Turkey's Expanding Global Reach
Assessment
Ankara is converting a decade of drone diplomacy and base-building into a coherent military-economic expansion across Africa, the Red Sea and the Turkic world, explicitly marketed as a replicable package. Defence Minister Yaşar Güler's 'Somalia model' — military training, technical support and infrastructure in exchange for shared profits — is now being courted by Sudan, Niger, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, and Turkey is openly expanding training programmes in Mali, Niger, Somalia and Libya to 'fill the vacuum left by France' while countering Russian and Chinese influence. The footprint is concrete: F-16s and tanks at the TURKSOM base in Mogadishu, a Somali 'spaceport'/missile range, discreet drones-armour-demining cooperation with Mali after the April killing of its defence minister, and a full state-visit welcome (cavalry escort, 21-gun salute) for Niger's junta leader Tchiani, who revealed Erdoğan ordered Turkish defence firms to deliver equipment on deferred payment. In Libya, Ankara brought both rival armies under one flag at EFES-2026 — 502 troops, 331 east and 171 west — to lock in support for its contested 2019 maritime deal against Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel. The Iran war is the accelerant: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz deepened proxy rivalry in the Red Sea and Horn (Turkish drones on both sides of the Sudan war, stationed at an Egyptian airbase), and let Ankara pitch itself as the alternative energy-and-transit hub — new corridors from Central Asia and the Gulf, a Hejaz Railway extension to Oman, Turkmen gas via the Trans-Caspian route, and a Middle Corridor reframed as the 'modern Silk Road.' Binding it together is Erdoğan's call for Turkic-world solidarity: as the OTS bloc ($2.4tn combined economy, 170m people) deepens defence, energy and AI integration, Türkiye prepares to take its rotating presidency and institutionalise the network as a strategic base.
Theatre
Events
- 1 4 Jun 2026 pivotal Erdoğan gives Niger's junta leader a state welcome and deferred-payment armsNiamey, Niger
Nigerien President Abdourahamane Tchiani visited Türkiye on June 4 on Erdoğan's invitation and received a full official welcome in Ankara — cavalry escort, military band and 21-gun salute — with the energy, defence and trade ministers and the intelligence chief attending. Tchiani publicly revealed that Erdoğan instructed Turkish defence firms to deliver military equipment to Niger on deferred-payment terms, a rare glimpse of Ankara's export financing, and he visited Roketsan. The relationship has expanded with Niger acquiring Bayraktar TB2 drones, armoured vehicles and training agreements signed in April 2026; Erdoğan stressed counterterrorism support for Sahel states, TİKA projects, the Türkiye-Niger Friendship Hospital and Maarif Foundation schools teaching 1,700+ students. The two sides signed accords including a Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETCO).
State pageantry as positioningA 21-gun salute and cavalry escort for an internationally isolated junta leader is calculated diplomatic theatre — Ankara conferring legitimacy that France and the West withhold, the soft-power dividend the Sahel pivot is built to capture.Deferred-payment financingErdoğan ordering firms to deliver arms before payment is the financing innovation that undercuts competitors — budget-constrained juntas get Bayraktar drones and armour they cannot prepay for, binding them to Turkey as creditor as well as supplier.Full Somalia-model stackPairing TB2s and Roketsan with the Friendship Hospital, TİKA agriculture projects, Maarif schools (1,700+ students) and a JETCO shows the complete military-plus-soft-power-plus-trade bundle deployed in Niger — the template generalised from Mogadishu to the western Sahel. - 2 2 Jun 2026 Turkey deepens discreet drone-and-armour cooperation with MaliBamako, Mali
Turkey strengthened security ties with Mali's military government — drone sales, training agreements, armoured vehicles, surveillance systems, demining equipment and personnel training — following the late-April coordinated attacks by Al-Qaeda-linked jihadists and Tuareg separatists that killed Mali's defence minister. Turkish private security companies are also reportedly active in the country. The discreet but strategic partnership positions Ankara as an indispensable ally for Bamako as the security situation deteriorates. The cooperation deepened further in the wake of the April offensive that overran northern Mali.
Stepping in after the decapitation strikeExpanding support right after a defence minister's killing and the loss of northern Mali makes Turkey the security backstop of a junta whose Russian protectors faltered — Ankara filling the gap left by both France and the stumbling Africa Corps.Full-spectrum, not just dronesAdding armoured vehicles, surveillance, demining and trainers — plus reported Turkish private security firms — moves Mali beyond TB2 sales into a comprehensive security architecture, the 'Somalia model' taking root in the western Sahel.Deliberate discretionThe 'discreet' framing signals Ankara managing the reputational risk of arming a junta in an active jihadist war — keeping the footprint low-profile while still becoming, in the report's words, 'indispensable' to Bamako. - 26 May 2026 pivotal African states queue for Turkey's 'Somalia model' security packageAfrica (Sahel / Horn)
Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler announced that several African countries are requesting security and economic assistance modelled on Turkey's partnership with Somalia. The 'Somalia model' involves Ankara providing military training, technical support and economic-infrastructure development in exchange for shared profits. Güler named Sudan, Niger, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia as potential candidates. The disclosure signalled Turkey's expanding influence through a packaged security-and-economic cooperation framework being actively shopped across the continent.
A productised exportNaming the 'Somalia model' as a replicable framework — training plus infrastructure for shared profits — turns Turkey's Mogadishu experience into a standardised offer, the strategic concept that lets Ankara scale from one base to a continental network.The candidate list maps the French exitSudan, Niger, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia are precisely the states where Western (especially French) and UN security roles have collapsed — Güler's pipeline tracks the vacuum Turkey is positioning to fill ahead of Russia and China.Profit-sharing coreThe 'shared profits' clause distinguishes Turkey's pitch from pure arms sales — Ankara takes equity in resources and infrastructure (lithium, uranium, gold, ports), making each security deal a long-term economic stake, not a one-off transaction. - 25 May 2026 Sudan's war becomes a regional proxy conflict fuelled by foreign dronesSudan
The Sudan war escalated into a regional proxy conflict, with the UAE, Ethiopia, Turkey and Iran supplying drones and military support: the RSF uses Chinese drones while the SAF uses Turkish and Iranian drones. UN data showed drone strikes by both sides killed at least 880 civilians from January to April 2025, over 80% of conflict deaths. Satellite images showed Turkish combat drones stationed at an Egyptian airbase near the Sudanese border, and a UAE-funded camp in western Ethiopia trained thousands of RSF fighters. The RSF's late-2024 capture of Al-Fashir in Darfur involved systematic massacres a UN investigation cited as signs of genocide; the military balance remains a stalemate.
Turkish drones on the SAF sideTurkey arming the Sudanese Armed Forces with combat drones — staged from an Egyptian airbase per satellite imagery — places Ankara in direct proxy opposition to UAE-backed RSF, aligning Turkey with Egypt and against the Israel/UAE bloc inside Sudan's war.Egyptian-airbase basingOperating Turkish drones from Egyptian territory near the border is concrete Turkey-Egypt security convergence — the Cairo-Ankara thaw turned into a shared logistics footprint against a common Emirati-backed adversary.Drone war's civilian toll880 civilians killed by drones in four months (>80% of deaths) is the human cost of the same UAV proliferation that drives Turkey's African export model — the TB2-class systems sold as counterterror tools fuelling a mass-casualty stalemate. - 3 23 May 2026 Turkey courts both Libyan armies to enforce its 2019 maritime claimTripoli, Libya
Turkey hosted joint military exercises with personnel from both of Libya's rival armies for the first time, signalling a strategic pivot to engage the eastern Benghazi administration it had previously fought. Ankara's aim is to secure support for the 2019 maritime-boundary agreement that would grant Turkey access to eastern-Mediterranean energy reserves. The move is opposed by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel, who reject the EEZ corridor the deal carves out. It marks Ankara's bid to lock its disputed maritime claim into place by winning over the Haftar-aligned east.
Pivot to the rival eastEngaging the Benghazi administration Turkey bombed in 2019–20 is a hard strategic reversal aimed at one prize — eastern ratification of the maritime MoU, which only becomes legally durable if both Libyan governments endorse it rather than just Tripoli.EEZ access as the payoffThe exercises are instrumentally tied to offshore gas: a unified Libyan endorsement of the 2019 corridor would give Turkish firms a legal basis to drill in waters Greece and Cyprus also claim, turning military diplomacy directly into resource rights.Anti-Ankara coalitionGreece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel jointly opposing the deal shows Turkey's Libya play hardening an eastern-Mediterranean counter-bloc — the same four states arrayed against Ankara from the EastMed gas dispute to the Israel-Somaliland tilt. - 22 May 2026 Libya and Syria join EFES-2026, which closes with a record 50 nationsİzmir, Turkey (EFES-2026)
EFES-2026 concluded on May 21 with a record 50 nations and over 10,000 personnel, including Libya's unified rival forces and Syria's first-ever foreign exercise. Libya deployed 502 troops — 331 eastern and 171 western — who trained under a single Libyan flag, the first joint foreign deployment of the rival factions, supporting Ankara's 'One Libya, One Army' goal, with the patrol craft Shafak in the naval phase; Syria sent ~50 personnel. The drill showcased the Bayraktar TB3 operating from TCG Anadolu, the Steel Dome integrated air-defence system, and a KARGU loitering-munition swarm run by a single operator, alongside the Kaan fighter, Hürjet trainer and Anka-3 stealth drone. A defence-tech competition drew 292 applications from 69 universities.
Exercise as marketing showroomFielding the carrier-launched TB3, Steel Dome and a single-operator KARGU swarm before 50 nations turns EFES into a live sales catalogue — the same Bayraktar/Aselsan systems already exported across Africa demonstrated to prospective buyers in one venue.Both Libyas under one flagThe 331-east/171-west split training as one delegation is the unification play consummated — 502 Libyan troops operationally fused, the strongest signal yet that Ankara can deliver the single Libyan counterpart its 2019 maritime claim needs.Convening powerA record 50-nation turnout including first-time Syria positions Turkey as a multinational exercise host on par with major-power conveners — soft-power leverage that normalises its expanding client roster as routine military diplomacy. - 22 May 2026 Türkiye unveils new energy corridors from Central Asia and the GulfIstanbul (INRES 2026)
At the 2nd Istanbul Natural Resources Summit, President Erdoğan and Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar unveiled a 'new energy architecture' built around alternative corridors, citing the Iran conflict as proof of energy-security fragility. Plans include extending the Iraq-Türkiye oil pipeline to Basra, a Saudi-Jordan-Syria-Türkiye electricity interconnection, transporting Turkmenistan's gas via the Trans-Caspian pipeline, maximising TANAP/TurkStream/BTC capacity, $30bn in grid investment, and a TANAP-modelled electricity corridor linking Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bulgaria and southeast Europe. The INRES panel included energy ministers from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Libya, Moldova, Nigeria, Sudan and Somalia, and Bayraktar said talks on Turkmen gas via Azerbaijan and Turkey are near agreement.
Hub strategy on Hormuz failurePitching corridors from Central Asia and the Gulf 'to Europe' while Hormuz is shut is Ankara monetising the chokepoint crisis — positioning Turkish pipelines and grids as the diversification route every buyer now needs, with the Trans-Caspian Turkmen-gas link the keystone.African energy ministers at the tableSeating Libya, Nigeria, Sudan and Somalia's energy ministers on the panel folds Turkey's African security clients into its energy-corridor architecture — the military 'Somalia model' and the pipeline map converging on the same partner list.Grid as the new pipelineA TANAP-modelled electricity corridor through Azerbaijan-Georgia-Bulgaria plus a Saudi-Jordan-Syria interconnection shifts Turkey's transit role from oil and gas into power transmission — a harder-to-bypass form of infrastructural leverage over southeast Europe. - 18 May 2026 Iran war deepens proxy rivalry in the Red Sea and Horn of AfricaRed Sea / Horn of Africa
The US-Iran war intensified proxy conflicts around the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, polarising rival blocs into a battle for resources, coastal real estate and chokepoint influence. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz heightened the strategic value of maritime chokepoints, fuelling competition for ports and bases. The war deepened rifts between an Israel/UAE bloc and an Egypt/Saudi Arabia/Turkey bloc, and worsened conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia and Somaliland. The escalation threatened US and European interests across the region.
Chokepoint substitutionHormuz's closure shifts strategic weight onto the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb, making Turkey's TURKSOM base and Somali coastline assets in an alternative chokepoint corridor — coastal real estate whose value spikes precisely as the Gulf route fails.Bloc hardeningThe war crystallising an Egypt/Saudi/Turkey bloc against Israel/UAE places Ankara on a defined side of the Horn contest, aligning its Somalia and Sudan footprints with Cairo and Riyadh against the Israel-Somaliland axis.Resource-and-real-estate scrambleReframing the Horn as a 'battle for resources and coastal real estate' is the structural demand signal behind Turkey's base-and-energy deals — outside powers racing to bank ports and exploration rights before the post-war map sets. - 16 May 2026 pivotal Turkey deploys F-16s and tanks to its Somalia base as Israel backs SomalilandMogadishu, Somalia
Turkey significantly increased its economic and military presence in Somalia, deploying F-16 jets and tanks to its largest overseas military base, building a space port, and signing energy-exploration agreements. The deepening partnership drew scrutiny over alleged interference in Somali politics amid an election dispute. Israel challenged Turkey by recognising Somaliland and weighing a military presence there, raising risks of regional destabilisation. The rivalry placed two outside powers on opposite sides of the Horn's contested coastline.
Base upgraded to combat airpowerStationing F-16s and tanks at TURKSOM turns a training base — which has already put ~16,000 Somali troops and Gorgor commandos through it — into a forward combat-airpower platform on the Red Sea approaches, the most capable Turkish projection node in Africa.Energy lock-inPairing the deployment with offshore energy-exploration deals converts security guarantees into resource access off the Somali coast — the security-for-profit core of the 'Somalia model' made literal in hydrocarbons.Proxy split with IsraelIsrael recognising Somaliland and eyeing a base there opens a direct Turkey–Israel contest over the Horn's coastline, dragging the post-Iran-war Israeli–Turkish rivalry into Somali territory and the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb approaches. - 15 May 2026 Erdoğan calls for Turkic solidarity and leads AI-and-defence integration at OTSTurkistan, Kazakhstan
At the OTS informal summit in Turkistan, Erdoğan called for greater Turkic solidarity over crises in Palestine, Lebanon, Iran and Ukraine, signed 13 agreements on investment, energy, defence and infrastructure, and announced Türkiye would prioritise cybersecurity cooperation during its OTS chairmanship. He advocated wider use of a common Turkic alphabet and AI-based Turkish language models, and proposed a 'unity in digital vision.' Leaders launched joint AI centres, an Artificial Intelligence University for Turkic students, a 'Five Million AI Leaders' programme and a Uzbek-proposed 'Digital Turkic Corridor,' while the Trans-Caspian fibre-optic cable between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan nears operation. The combined OTS economy reached $2.4 trillion in 2025.
Defence-and-cyber institutionalisationSigning 13 agreements spanning defence and making cybersecurity Turkey's chairmanship priority moves the OTS from cultural club toward a security bloc — Ankara wiring joint military training and cyber cooperation into a standing institution it is about to chair.Digital-corridor layerThe Trans-Caspian fibre-optic cable plus the Uzbek 'Digital Turkic Corridor' build a data spine parallel to the physical Middle Corridor — extending Turkish-led connectivity from rail and gas into the information layer across the Caspian.Language as soft infrastructurePushing a common Turkic alphabet and Turkish-language AI models is durable soft-power engineering — embedding Turkey's linguistic and technological standards into a $2.4tn, 170-million-person bloc that outlasts any single agreement. - 14 May 2026 Erdoğan frames the Turkic world as 'the key to peace in Eurasia' at the OTS summitAstana, Kazakhstan
President Erdoğan visited Kazakhstan for the Organization of Turkic States summit, publishing an article titled 'The Key to Peace in Eurasia: The Turkic World' and calling the Middle Corridor the 'modern-day equivalent of the Silk Road,' with plans to increase Kazakh oil transport via Turkish routes. He and President Tokayev signed a Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Expanded Strategic Partnership, setting a €13bn bilateral trade target, and cited Turkish investment in Kazakhstan near €5bn and over 550 completed projects. Agreements covered UAV production, oil and gas, legal assistance, education and finance, and Erdoğan received the first-ever Order of Qoja Ahmet Yasawi. He then departed Astana for Turkistan to attend the OTS Informal Summit.
Middle Corridor as strategic spineBranding the Middle Corridor the 'modern Silk Road' and pledging more Kazakh oil via Turkish routes ties Central Asian energy flows to Turkish territory — the Trans-Caspian / TITR axis that lets Ankara monetise its position between China and Europe as the Russia route is shunned.UAV-production exportAn agreement on UAV production in Kazakhstan exports Turkey's signature Bayraktar capability into Central Asia, replicating eastward the drone-industrial partnership model Ankara built across Africa — a defence-industrial footprint, not just sales.Symbolic primacyBecoming the first recipient of the Order of Qoja Ahmet Yasawi and authoring the bloc's framing article positions Erdoğan as the Turkic world's ideological leader heading into Turkey's OTS presidency, converting cultural affinity into institutional control. - 4 29 Apr 2026 Libya's rival eastern and western forces train together in Turkey's EFES drillLibya (Tripoli)
For the first time, military personnel from Libya's divided eastern and western forces jointly took part in the EFES-2026 Combined Joint Exercise in Turkey — 331 from the east and 177 from the west — with the Turkish Defence Ministry calling it a step toward a unified Libya. The exercise ran a Computer-Assisted Command Post Phase on April 11–17 and a live phase from April 20 in İzmir, featuring the Libyan naval attack boat LNS Shafak. Both factions had also appeared together at the Flintlock-2026 special-forces exercise in Sirte (April 13–30), the first time Libya hosted a joint-forces operating location per AFRICOM. The effort is backed by the 3+3 Libyan Joint Military Committee.
Unifying a client armyBringing 331 eastern and 177 western Libyan personnel under one programme is Ankara engineering 'One Libya, One Army' from the outside — folding Haftar's east, which Turkey fought in 2019–20, into the same training pipeline as its Tripoli ally to produce a single counterpart that can ratify the 2019 maritime deal.Naval-asset signallingPutting the Libyan attack craft LNS Shafak into the İzmir naval phase ties Libyan maritime forces operationally to Turkey's navy — a concrete step toward the joint eastern-Mediterranean patrol posture the 2019 EEZ corridor would require against Greek and Egyptian claims.Crowding the same theatre as AFRICOMLibya co-hosting Flintlock with the US, France and Italy days earlier shows Ankara operating inside the same multinational space as Western militaries, not against them — positioning Turkish basing as the durable partner once short-term Western exercises end. - 5 29 Apr 2026 Erdoğan invokes Muslim unity across Sudan, Somalia and Yemen conflictsAnkara
At the International Quran Recitation Competition awards ceremony on 29 April 2026, President Erdoğan called for Muslim unity amid conflicts and humanitarian crises in Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen, criticising the international community for inaction. He urged Muslims to set aside internal divisions and support one another. The appeal foregrounded Sudan and Somalia — the two African theatres where Turkish military cooperation is deepest. It framed Ankara's expansion as humanitarian solidarity rather than power projection.
Rhetorical cover for hard powerNaming Sudan, Somalia and Yemen as solidarity causes wraps Turkey's concrete drone-and-base presence in those exact theatres in religious-humanitarian language — the ideological packaging that lets the 'Somalia model' read as fraternity rather than arms sales.Targeting the AES audienceAn appeal to set aside 'internal divisions' speaks directly to the Muslim-majority Sahel juntas (Mali, Niger, Burkina) that Ankara is courting, positioning Turkey as a values-aligned partner against the secular former colonial power France.Ummah leadership claimErdoğan attacking the 'international community' for inaction is a bid for moral leadership of the Muslim world that competes with Gulf rivals (Saudi Arabia, UAE) for the same African and Red Sea clientele.
Background
Turkey's Africa opening began under the 2005 'Year of Africa' policy and grew to 40+ embassies; Erdoğan's 2011 Mogadishu visit during the famine made Somalia the anchor. The TURKSOM base in Mogadishu — Turkey's largest overseas facility, opened 2017 — has trained ~16,000 Somali troops including the Gorgor commando units, with the Turkish contingent raised from ~400 to ~800 in 2025 and parliament authorising up to 2,500. Ankara has since deployed Bayraktar TB2 drones, F-16s and M48/M60 tanks to Mogadishu and announced a Baykar-built 'spaceport' (described by analysts as a missile range), framing Somalia as part of Turkey's 'heartland geography.' This is now the template Defence Minister Güler markets as the 'Somalia model.'
Turkish UAVs are the spearhead of the expansion: African buyers of the TB2/Akıncı/Anka/Aksungur include Libya, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Tunisia and Morocco. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso each took TB2 deliveries from 2022; by 2024 Turkey was West Africa's fourth-largest arms supplier (~11% of imports). As France's Operation Barkhane collapsed and the AES juntas expelled French and then leaned on Russian forces, Ankara moved in offering equipment, training, financing and TİKA soft power (mosques, hospitals, the Maarif Foundation schools) — and access to lithium (Mali), uranium (Niger) and gold (Burkina Faso). Niger received six TB2s and Hürkuş aircraft 2021–22 and the first regular Turkish troop deployment in the region.
On 27 November 2019 Turkey signed twin memoranda with Libya's Tripoli-based GNA: a maritime-delimitation MoU carving an EEZ corridor across the eastern Mediterranean, and a security pact under which Ankara supplied drones, armour and trainers that reversed Haftar's 2020 assault on Tripoli. The maritime deal was condemned by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, the EU and the eastern Tobruk government, and remains the legal lever Ankara wants ratified for offshore gas access. Bringing both rival Libyan armies — eastern and western — to train under one flag at EFES-2026 is Ankara's bid to convert the divided country into a single client that will endorse the 2019 boundary.
The Turkic Council (founded 2009) became the Organization of Turkic States at the 2021 Istanbul summit; members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, with Turkmenistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as observers. Its strategic spine is the Middle Corridor / Trans-Caspian International Transport Route — China-to-Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey — whose traffic surged after 2022 as cargo fled the Russia route. Ankara is pushing the long-stalled Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline to bring Turkmen gas westward, and Energy Minister Bayraktar calls it 'strategically essential.' Erdoğan's drive to take the OTS rotating presidency and add defence, AI and energy integration turns a cultural bloc into a geopolitical base for Turkey's eastern reach.