GrayscaleInsight GrayscaleInsight
[UA] External ongoing updated 2026-06-09

Ukraine's Fight for EU Membership

▲ Building · since 30 Apr 2026 · 13 events

Assessment

Ukraine's accession bid moved from a stalled, blocked process toward the brink of its first concrete milestone — and a structural fight over what membership Ukraine is being offered. The veto held by Viktor Orbán's Hungary fell with his April 2026 electoral defeat, but the obstacle did not vanish: incoming PM Péter Magyar conditioned support for opening the Fundamentals cluster on legal guarantees for the ~70,000-80,000 ethnic Hungarians of Zakarpattia, and on 6 June moved the block from the start to the end of the road, pledging a binding national referendum on Ukraine's final accession. As Hungary stepped back, France, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and Italy aired reservations about fast-tracking a large, poor, agricultural state into the CAP and cohesion budgets, and Berlin floated 'associate membership' — Council and Parliament seats without voting rights, gradual single-market access, subsidies delayed. Zelensky rejected it outright as 'half-measures' and 'ersatz membership' in a 22 May letter to Costa, von der Leyen and Christodoulides, demanding full and equal accession; FM Sybiha and DPM Kachka pressed to open all six clusters by June-July. By early June a Hungary-Ukraine minority-rights deal had cleared the first cluster for a 15 June intergovernmental conference, even as a draft law weakening judicial-integrity checks threatened €700m in EU Facility funds. The open question: whether the Fundamentals-first machinery, unanimity at every step, and member-state cost fears let Ukraine convert candidate momentum into a closed deal by its 2027 target — or whether 'gradual integration' becomes a permanent waiting room.

Theatre

Persian GulfGulf of OmanMediterraneanRed SeaBlack SeaCaspian SeaBaltic Sea IRANIRAQSAUDI ARABIASYRIATURKEYJORDANOMANU.A.E.YEMENUKRAINERUSSIABELARUSPOLANDROMANIA

Events

  1. 1 8 Jun 2026 A draft law weakening judicial-integrity checks threatens €700m in EU Facility funds
    Kyiv

    On 8 June 2026 analysis by the DEJURE Foundation found that Draft Law 13165-2 in Ukraine's parliament would weaken verification of judges' integrity declarations — removing key questions on asset matching, oath violations and family ties, and narrowing liability to nearly unprovable intentional lying. The law risks undermining anti-corruption reforms and jeopardising €700 million in EU Ukraine Facility funding, following the major corruption scandal involving former Supreme Court Chief Justice Kniazev. The same week, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos visited Kyiv to support Ukraine's reform progress and winter recovery, meeting DPM Yuliia Svyrydenko.

    Self-inflicted risk to the gateway clusterA domestic bill weakening judicial-integrity checks strikes at the exact substance of Cluster 1 (judiciary, rule of law, anti-corruption) just as that cluster is set to open — the clearest example of how Ukraine's own legislature can undercut the 'irreversible track record' the Fundamentals-First rule demands, handing reservation-minded capitals fresh ammunition.
    €700m as the conditionality price tagThe €700m in EU Ukraine Facility funding at risk quantifies the financial cost of rule-of-law backsliding — conditionality is not abstract: weakening judicial verification directly threatens a concrete tranche, making anti-corruption reform a live budget question, not a box-ticking exercise.
    Commissioner on the ground as counterweightKos visiting Kyiv the same week to back reform progress is the EU applying personal, in-country pressure precisely as the draft law surfaces — the enlargement chief's presence is the mechanism by which Brussels signals that the cluster opening and the funding both hinge on Kyiv not passing this bill.
  2. 6 Jun 2026 pivotal Hungary agrees to lift its veto on opening the first cluster but defers a final block to a referendum
    Hungary / Ukraine

    On 6 June 2026 Hungarian PM Péter Magyar announced a comprehensive agreement with Ukraine on minority rights for ethnic Hungarians in Zakarpattia — broader educational, cultural, linguistic and political rights, restored minority-language schools and Hungarian symbols — conditional on Ukraine legislating it. In return, Hungary would support opening the first EU accession cluster (Fundamentals). But Magyar pledged a binding national referendum on Ukraine's final accession, effectively moving the veto from the start to the end of the process. The agreement, described as a significant Kyiv concession on education rights, cleared the way for an intergovernmental conference to formally open Cluster 1 on 15 June in Luxembourg, with Council endorsement expected at the 18 June summit.

    The veto moved, not removedMagyar trading cluster-opening for a binding referendum on final accession is the defining manoeuvre of this thread: it converts an early-stage block — which the Fundamentals deal resolves — into an end-stage one that no EU mechanism can bypass, so Ukraine can open every cluster and still face a Hungarian popular vote at the finish line.
    Concession on education rightsKyiv legislating restored minority-language schools and Hungarian symbols for Zakarpattia is a concrete sovereignty concession on its own education and language policy — the specific price of clearing Cluster 1, showing accession progress bought with domestic legislative change, not just diplomatic goodwill.
    A dated, located milestoneThe deal produces the thread's first hard milestone: an intergovernmental conference on 15 June in Luxembourg formally opening Fundamentals, with Council endorsement on 18 June — turning a year of stalling into a scheduled, venue-specific opening of the gateway cluster that paces all the rest.
  3. 2 26 May 2026 Ukraine's negotiator Umerov meets E3 security advisers in Berlin amid the membership rift
    Berlin

    Rustem Umerov, Secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council, arrived in Berlin on 26 May 2026 for talks with the national security advisers of Germany, France and the UK (the E3 group), following a massive Russian strike on Kyiv and Moscow's warning for foreign diplomats to leave the capital. The meeting unfolded amid the open rift between Chancellor Merz and President Zelensky over Merz's 'associate membership' proposal, which Zelensky had rejected in favour of full membership. The talks signalled European efforts to take a greater role in Ukraine's diplomacy after the US indicated it would step back from mediation.

    The architect of 'associate' hosts the negotiatorUmerov meeting E3 advisers in Berlin — Merz's capital, days after Merz's associate-membership pitch and Zelensky's rejection — puts Ukraine's chief negotiator face-to-face with the very government whose membership formula Kyiv just refused, fusing the accession dispute into the broader E3 diplomatic channel rather than keeping it a separate Brussels track.
    Adviser-level plumbingAn NSDC-secretary meeting with E3 national security advisers is the working-level machinery beneath the leaders' clashes — the channel where the associate-versus-full disagreement gets managed in detail, and where Kyiv lobbies the three biggest member states (well, two EU members plus the UK) directly rather than through the Commission.
    Membership entangled with the security roleConvening on EU-membership tensions inside a meeting about Europe's expanded diplomatic role shows the two are now linked: the same E3 states asked to lead on Ukraine's security are the ones offering it a diminished EU status, a contradiction Kyiv presses by raising both at once.
  4. 3 23 May 2026 pivotal Zelensky rejects 'associate' EU membership, demanding full and equal accession in a letter to EU leaders
    Kyiv

    On 22-23 May 2026 President Zelensky formally rejected the German-backed proposal for associate EU membership — which would deny Ukraine voting rights — in a letter to European Council President António Costa, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides. He argued Ukraine defends Europe 'fully, not partially, and not with half-measures,' that it would be 'unfair for Ukraine to be in the European Union but remain voiceless,' and that no complete European project is possible without Ukraine. FM Sybiha reiterated the position, neither endorsing nor rejecting Merz's specific format but stressing it could not replace full membership; Slovakia's Robert Fico opposed the associate format from the other direction. Zelensky noted Orbán's removal had created an opening to advance accession talks.

    The vote is the red lineZelensky's specific objection — that associate status leaves Ukraine 'voiceless' in a Union it would belong to — locates the entire fight on one feature: voting rights. Merz's model offers seats and market access but withholds the vote, and it is that single subtraction, not the gradualism, that Kyiv frames as unacceptable second-class status.
    Letter to three named principalsAddressing the rejection to Costa, von der Leyen and Christodoulides — Council, Commission and the Cypriot presidency steering the June cluster opening — targets the exact decision-makers, converting a public 'half-measures' line into a formal démarche aimed at the bodies that will rule on the associate-versus-full question.
    Defence-as-claim argumentZelensky tying the membership demand to Ukraine defending Europe 'fully, not partially' reframes accession as earned entitlement rather than applicant supplication — a rhetorical move that pressures member states to treat a country bleeding for the continent's security as a peer, not a probationary associate.
  5. 4 22 May 2026 Ukraine pushes to open all six EU negotiation clusters by June, citing the removed Hungarian obstacle
    Kyiv

    On 22 May 2026 Ukrainian FM Andrii Sybiha insisted on formally opening all six EU negotiation clusters by June, saying the main political obstacle posed by Hungary's previous government had been removed after the elections, and confirmed preparations for a Zelensky-Magyar meeting. He rejected Merz's 'associated membership' proposal and Schröder as a peace mediator. DPM Taras Kachka urged the EU to open all six clusters in June, noting three were ready a year earlier before Hungary began blocking; Commissioner Marta Kos confirmed the first cluster could open in June under Cyprus's presidency and the rest in July under Ireland's. Slovak FM Juraj Blanár confirmed Slovakia's support for opening the first cluster, and Italy's FM Antonio Tajani separately reaffirmed Italian backing for Ukraine's full membership.

    All six versus oneSybiha and Kachka demanding all six clusters open by June directly contests Magyar's offer of one — Kyiv's maximal ask is designed to bank momentum before member-state reservations on agriculture and cohesion can re-coalesce around the later clusters, treating speed itself as protection against the slow lane.
    Three clusters were ready a year agoKachka's specific claim that three clusters were ready before Hungary started blocking quantifies the cost of the veto in lost time — it reframes the current push not as a new demand but as recovering a year that obstruction stole, strengthening the case for an immediate multi-cluster opening.
    Coalition of supporters lined upSlovakia backing the first cluster and Italy's Tajani endorsing full membership shows Kyiv assembling a counter-bloc to the associate-membership camp — naming supportive capitals is the diplomatic mechanism for isolating the Franco-German gradualist proposal as a minority position.
  6. 18 May 2026 Hungary and Ukraine launch technical talks on minority rights to unlock the accession path
    Hungary / Ukraine (Transcarpathia)

    On 18 May 2026 Hungary's new PM Péter Magyar announced technical-level talks with Ukraine to secure legal guarantees for the linguistic, educational and cultural rights of the ethnic Hungarian community in Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia), estimated at 70,000-80,000 people — after a call with European Council President António Costa, who stressed minority rights must be resolved before further steps. FM Andrii Sybiha agreed to expert consultations; the first round was held online on 20 May led by Sybiha and Hungarian FM Anita Orbán, with a second round agreed for the following week and an in-person meeting on 22 May in Helsingborg. Magyar later set 11 specific minority-rights demands as the condition for consenting to open accession clusters, to be discussed at the 18-19 June European Council.

    A bilateral ethnic dispute gating a 27-member processThe accession of a 38-million-person state being gated on legal protections for ~70,000-80,000 Transcarpathian Hungarians shows how unanimity lets a narrow bilateral grievance hold the whole bloc's enlargement hostage — Costa's intervention 'minority rights must be resolved before further steps' formalises that linkage.
    Eleven demands as the price listMagyar reducing the condition to 11 specific minority-rights demands on language, education and culture turns the block into a concrete, closeable checklist — the mechanism that makes a deal possible by mid-June, unlike Orbán's open-ended obstruction which had no defined exit.
    Process restored at expert levelThe machinery here is working-level: Sybiha and Anita Orbán running expert consultations and a Council deadline of 18-19 June is the plumbing that converts a political thaw into a procedural unlock, the same adviser-level diplomacy that runs beneath the leaders' summits.
  7. 16 May 2026 Accession talks stall as Hungary, France and Poland raise fresh conditions
    European Union

    On 16 May 2026 reporting found that despite Hungary's change of government, Ukraine's EU accession negotiations remained stalled. Commissioner Marta Kos urged member states to open all clusters, with the first expected by end-June, but Kyiv's hope to open the first cluster by 26 May looked unlikely before mid-June. France and Poland were pushing for stricter conditions on the agriculture and transport clusters (Clusters 4 and 5), and the EU was weighing revised negotiating criteria to address member states with strong farming lobbies. Hungary's PM Magyar signalled willingness to open only one cluster initially, pending Ukraine's minority-rights reforms.

    Agriculture and transport as the chokepointsFrance and Poland targeting Clusters 4 (transport) and 5 (agriculture and cohesion) pinpoints exactly where the cost fears bite — the CAP and single-market competition in farming and trucking — and revising those clusters' criteria to placate farming lobbies is the concrete mechanism by which member-state economic interests reshape the accession terms.
    One cluster, not sixMagyar offering to open only the first cluster initially, against Kyiv's push for all six by June-July, narrows the immediate prize to Fundamentals alone — a partial opening that lets Budapest claim cooperation while keeping the contentious agriculture and budget clusters in reserve as future leverage.
    Stalled despite the veto changeThe headline finding — talks stalled even after Hungary's government changed — is the structural point of this thread: the block was never only Orbán; it is unanimity plus distributed reservations, so removing one obstructionist exposes the next layer rather than clearing the path.
  8. 11 May 2026 Hungary's new government pledges to stop using the EU veto as 'blackmail'
    Budapest / European Union

    Hungary's new government under PM Péter Magyar, sworn in 9 May 2026, and FM Anita Orbán announced on 11 May that Budapest would no longer use its EU veto as 'blackmail' or 'political theater,' a sharp break from Viktor Orbán's confrontational stance. The government aimed to rebuild trust with the EU and NATO and unlock frozen EU funds. On Ukraine, Hungary would support EU integration only where it aligned with national interests and would keep demanding expanded rights for the ethnic Hungarian minority. Magyar said Hungary would not veto EU decisions 'as a matter of principle' but maintained its refusal to send weapons or troops, and tied cooperation to unblocking €16.4 billion in frozen Hungarian funds.

    Principle without unconditional releaseMagyar renouncing the veto 'as a matter of principle' while still conditioning Ukraine support on 'national interests' and minority rights is a rhetorical reset, not a structural one — the unanimity lever stays in Budapest's hand, repurposed from Orbán's open obstruction to Magyar's transactional conditionality.
    Frozen funds as the real currencyLinking the new posture to unlocking €16.4bn in frozen Hungarian EU money names the transaction underneath the cooperation: Budapest trades veto restraint for the release of its own cohesion funds, making Ukraine's accession a bargaining chip in Hungary's separate rule-of-law dispute with Brussels.
    Arms and troops still off the tableEven the EU-friendlier Magyar drawing a hard line against sending weapons or troops shows the limit of the reset — Hungary will unblock process but not contribute capability, so the political thaw on accession does not extend to the military-aid track this thread excludes.
  9. 5 11 May 2026 EU's Kallas urges opening all Ukraine accession clusters by summer
    Brussels

    On 11 May 2026 EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas said Vladimir Putin was in a weaker position than ever — citing battlefield losses, deep strikes into Russia and domestic discontent — and urged opening all EU accession negotiation clusters with Ukraine by summer (August). She paired the push with new EU sanctions on Russian entities. Her call aligned with Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos's expectation that the first Fundamentals cluster could open by end-June under Cyprus's presidency and the rest in July under Ireland's, with preparatory work largely complete.

    Brussels leadership pushes the timelineKallas and Kos publicly setting a summer deadline for all clusters is the EU institutional leadership trying to pull the process forward against member-state caution — the Commission and High Representative pressing the Council, where unanimity actually decides, to convert completed screening into formal openings.
    Presidency calendar as the mechanismThe plan's concreteness lies in the rotating-presidency handoff — Fundamentals under Cyprus by end-June, the rest under Ireland in July — tying accession progress to the institutional calendar so the 'when' has named custodians, not just an aspiration.
    Russian weakness as the political windowFraming the push around Putin's weakness ties enlargement tempo to the war's trajectory: Kallas argues a weakened Russia is the moment to lock Ukraine in, making the accession sprint partly a geopolitical bet that the battlefield window justifies overriding process caution.
  10. 1 May 2026 Member states' reservations on fast-track accession surface after the Hungarian veto falls
    European Union

    Following Viktor Orbán's April 2026 electoral defeat, which removed his veto, France, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and Italy openly voiced reservations about fast-tracking Ukraine's membership. France and Germany formally proposed an associate-membership model granting Ukraine European Parliament and Council of Ministers representation without voting rights, with gradual single-market integration and delayed access to major subsidies. Ukrainian FM Andriy Sybiha rejected any 'ersatz membership' or partial format, insisting on full integration. Reporting detailed the structural obstacles to admitting Ukraine under current rules — massive potential agricultural-subsidy and cohesion costs — against the geopolitical case for anchoring Kyiv in the EU's security architecture.

    The veto's removal exposed the real blockOrbán's defeat removing the formal veto did not unlock accession; it revealed that France, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and Italy had their own reservations the Hungarian block had conveniently masked — shifting the obstacle from one obstructionist to a coalition of cost-wary net payers.
    Associate model as named policyFrance and Germany 'formally proposing' Parliament and Council seats without voting rights, plus delayed subsidies, converts the gradual-integration idea into a concrete two-tier design — representation stripped of the vote and the money, the exact features Sybiha labels 'ersatz' membership.
    Subsidies as the hidden vetoThe structural problem named here — agricultural-subsidy and cohesion costs under current EU rules — is the financial mechanism behind the political caution: with the CAP budget potentially rising a quarter and cohesion thresholds shifting, the net payers' reluctance is a budget calculation dressed as a process concern.
  11. 1 May 2026 Ukraine-EU tensions rise over slow accession pace and a proposed 10-year phased path
    European Union

    On 1 May 2026 the Financial Times reported that Ukraine's push for rapid EU membership had caused tensions with European capitals. France and Germany proposed a phased approach taking at least 10 years, which Kyiv rejected. EU officials noted Ukraine's reform efforts had slowed, particularly on rule of law and anti-corruption — the core of the Fundamentals cluster that paces the entire process. The report crystallised the gap between Kyiv's wartime urgency and the member states' insistence on conditionality.

    A decade versus 18 monthsThe Franco-German 'at least 10 years' phased path collides directly with Kyiv's stated 12-18-month chapter-closing timeline — a roughly sevenfold disagreement on tempo that turns 'when' into the central political fight, distinct from the 'whether' that Hungary's veto governed.
    Reform slowdown hands the brake a justificationEU officials flagging slowed rule-of-law and anti-corruption reform matters mechanically: under Fundamentals-First, Cluster 1 must show an 'irreversible track record' before any chapter closes, so a reform slowdown gives reservation-minded capitals a procedurally legitimate reason to slow-walk, not just a political one.
    Wartime urgency as Kyiv's leverUkraine's case for speed rests on the war — accession as a security anchor — but that urgency cuts both ways: it pressures the EU to deliver symbolism while giving member states cover to argue a country at war cannot complete the institutional track at speed.
  12. 1 May 2026 Kyiv targets closing most chapters in 12-18 months and an accession treaty by 2027
    Kyiv

    Ukraine's Deputy PM Taras Kachka announced on 1 May 2026 that Ukraine could close most EU accession negotiating chapters within 12-18 months and sign the accession treaty by 2027, after completing 145 EU requirements and opening six negotiation clusters by July. DPM Olha Stefanishyna reiterated openness to a special interim EU status but rejected any alternative to full membership. Both flagged the threats to the timeline: the Franco-German phased approach that could push full membership beyond a decade, and Hungary's minority-rights conditions.

    145 requirements as the metricKachka anchoring the timeline to 145 completed EU requirements turns Kyiv's 2027 claim into a measurable position rather than a slogan — but it is Kyiv's own scorecard; the unanimity rule means member states, not Ukraine's checklist, decide when each cluster opens and closes.
    Interim status accepted, alternative refusedStefanishyna's distinction — open to a 'special interim status' as a step but rejecting any alternative to full membership — is the precise line Kyiv draws against the associate model: a waystation toward the vote is acceptable, a permanent seat without the vote is not.
    Two named threats to the dateBy naming both the Franco-German decade and Hungary's minority conditions as the risks to 2027, Kyiv concedes its timeline depends on two things outside its control — net-payer cost fears and a bilateral ethnic-rights dispute — neither of which a domestic reform sprint can resolve.
  13. 30 Apr 2026 EU drafts a 'temporary privileges' package as an alternative to fast-track membership
    Brussels

    On 30 April 2026 the European Union was reported to be developing a package of temporary privileges for Ukraine — broader access to the single market and EU institutions and deeper program participation — without immediate full membership. Backed by Germany and France, the 'accelerated gradual integration' model was framed as delivering tangible benefits while Kyiv continued reforms. Ukraine sought phased single-market access and deeper EU program participation but insisted on full membership, even as EU officials called accession by 2027 impossible. The proposal was the first concrete sign that, as Hungary's block weakened, the larger members would pivot to substitutes for the real thing.

    Substitute, not stepping stoneOffering single-market and institutional access 'without immediate full membership' is the first articulation of the gradual-integration track that Berlin and Paris would harden into the associate-membership pitch three weeks later — a parallel channel that delivers benefits while indefinitely deferring the voting rights and budget access that define membership.
    2027 declared impossibleEU officials flatly calling Kyiv's 2027 accession-treaty target impossible, on the same day they float a privileges package, sets the expectation gap that drives the whole dispute: Ukraine plans to close chapters in 12-18 months, the EU plans a decade, and the privileges package is built to fill the years in between.
    Franco-German authorshipGermany and France co-authoring the model is significant because they are the two net-payer states whose CAP and cohesion exposure is largest — the architects of the slow lane are precisely the capitals that would bear the budgetary cost of the fast one.

Background

From candidate to negotiations

In the real-world process this fictional timeline tracks, the European Council granted Ukraine candidate status on 23 June 2022, four months into Russia's full-scale invasion, and decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023; talks formally opened on 25 June 2024 alongside Moldova. Accession means adopting the entire EU 'acquis' — common law and rights — assessed through screening, then opening and closing negotiation clusters. The bid is simultaneously a geopolitical anchor against Russia and a technical reform marathon expected to take years; Kyiv's own stated target is to close most chapters and sign an accession treaty by 2027, a timeline EU officials repeatedly call optimistic. Sources: European Commission enlargement.ec.europa.eu; Wikipedia 'Accession of Ukraine to the European Union'.

35 chapters, six clusters, unanimity

The acquis is split into 35 chapters grouped into six thematic clusters: (1) Fundamentals, (2) Internal Market, (3) Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth, (4) Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity, (5) Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion, (6) External Relations. Under the 'Fundamentals First' principle, Cluster 1 — covering rule of law, the judiciary, anti-corruption, democratic institutions and fundamental rights — opens first and closes last, and its progress paces everything else: no other chapter can close until Kyiv shows a 'solid, irreversible track record' on reform. Crucially, every step requires unanimous agreement of all member states in Council — to approve screening reports, set benchmarks, and open or close each cluster — so any single capital can stall the process. Sources: European Parliament epthinktank.eu; ECFR 'Accelerate the accessions'.

Hungary's veto and the referendum trap

Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary used unanimity to hold EU-Ukraine policy hostage — vetoing accession steps, sanctions and aid, often tying them to Hungarian-minority grievances in Transcarpathia and to the release of its own frozen EU funds. The veto became the single biggest political block on opening Ukraine's clusters even after technical screening was complete. In this timeline Orbán loses the April 2026 election to Péter Magyar's Tisza party, which pledges to stop using the veto as 'blackmail' — but instead of dropping the block, Magyar converts it: he trades a minority-rights deal for opening Cluster 1, then announces a binding national referendum on Ukraine's final accession. That moves the veto from the start of the process to its end, a future blockade EU mechanisms cannot bypass. Sources: The Parliament Magazine 'How Orbán holds EU enlargement hostage'; Kyiv Post 'The Referendum Trap'.

Associate membership and the cost fears

With Hungary's veto lifting, the harder reservations surfaced from the large net-payer states. Admitting Ukraine — Europe's would-be agricultural superpower and one of its poorest large economies — would reshape the Common Agricultural Policy (the CAP budget could rise roughly a quarter, making Ukraine its largest recipient ahead of France) and the cohesion funds, pushing regions in Poland, Spain, Greece and the Baltics above the eligibility threshold and turning current beneficiaries into net contributors. France and Poland focused objections on agriculture and road transport. Out of this, Germany's Merz pitched 'associate membership': observer seats at summits, in the Council and Parliament and a powerless Commissioner, all without voting rights, with step-by-step single-market access and delayed subsidies, running in parallel to formal accession. Zelensky branded it 'half-measures' and 'semi-membership' and rejected it; Lithuania, Italy and others backed full membership. Sources: Euronews 'Merz's plan of associate EU membership'; NBC News; CEPS/ICDS budget-impact paper.

← Back to Ukraine