, equipment such as drones and missile systems deployed by the U.S. military in allied regions like the Philippines still faces practical problems like insufficient adaptability to jungle and archipelago environments.

V. Reform Substance and Strategic Motivation: Graceful Contraction Under Manufacturing Decline

The military reform led by McMaster and the "Eagle of Resistance" strategy, while appearing to be a transformation in operational philosophy, are in fact a passive adjustment following the decline of U.S. national power. Moreover, behind them lies a deeper motivation of "one last grab" before strategic contraction.

Reform Substance: Pragmatic Shift Forced by Manufacturing Decline

Compared to the Obama and Biden eras, McMaster's reforms are closer to actual combat confrontation thinking. For example, the high-intensity FPV drone confrontation exercise conducted by the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division and Philippine forces on Luzon Island in May 2025 drew lessons from the Chinese grassroots units' combat readiness experience of using 3D printing technology to manufacture drone parts on-site. However, the essence of his reform is not proactive innovation but stems from a fundamental reality: U.S. manufacturing capability (the lifeline of the defense industry) has severely declined. Whether it's making allies pay, adjusting production lines, or abandoning high-end equipment, all are inevitable results of the United States' inability to support its global hegemonic ambitions with its national power. The so-called "Axis of Resistance-ization" is essentially a transitional form of hegemonic contraction.

Strategic Motivation: "Limited Conflict" Layout Before Strategic Contraction

A seemingly paradoxical inference emerges: At the very moment the United States is determined to pursue the "Monroe Doctrine" and retreat to the Americas, the possibility of a "limited-intensity conflict" with China paradoxically increases. The motivation is similar to a shop owner about to go bankrupt and flee making "one last grab": The United States needs a conflict with immense propaganda effect, a high-profile opponent, and one where "winning or losing doesn't lose face." It cannot choose Russia, which has already demonstrated formidable strength (to avoid getting bogged down in a war of attrition), nor can it choose Iran, which lacks sufficient weight (lacking propaganda value). Therefore, China, which has not yet gone to war but possesses global influence, becomes the optimal choice.

It is predicted that this "decisive battle" is more likely to be a "limited conflict": The United States will not stake expensive assets like aircraft carriers and advanced fighter jets but will adopt a "long-range trash dumping" mode, deploying large quantities of cheap drones and missiles. The benefits of this approach are: First, asset losses are controllable, facilitating withdrawal at any time. Second, it exchanges Asia-Pacific bases and ally core areas for the right to strike China's homeland core areas, "appearing worthwhile in propaganda." Third, the outcome of the battle is difficult to clearly define, making it easy for both sides to claim "victory" (similar to the mutual attacks between Iran and Israel). The ultimate goal is to create conditions for the United States to "strategically contract" gracefully through a controllable conflict that can be defined in propaganda as "not losing."

Conclusion

The U.S. Asia-Pacific "Eagle of Resistance" strategy is the core implementation measure of the 2025 National Security Strategy. Its essence is a passive transformation by the U.S. military, abandoning the high-end arms race and turning to low-cost attrition warfare against the backdrop of manufacturing decline. Although McMaster's reforms are pragmatic in direction and demonstrate strong execution, they face dual resistance from internal impeachment investigations and interest group games. Furthermore, the Asia-Pacific "Axis of Resistance" he has constructed suffers from a fatal shortcoming due to insufficient ally capabilities. Whether this strategic transformation can achieve the U.S. goal of "graceful contraction" remains unknown. However, it is certain that it will profoundly impact the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region and also reflect the loosening and restructuring trend of the global hegemonic system.