Turkey & Post-Assad Syria
Assessment
Eighteen months after the December 2024 fall of Bashar al-Assad and the installation of Ahmed al-Sharaa's HTS-rooted government, Turkey has become the dominant outside power in Syria — converting a decade of military intervention and refugee burden into reconstruction, energy and security leverage. The energy spine is now live: Erdoğan announced that Turkish-transited Azerbaijani gas (1.2 bcm/yr from Shah Deniz) is restarting Syrian power plants, and Energy Minister Bayraktar pitched an 'electricity version of TANAP' linking Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Bulgaria atop a $30bn Turkish grid upgrade. The corridor play is the strategic core: Ankara and Damascus revived the 2009 'Four Seas' rail/road/pipeline project (Foreign Ministers Fidan and al-Shaibani in Ankara), Sharaa pitched it at an EU summit in Cyprus drawing $28bn+ in 2025 investment deals, and Transport Minister Uraloğlu detailed a Hejaz Railway revival via Aleppo-Damascus-Jordan toward Oman plus the 1,200km Iraq Development Road — all framed as land alternatives to the Hormuz/Red Sea routes disrupted by the Iran war. Militarily Turkey hosted ~50 Syrian troops and 502 Libyans (both rival factions) at EFES-2026 near İzmir — the reconstituted Syrian army's first-ever foreign exercise — and runs joint MIT-Syrian intelligence operations (10 ISIL suspects detained, Assad-era chemical stocks being cleared with OPCW). Two frictions cut against the narrative: Ankara is policing the story at home — MIT demanded prosecution of journalist Abdullah Bozkurt over an exposé of its jihadi ties, and is prosecuting a former officer over Syrian-defector kidnappings — and the unresolved SDF/Kurdish question runs through the March-2025 integration deal and unconfirmed Mazlum Abdi–Öcalan contacts via a 'channel prepared by Turkey.' With 634,000 of 1.6M returnees coming from Turkey and Erdoğan offering to broker Hezbollah-Lebanon files with Washington, Turkey's Syria role is widening from security guarantor into regional power-broker.
Theatre
Events
- 1 7 Jun 2026 Gaziantep hosts a Türkiye–Syria 'City Economies Summit' to wire Gaziantep to AleppoGaziantep, Turkey
Anadolu's City Economies Summit, hosted by Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality on June 9, 2026, was announced to focus on reviving trade, logistics and production ties between Türkiye and Syria, twinning Gaziantep with Aleppo. Turkish Trade Minister Ömer Bolat and Syrian Economy and Industry Minister Mohammad Nidal al-Shaar were billed as speakers, alongside the governors of both Gaziantep and Aleppo and Anadolu CEO Serdar Karagöz. The headline proposal was a cross-border 'intermediate production ecosystem' built on specially regulated production-and-trade zones between the two cities. It frames reconstruction not as aid but as integrating Aleppo's industry into Turkey's supply chains.
City-pair integrationTwinning Gaziantep (the Turkish industrial hub that absorbed Aleppo's fleeing manufacturers during the war) with Aleppo itself is reconstruction by supply-chain re-stitching — Turkey reclaims the cross-border industrial network Assad-era conflict severed, with Turkish firms positioned as the upstream half.Ministerial-level intentPutting Trade Minister Bolat opposite Syria's Economy Minister al-Shaar, not just business delegations, signals a state-backed framework — 'specially regulated production-and-trade zones' implies tariff/customs carve-outs that only governments can grant, the legal scaffolding for a durable economic dependency.Border-zone economicsLocating an 'intermediate production ecosystem' along the Gaziantep–Aleppo border lets Turkish capital exploit Syrian labor and reconstruction demand at the seam, anchoring returnees on the Syrian side while keeping value capture and finance on the Turkish side. - 4 Jun 2026 Turkey backs Syria's OPCW chemical-weapons cleanup at the UN Security CouncilNew York (UN Security Council)
Türkiye's UN permanent representative Ahmet Yıldız told the Security Council on June 4 that Syria's chemical-weapons dossier was 'one of the most tragic and disturbing legacies of the Assad era,' praising the al-Sharaa government's cooperation with OPCW inspectors in locating undeclared munitions, agents, equipment and documentation. He highlighted a 'Breath of Freedom' task force — Türkiye plus seven other nations — and urged reinstating Syria's rights under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Türkiye had hosted a task-force workshop in Ankara on Feb. 16–17 and pointed to the next meeting in The Hague. It positions Ankara as Damascus's sponsor and validator inside the multilateral system.
Sponsor at the UNSCTurkey vouching for Syrian OPCW cooperation at the Security Council is diplomatic cover-provision — Ankara lends al-Sharaa's untested government international legitimacy on the single dossier (300+ documented Assad-era chemical attacks) most likely to brand it a rogue state.Task-force chairmanshipHosting the 'Breath of Freedom' eight-nation workshop in Ankara and steering it toward The Hague makes Turkey the convening hub of the cleanup, embedding it in the verification architecture rather than leaving Syria to deal bilaterally with the OPCW.Reintegration leverPushing to reinstate Syria's CWC rights converts disarmament cooperation into a readmission ticket — each cleared stockpile is a step toward sanctions relief and the normalized Syria that Turkey's corridor and energy plans require. - 2 3 Jun 2026 A former MIT officer faces life for handing Free Syrian Army defectors to Assad — with a FETÖ twistAnkara, Turkey
An Ankara Chief Prosecutor indictment released June 3 sought 35 years to life for Önder Sığırcıkoğlu, a former MIT officer accused of abducting two Free Syrian Army commanders — Hussein Harmoush and Mustafa Kassoum — in 2011 and handing them to the Assad regime, where Harmoush died under torture. Sığırcıkoğlu, captured on the Syrian–Lebanese border in a joint MIT–post-Baathist Syrian intelligence operation, was also charged with political espionage and with passing MIT information to Russian intelligence between 2014 and 2024 under Assad-regime protection. The indictment alleges FETÖ-linked suspects helped him escape an Osmaniye prison in 2014. The case turns Assad-era betrayals into a present-day prosecution co-run with Damascus.
Joint-intelligence captureSeizing the suspect via a joint MIT–Syrian-intelligence operation on the Syria–Lebanon border is operational proof of the new security partnership — Ankara and Damascus now share fugitive-recovery plumbing across the very border that defined the war.FETÖ overlayFolding a Gülenist (FETÖ) prison-break allegation into a Syria-war kidnapping case fuses Erdoğan's two signature security narratives — the 2016-coup network and Syria policy — letting Ankara recast a decade-old scandal as enemy infiltration rather than its own intelligence failure.Selective accountabilityProsecuting one officer for delivering defectors to Assad lets the state perform justice for war-era crimes while the same agency (MIT) simultaneously suppresses reporting on its jihadi ties — accountability aimed outward, secrecy enforced inward. - 3 3 Jun 2026 Turkey details a Hejaz Railway revival through Syria toward Oman, plus the Iraq Development RoadAnkara, Turkey
Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu said on June 3 that Turkey plans to modernize the historic Hejaz Railway and extend it to Oman as a global trade alternative to the Strait of Hormuz. The initial stage connects Turkey to Aleppo via the existing Aleppo–Damascus–Jordan network while negotiations with Saudi authorities continue, with the final line reaching the Omani coast. Uraloğlu confirmed the design phase is complete for the separate 1,200km Iraq Development Road (Basra to the Turkish border, with UAE, Qatar, Iraq and Turkey funding), which 'awaits a calmer regional environment,' and that the Zangezur Corridor's Kars–Iğdır–Dilucu line tender was finalized. It puts engineering specifics under the corridor rhetoric.
Syria as the missing linkRouting the Hejaz revival through Aleppo–Damascus–Jordan makes Syrian territory the indispensable middle segment between Turkey and the Gulf — without a Turkey-aligned Damascus the whole rail alternative to Hormuz is geographically impossible.Two corridors, one hedgeAdvancing the Hejaz/Four-Seas line and the $1,200km Iraq Development Road in parallel gives Ankara redundant land routes to the Gulf — a deliberate hedge so no single chokepoint (Hormuz, the Red Sea, or an unstable Iraq) can sever Turkey's bid to be Europe's gateway to Gulf trade.Conditioned on calmUraloğlu's admission that the Development Road 'awaits a calmer regional environment' exposes the binding constraint: the corridors are bankable only if Turkey can deliver the regional stability — in Syria above all — that it is selling itself as the guarantor of. - 4 1 Jun 2026 pivotal Erdoğan: Turkish-transited Azerbaijani gas is restarting Syria's power plantsSyria
President Erdoğan said on June 1, in a message to Baku Energy Week delivered by Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, that Turkey and Azerbaijan had begun natural-gas exports to Syria — flows of 1.2 billion cubic meters annually from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field, transited through Turkey — used to restart Syrian power plants and meet basic energy needs in conflict-affected areas, calling the contribution to Syria's development 'indisputable.' Bayraktar announced a new 'electricity version of TANAP': a Green Electricity Transmission and Trade corridor linking Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Bulgaria, backed by a planned $30bn Turkish grid upgrade over a decade. Erdoğan noted Turkey had backed Syria's opposition through the 13-year war and is now a main ally of the new government. It makes Turkey the literal power source of post-Assad Syria.
Keep-the-lights-on leverageSupplying 1.2 bcm/yr of Azerbaijani gas that physically restarts Syrian power plants gives Ankara a switch over the new state's electricity — a dependency far stickier than aid, since cutting it would dark Syrian cities and is itself routed entirely through Turkish pipe.The TANAP-electricity gridBayraktar's Turkey–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Bulgaria 'electricity TANAP' plus a $30bn grid upgrade extends Turkey's role from gas-transit state to the region's electricity clearing-house, wiring Syria into a Turkish-anchored grid that reaches the EU border at Bulgaria.Azerbaijan as co-patronDoing this jointly with Baku (Shah Deniz gas, the TANAP analogy) institutionalizes the Turkey–Azerbaijan axis as Syria's energy patron — the same partnership that runs the Zangezur Corridor — extending Ankara's 'two states, one nation' energy bloc into the Levant. - 29 May 2026 Sharaa pitches the 'Four Seas' corridor at an EU summit, drawing $28bn in Syria investment dealsCyprus (EU summit)
Syria's interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa formally proposed the 'Four Seas' project at an emergency EU summit in Cyprus, positioning post-Assad Syria as a land-based transit hub linking the Mediterranean, Black, Caspian and Arabian seas as an alternative to the closed Strait of Hormuz and an insecure Red Sea. Per analysis carried by the events feed, Sharaa's 'zero problems' policy and neutrality in the Iran war had already drawn at least $28 billion in 2025 investment deals from Middle Eastern states, with US majors Chevron and ConocoPhillips signing on and Sharaa invited to a June 2026 G-7 summit. The pitch overlaps directly with Turkey's revived corridor plans, making Ankara and Damascus co-promoters of the same map.
Iran-war demand shockThe corridor's commercial case rests on Hormuz being effectively closed and the Red Sea insecure from the Iran war — Syria and Turkey are monetizing the disruption of the rival maritime routes, so the pitch's viability is hostage to whether the Gulf chokepoints reopen.$28bn validationAt least $28bn in 2025 deals plus Chevron and ConocoPhillips signing converts the corridor from aspiration to capital commitment — and draws US energy majors into a Syria that Turkey is simultaneously wiring, aligning American and Turkish commercial interests on the same ground.Brussels and the G-7 open upSharaa pitching at an EU summit in Cyprus and being invited to the G-7 shows Western normalization of the HTS-rooted government is racing ahead — each diplomatic upgrade de-risks the corridor and validates Turkey's bet on being its indispensable transit partner. - 5 24 May 2026 pivotal Fidan and al-Shaibani revive the 2009 'Four Seas' project in AnkaraAnkara, Turkey
Foreign Ministers Hakan Fidan (Türkiye) and Asaad al-Shaibani (Syria) announced in Ankara the revival of the Four Seas Project — a rail, road and pipeline initiative first proposed by Ankara in 2009 and shelved when the Syrian civil war began in 2011 — as part of a broader strategic partnership. The project aims to connect the Persian Gulf, Mediterranean, Black Sea and Caspian Sea, making both countries central transit hubs amid the Hormuz closure. US ambassador and Syria envoy Tom Barrack publicly promoted it as a route around Hormuz and the Red Sea; the EU restored a cooperation framework with Syria; and Türkiye, Syria and Jordan signed a trilateral deal to revive the Hejaz Railway and link it to Saudi Arabia's network. It is the formal launch of the Turkey-Syria corridor partnership.
From 2009 to nowReviving the exact project Ankara floated to Assad in 2009 — dead for 15 years — signals that Turkey sees al-Sharaa's Syria as finally pliable enough to build the connector state it always wanted, with the regime change being the unlock the original plan lacked.US blessing via BarrackTom Barrack, US ambassador to Türkiye and Syria envoy, publicly promoting the corridor means Washington is endorsing a Turkish-Syrian transit axis as an anti-Iran/anti-Hormuz hedge — rare US-Turkey alignment that lowers the geopolitical risk premium on the whole scheme.The trilateral rail spineThe Türkiye–Syria–Jordan Hejaz deal linking to Saudi Arabia's network is the concrete first leg — a Gulf-to-Europe land bridge whose every kilometer through Syria deepens Damascus's structural reliance on staying inside Turkey's orbit. - 23 May 2026 Turkish and Syrian intelligence run a joint operation netting 10 ISIL suspectsSyria
Türkiye's MIT and Syrian intelligence services arrested 10 suspected ISIL (Daesh) members in a joint operation inside Syria on May 23, all wanted under Interpol Red Notices and brought to Türkiye for prosecution; nine were jailed pending trial. The detainees were Turkish nationals who had crossed into Syria to join Daesh, and included Ömer Deniz Dündar, linked via fingerprint evidence to perpetrators of the 2015 Ankara train-station bombing that killed 109 people. Others named were Ali Bora, an alleged Daesh intelligence figure for the group's 'Türkiye province,' and Hüseyin Peri of its health unit. It demonstrates an operational counter-terror partnership with the al-Sharaa security apparatus.
Operational integrationMIT and Syria's new intelligence service jointly arresting Red-Notice suspects and extraditing them to Turkey shows the security partnership has moved past declarations into shared field operations — Ankara now polices Syrian territory with Damascus's cooperation, not against it.Closing old casesCapturing a man tied by fingerprint evidence to the 2015 Ankara bombing (109 dead) lets Erdoğan show the post-Assad order delivering justice for Turkey's worst ISIL attack — converting the security partnership into a domestic political dividend.Counter-ISIL as legitimacyFraming the new Syrian intelligence service as a reliable counter-Daesh partner directly answers the Western worry that an HTS-rooted government is a jihadi risk — every joint ISIL arrest is an argument that Turkey's Syria is a security provider, not a threat. - 22 May 2026 pivotal Syria's reconstituted army makes its first-ever foreign deployment at Turkey's EFES-2026İzmir, Turkey
Libya and Syria deployed troops to Turkey's EFES-2026 Combined Joint Live-Fire Field Exercise near İzmir, the first time either country had taken part in a military exercise on foreign soil; the live-fire phase concluded May 21 with over 10,000 personnel from 50 nations. Syria's roughly 50-person contingent marked the newly reconstituted Syrian army's first-ever exercise abroad, while Libya's 502 troops — 331 eastern and 171 western — trained under a single flag toward Ankara's 'One Libya, One Army' goal. Turkish officials framed both as part of Ankara's military-restructuring and advisory programs and said cooperation would expand. It dramatizes Turkey rebuilding two post-conflict armies in its own image.
Army-building as influenceHosting the reconstituted Syrian army's debut foreign drill makes Turkey the trainer and template for Syria's new military — the deepest form of security dependency, since doctrine, command habits and equipment standards set at İzmir lock in Turkish influence for a generation.Two clients, one stagePutting Syrian and rival-Libyan contingents at the same exercise showcases Turkey as the rehabilitator of post-conflict armies across two theaters — a deliberate demonstration to other fragile states that Ankara, not the US or Russia, is the address for army reconstruction.Advisory-program scaffoldingOfficials tying the deployment to 'military-restructuring and advisory programs' confirms embedded Turkish advisers inside the Syrian force — institutional penetration that outlasts any single exercise and gives Ankara eyes inside Damascus's chain of command. - 20 May 2026 Erdoğan and Trump discuss Syria and Lebanon by phone; Trump calls him 'a great ally'Ankara, Turkey
Presidents Erdoğan and Trump held a phone call on May 20, 2026, covering bilateral ties, regional stability and the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara. On Syria, Erdoğan stressed that lasting stability there would be 'an important gain for the entire region' and that Türkiye's support for Syria 'would continue uninterrupted,' while also urging against further deterioration in Lebanon and calling the extended Iran ceasefire 'a positive development.' Trump afterward told reporters at Joint Base Andrews the call was 'very good,' said 'I have a relationship with him that nobody else does,' and called Erdoğan 'a great ally.' It signals US deference to Turkey's lead on the Syria file.
US lead-deferenceErdoğan telling Trump Turkish support for Syria will be 'uninterrupted' and Trump responding with effusive praise signals Washington is content to let Ankara run point on stabilizing Syria — a green light that lowers the risk of US-Turkey friction over the SDF and reconstruction.Bundling LebanonErdoğan raising Lebanon in the same call as Syria stakes a claim to a wider Levant brokerage role (consistent with his Hezbollah-mediation offer), using the Syria rapport with Trump to expand Turkey's portfolio beyond its own border.NATO-summit linkageTying the Syria conversation to the Ankara NATO summit lets Erdoğan trade alliance hosting for US latitude on his regional agenda — personal-relationship diplomacy ('nobody else does') that converts Trump's goodwill into operational freedom in Syria. - 17 May 2026 pivotal Report claims SDF commander Mazlum Abdi was taken to meet Öcalan via 'a channel prepared by Turkey'İmralı / northern Syria
A KDP-linked Iraqi Kurdistan site, Darka Mazi, reported that SDF commander Mazlum Abdi (Ferhat Abdi Şahin) and SDF external-relations head İlham Ahmed were secretly taken to İmralı island prison in March 2026 through 'a channel prepared by Turkey' to meet imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, who allegedly urged them toward the 'Terror-Free Turkey' process. A 9 May claim had similarly placed PKK figures Sabri Ok and Bese Hozat at İmralı before a July 2025 symbolic weapon-burning ceremony in Sulaymaniyah. As of May 17 neither the Presidency's Disinformation Centre, the Justice Ministry nor MİT — which coordinates the process under İbrahim Kalın — had denied it. The unconfirmed contacts tie Syria's Kurdish question directly to Ankara's domestic Kurdish track.
Cross-border channelIf real, Turkey ferrying the SDF's top commander to İmralı means Ankara is using its custody of Öcalan as leverage over the Syrian Kurdish force it has fought for years — folding the SDF integration problem into the same MİT-run track (under Kalın) as its domestic PKK process.Official silence as tellThree named institutions (Presidency, Justice Ministry, MİT) declining to deny the İmralı claims is itself a signal — non-denial keeps a secret backchannel deniable while letting the idea that Abdi answers to Öcalan circulate, pressuring the SDF's standing in Damascus.Spillover into the AKP baseThe unverified reports opened debate inside the AK Parti over whether Parliament should legislate the process before the PKK disarms — showing how the Syrian SDF file directly destabilizes Erdoğan's domestic coalition management, not just Turkey-Syria relations. - 2 May 2026 UN: 1.6M Syrian refugees have returned since Assad fell — 634,000 from TurkeySyria
More than 1.6 million Syrian refugees have returned to Syria since the late-2024 change of power, per UNHCR data cited by Welt am Sonntag, with the largest contingents from neighboring Turkey (634,000), Lebanon (621,000) and Jordan (284,000); Germany accounted for just 6,100. German Chancellor Merz had received al-Sharaa in March to discuss a return framework, with a denied '80%' target floated, while Foreign Minister Wadephul cast doubt on short-term mass returns after visiting the devastated town of Harasta ('hardly any people can live with dignity'). The figures quantify Turkey's stake: it hosted the largest Syrian population and is now the largest source of returns.
Domestic-pressure release634,000 returns from Turkey is the single largest national outflow, easing the anti-refugee political pressure that drove Erdoğan's Syria policy — every returnee converts a domestic liability (part of the ~3M hosted) into a stakeholder in a Turkey-aligned Syria.Reconstruction as return-engineReturns scale only as fast as Syria becomes livable — Wadephul's Harasta remark ('hardly any people can live with dignity') ties Turkey's housing/grid/energy reconstruction directly to its ability to keep the return numbers climbing toward politically useful levels.Leverage over EuropeTurkey demonstrating it can drive returns (vs. Germany's 6,100) strengthens Ankara's hand in EU migration bargaining — proof that Turkish-managed Syrian stability, not European processing, is what actually empties the camps. - 29 Apr 2026 Turkey offers to broker a Hezbollah arrangement between the US and LebanonBeirut, Lebanon
Türkiye approached the US and Lebanon with a proposal to help broker an arrangement involving Hezbollah, per sources cited by The Jerusalem Post, seeking an active mediator role; Washington gave no clear answer. The offer came amid a fragile Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire with ongoing violations and over a million displaced from southern Lebanon and Beirut, after Ankara delivered 360 tons of aid through the Port of Beirut. The report noted Türkiye had become a significant player in Syria under al-Sharaa even as Israel sought to block Turkish military bases there, and had earlier insisted any Iran deal also cover Lebanon. It shows Turkey leveraging its Syria position to claim a wider Levant broker role.
Syria springboardAnkara pitching itself as a Hezbollah mediator flows directly from its new Syria standing — controlling the overland approaches and the post-Assad order gives Turkey the geographic and political standing to claim relevance on Lebanon's Iran-backed armed group.Aid-then-mediatePairing the 360-ton Beirut aid delivery with a mediation offer is influence-building by sequence — humanitarian access first, political broker status second — the same reconstruction-to-leverage playbook Turkey runs inside Syria, now extended to Lebanon.Washington's non-answerThe US neither accepting nor rejecting the offer marks the ceiling on Turkey's Levant ambition: Ankara can self-nominate as broker, but on Hezbollah it still needs an American yes it has not gotten, unlike the lead it enjoys inside Syria. - 28 Apr 2026 MIT secretly demands prosecution of a journalist over an exposé of its Syria jihadi tiesAnkara, Turkey
Turkey's MIT intelligence agency secretly demanded the prosecution of Sweden-based Turkish journalist Abdullah Bozkurt over an investigative article exposing its covert wartime ties to jihadist groups in Syria, triggering a criminal investigation and trial in absentia. A secret January 22, 2025 letter signed by MIT legal counsel on behalf of intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın complained that Bozkurt had detailed MIT's relationship with Anas Hasan Khattab — now director of Syria's General Intelligence Service, and a man designated by the US (2012) and UN (2014) over al-Qaeda links. The article said senior MIT officer Kemal Eskintan, alias 'Abu Furqan,' had handled Khattab. The case exposes the uncomfortable jihadi lineage beneath Ankara's Syria win.
Khattab now runs Syrian intelThe exposé's core fact — that a US/UN-designated al-Qaeda-linked figure MIT once handled, Anas Khattab, now heads Syria's intelligence service — is precisely why Ankara wants it buried: Turkey's chief security partner in Damascus is a man it spent years shielding from terror designations.Cross-border lawfareMIT pursuing a Sweden-based journalist via in-absentia prosecution extends Ankara's information control beyond its borders, signaling that exposing the jihadi plumbing of its Syria policy carries legal risk even in exile — chilling the reporting that complicates the reconstruction narrative.Kalın's fingerprintsThe demand running through intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın — the same official steering the SDF/'Terror-Free Turkey' process — shows one hand managing both the Kurdish track and the suppression of MIT's jihadi history, the two reputational liabilities of Turkey's Syria project.
Background
Bashar al-Assad's regime collapsed in December 2024 after a lightning offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army captured Damascus; Assad fled to Russia. HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa became interim president and published a constitutional declaration in March 2025, adopting a 'zero problems' / connector-state foreign policy to break isolation. Turkey — which had backed the opposition through the 13-year civil war and whose negotiation overtures Assad had rebuffed — emerged as the principal regional winner and one of the new government's main allies, anchoring this entire situation.
Turkey's post-Assad dominance rests on a decade of forward presence: Operation Euphrates Shield (2016, Azaz–al-Bab–Jarablus), Operation Olive Branch (2018, Afrin) and Operation Peace Spring (2019, the northeast), which carved a ~460km-by-30km buffer/'safe zone' along the border. Ankara took on reconstruction there — brick housing, restored municipal services, infrastructure — explicitly to enable refugee returns, while hosting over 3 million Syrians, the world's largest Syrian refugee population. That military-and-reconstruction footprint is the platform Turkey now scales nationwide under al-Sharaa, and the domestic refugee pressure that makes returns politically urgent.
The unresolved knot is the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). A March 11, 2025 deal between al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazlum Abdi agreed to fold Kurdish military and civil institutions into the Syrian state, but implementation stalled over whether SDF fighters merge as autonomous units or are dissolved, with a phased-integration ceasefire reached only in early 2026. Turkey — which treats the SDF's core as the Syrian wing of the PKK — keeps pressing Damascus to absorb it, tying the file to Ankara's domestic 'Terror-Free Turkey' process under intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın. (The Turkey–Israel rupture and the PKK domestic peace process are tracked as separate situations.)
Syria's pitch — funding reconstruction by serving as the Middle East's new transit hub — dovetails with Turkey's connectivity ambitions. The 'Four Seas' project, first floated by then-President Abdullah Gül in Damascus in 2009 and shelved in 2011, would link the Mediterranean, Black, Caspian and Arabian seas by rail, road and pipeline; it now sits alongside the Iraq Development Road and the Middle Corridor as land alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. US special envoy Tom Barrack publicly revived the concept, the EU restored a cooperation framework with Damascus, and Gulf states plus US energy majors signed deals — making Turkish-Syrian connectivity a contest for who controls the wires, rails and pipes of a reopening Syria.