On the date, Thomas Crawford crouched on the rooftop of a building approximately yards away from former President Donald Trump, who was delivering a campaign speech at the time. Crawford fired eight shots using a - semi-automatic rifle. One of the bullets grazed Trump's ear. Two people in the crowd were injured. A man named Cory Comparetto was shot and killed while protecting his family.

After the assassination incident, a rally participant - wearing a red sun hat, disguised as Trump, and using a marker to carve "" above "Trump" - told reporters about the chaos that ensued when he tried to report the shooter's location to law enforcement. "We said, 'Hey, man! There's a guy on the roof with a rifle!' The police said, 'What?'" he said. "They didn't know what was happening."

Over the following months, Congress has been trying to uncover "what exactly happened." Last month, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs released an interim bipartisan report summarizing the findings of the investigation into the Secret Service's "planning, communications, intelligence sharing, and related security failures" before and on the day in question.

The mission of the United States Secret Service () is to protect current and former presidents. On the day of the assassination attempt, they deployed a large number of police around the rally. According to the committee, despite these security measures, year-old Crooks still flew a drone over the rally area, brought two explosive devices near the rally, climbed to the top of a building with a rangefinder and a large semi-automatic weapon, and fired at former President Trump.

This is the fundamental issue facing the committee: Why has the U.S. Navy failed to accomplish its mission?

The report is titled "Review of U.S. Secret Service Plans and Security Failures Related to the Assassination Attempt on [Date]".

**如需PDF全文请关注后回复关键词：**Trump assassination attempt report

Based on interviews with law enforcement agencies and limited documentation, the following details five major failures of the United States Secret Service:

1. The U.S. security forces failed to clearly delineate the planning and security responsibilities for the month-day rally.
2. The U.S. Navy failed to ensure that the U.S. Glass Research Company () building, where the Crooks missile was launched, was adequately protected.
3. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has failed to effectively coordinate with state and local law enforcement agencies.
4. The U.S. security forces failed to provide resources that could enhance security for the rally on [date].
5. The National Security Agency of the United States failed to communicate information about suspicious individuals to key personnel and failed to take action to ensure the safety of former President Trump.

Here is a summary of the findings and recommendations from the report.

Planning failure

On the day of the month, the U.S. National Security Agency began assigning key personnel to coordinate the security measures for Trump's rally on the day of the month. These agents "provided the committee with conflicting, vague, or unresponsive information about who is responsible for key parts of the planning and security," indicating a lack of clear role division. For example, the planning for the perimeter of the venue was a "joint decision" rather than an "individual decision"—referred to as a "consensus decision" by the NSA's on-site agents, while another agent stated that the decision was ultimately approved by the head of the Pittsburgh Field Office (). Denied this claim.

The report states, "The National Security Agency did not share materials outlining its expectations, and according to state and local law enforcement, planning meetings were disorganized and lacked direction." At a meeting on [date] attended by the Secret Service, the FBI, and state and local law enforcement, the National Security Agency did not discuss the perimeter of the venue; on [date], the National Security Agency, Pennsylvania State Police, and Butler County law enforcement separately inspected the venue before meeting to create a map. When discussing the exercise on [date], the commander of Butler Emergency Services noted, "There was no coordination... people were just wandering around... I felt there was no plan." It is reported that state and local law enforcement were concerned about the National Security Agency's inadequate preparation, with some NSA personnel joining the exercise by phone or "not joining at all."

The report further reveals that Secret Service personnel did not adequately cover the building—Crooks climbed the building to clearly see Trump—despite the anti-sniper team leader's concern that the roof was a "weak point." The team leader had also noted, days before the incident, that the line of sight of one of the two anti-sniper positions, known as "Hercules," was partially obstructed by trees. However, the team leader did not mention this obstruction to the Hercules team, claiming, "Honestly, I didn't even think about it." The anti-sniper operators of the Hercules team did not raise the obstruction to the team leader because "the building would be guarded by locals."

These "locals"—snipers employed by the Butler County law enforcement—claim they understand that their primary duty is to disperse crowds, but the Secret Service personnel interviewed by the committee never clarified or questioned this understanding. The committee also conducted its own inspection of the site and found that on [date], local snipers had limited visibility from the [location] rooftop. Acting Director of the National Security Agency Ronald Rowwe stated that local snipers should have spotted Crock on the [location] rooftop. In response, a local law enforcement sniper pointed out that the sniper "had to lean out of the window" to see clearly.

The Secret Service failed to mitigate other line-of-sight issues before the rally on [date]. A U.S. Secret Service field agent on the ground said, "Nearly everything around the venue was considered a line-of-sight issue or a vulnerability." On-site personnel "tried" to place vehicles to block potential threats from clearly seeing Trump, but this never happened. Nevertheless, "the U.S. Secret Service counter-sniper at the Hercules [number] position told the committee that he believed the mitigation measures were adequate."

Planning mistakes are not limited to role ambiguity and sightline issues. It has been reported that Trump's Secret Service agents requested certain additional resources, but were denied by "other U.S. Secret Service departments." The denied resources included anti-drone systems (-) and drone systems (), as described below. Additionally, the Secret Service also requested anti-commando liaisons "to help coordinate tactical assets," but this was also denied. The Secret Service Trump detail overlooked the request for an anti-surveillance team (), which is responsible for observing threats in the peripheral areas—despite the scale of this event being "suitable for requesting type assets," according to the Assistant Director of the U.S. Secret Service Protective Operations Division. The Chief Advance Agent stated that was not requested because it "was not a typical asset for a former president."

On the day of Trump's rally, First Lady Jill Biden held a smaller indoor event in Pittsburgh. The two events were close in proximity, implying some "shared assets." The on-site manager of Trump's rally "acknowledged that the sharing of assets between protected individuals could strain resources," but believed that "there would be no resource issues under this specific arrangement, as she had previously worked with local law enforcement agencies that provided shared coverage."

Additionally, the committee stated that "there were at least two errors regarding the locations of local counter-snipers at the event in the security planning documents for the 'Trump Rally'." The first error occurred in the preliminary investigation—which "summarized the security plan"—incorrectly recording the positions of local snipers. On-site personnel acknowledged this error but claimed that during the site visit, everyone was informed of the actual positions of local assets. The second error appeared in the site map, again incorrectly depicting the locations of local snipers.

General communication failure

The committee noted that multiple U.S. Navy officials, including the acting director, acknowledged a series of communication failures on the day of the month.

Many failures are linked to isolated communications among Trump rally security officials. At the rally, the Secret Service used at least three radio channels, "each channel designated for different categories of personnel"; the Pennsylvania State Police used two radio channels; local law enforcement used another three channels.

The Secret Service relies on encrypted radio frequencies that can only be accessed using radios issued by the Secret Service. Local police informed the committee that the Secret Service did not provide any radios to local law enforcement. This limited access appears to be mutual: all Secret Service personnel interviewed by the committee stated that they could not access local law enforcement radio channels (though there may have been a few one-off communications). A Secret Service official revealed to the committee that a local official had provided him with a "local radio," but he said he was unable to listen due to other obligations.

According to the committee, mobile phones are the primary means of communication between the U.S. Secret Service and local law enforcement. The head of the Secret Service's counter-sniper team told the committee that using mobile phones is "not great, but better than nothing." He added, "It's best to use radios. They are instantaneous. But they don't have our radios. We don't have theirs either."

Worse still, several radios belonging to US Secret Service personnel were out of order. This was evidently partly because some of the radios used by Secret Service personnel at the rally were too close to each other, and the Secret Service radios picked up broadcasts from the security detail of nearby First Lady Jill Biden. However, on the day of the rally, US Secret Service personnel changed at least some of the radio frequencies they used to address the crossover issue with the First Lady's security detail.

The Pittsburgh Field Office agent handed his radio over to the lead advance agent responsible for rally security, but the latter's radio was inoperable. Consequently, "direct radio communication with other NSA agents during the rally was not possible."

Due to these and other failures in information sharing, several key Secret Service personnel—including the lead advance agent and the counter-sniper team leader—were unaware that local law enforcement had identified "a suspicious person with a rangefinder" until the individual began shooting at the former president. A Pennsylvania State Police sergeant stationed in the Secret Service security room at the rally said he informed the Secret Service security room agents that local law enforcement had identified the suspicious person with a rangefinder about minutes before the shooting and communicated that the person was shooting from a rooftop about two minutes before the shooting. Several U.S. Secret Service personnel only became aware of the suspicious person with a rangefinder after the shooting, as they did not receive this information from the Secret Service security room. These officials reported in committee interviews that "they expected the U.S. Secret Service security room to relay relevant information from all law enforcement agencies working at the rally site." The state police sergeant said he was unaware of what the security room agents did after receiving the information.

Regarding who is responsible for the normal operation of the Secret Service security room, Secret Service personnel provided different answers to the committee. The committee wrote that according to Secret Service policy, the on-site agent is responsible for the "physical setup and staffing" of the security room. However, the on-site agent at the rally told the committee during the interview that she does not bear primary responsibility for the security room, and the "on-site counterpart" is responsible for coordinating the equipment and staffing of the security room. The on-site agent also stated that she believes the local field office is responsible for the equipment and staffing of the security room. The on-site counterpart disagreed. She told the committee that "the on-site agent is truly responsible for ensuring the setup of the security room and the smooth communication." The chief advance agent told the committee that the on-site agent and the on-site counterpart are jointly responsible for "ensuring that the site has sufficient resources and that everything in the plan is in place."

Line of sight and communication restrictions

The committee also established a section specifically documenting sight and communication failures that occurred on the day of the gathering (as opposed to the planning phase), as well as those that took place during the approximately minute period when Crooks took his position, fired, and was ultimately neutralized by the counter-sniper. As expected, the failure to adequately plan for resolving sight and communication limitations led to significant obstacles on the day of the event.

Although Hercules (as mentioned above) could not clearly see the roof, Hercules (another Secret Service counter-sniper position) could—but the team leader accompanying Hercules told the committee that during most of the rally, he was "essentially facing the same direction as the stage."

The report states, "Around mid-afternoon, the team leader of the U.S. Navy counter-sniper unit received a text message from a local sniper, reporting that there was an individual near the building holding a rangefinder and looking towards the stage." In the afternoon, the team leader informed the counter-sniper unit via email about this individual, including two photos of Crooks, with the email titled "Local Counter-Sniper Vigilance Required"—a member of the Hercules team considered the directive "vague in wording," but they "continued to search and observe the scene."

Subsequently, Hercules Anti-Sniper saw an officer approaching from the bushes and sent a radio transmission to the security room, which Hercules also received. Hercules Team Leader testified that shortly after receiving the transmission, "within the last few minutes," Hercules Team Leader and team members "repositioned" themselves, facing the building. The report states, "Based on the estimated possible route of Crooks crossing the roof of the building starting from the afternoon of [month] [day], American anti-sniper personnel at the Hercules position could have directly seen him for at least part of the time he was crossing the roof," but the report notes, "the committee could not determine" if the snipers would have seen Crooks if they were facing him.

During this period, more police began to run towards the building with guns. The committee noted, "Despite this, the leader of the US Special Forces anti-sniper team did not convey this information via radio to anyone," including Trump's entourage, who could have prevented Trump from taking the stage or advised to remove him.

According to the leader of the anti-sniper team who was present with the sniper who shot Crooks, Crooks was killed "within just a few seconds" of coming into their sight—with only one shot, and the anti-sniper interviewed by the committee claimed that the action was "unauthorized."

intelligence issues

The Secret Service decided in early January to deploy counter-snipers to all of Trump's outdoor events. The Assistant Director of the Secret Service's Protective Operations Division told the committee that this decision was "based on multiple factors, including the scale of the former president's outdoor activities, his imminent nomination, and threat information, some of which was classified." Among the 11 Secret Service personnel interviewed by the committee, two were aware of "credible threats related to former President Trump before January 6th, with only one knowing the classified information behind the threat." The committee assessed that the Secret Service's decision to deploy counter-snipers to the rally "likely saved lives."

Among the officials interviewed, one who knew about the "credible threat" against the former president was the lead advance agent for the rally on 月 日. According to the committee, despite the lead advance agent being informed of the threat, she wrote in the preliminary intelligence section related to event security: "Currently, no adverse intelligence has been found regarding this visit." When the committee asked the agent why she wrote this note, she said that her understanding when filling out the document was that "there was no adverse intelligence to be conveyed to the entire group." She continued, "If it were classified information, ... it would not be recorded in writing. It would be conveyed to those who need to know in that situation." Pittsburgh told the committee that he wanted any credible threat or intelligence to be included in the preliminary intelligence section.

The Chief Advance Agent reported to the committee that she informed them of reliable intelligence related to a threat. However, the committee was told that the Chief Advance Agent never notified him of the threat, and if he had been aware of this intelligence, he would have followed up to inquire about more specific details of the threat and might have advocated for moving the event indoors. He also stated that if he had this information, he would have requested an increase in security assets. Other agents involved in planning the event's security told the committee that they "absolutely" should have been informed of "reliable intelligence or a threat."

Before the rally, the advance team from the intelligence division of the Secret Service called the Secret Service Protective Intelligence Division to inquire if there were any updates related to intelligence. He reported to the committee that he was informed there were no updates. The field agent told the committee that the bulletin containing security advisory information regarding the rally "came back negative, as it reflected that there were no threats or other issues or concerns prior to the visit."

Although the threat issue was discussed with the committee, FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate testified before the Senate on [date] that "there is a lack of information or intelligence regarding threats to the rally, former President Trump, or any other individuals present... specifically prior to the rally."

Responding to drone system failures

The committee found that, according to comments made by Acting Director Rowe during a Senate hearing, the U.S. Air Defense Agency's anti-drone system did not begin operating until after the rally that afternoon due to a technical malfunction. Earlier that day, around noon, Crooks had piloted a drone near the Butler rally site. Rowe stated that if the system had been operational, "we might have been able to stop him."

In addition to these technical difficulties, the Secret Service personnel lacked adequate - equipment, and requests for additional equipment were denied. An outdoor field survey by the NSA's Technical Security Division found that the area was "vulnerable to drone attacks due to limited - equipment on site." On the day of the rally, Secret Service personnel used - equipment "designed to counter unauthorized drone use." They also implemented temporary flight restrictions (). At a planning meeting on [date], "- advance personnel requested increased mitigation capabilities and more advanced mitigation systems, to be operated by technicians as a backup to the - system. Both requests were denied." Advance personnel also requested an extension of the event's , which was also denied—with no explanation. The restriction only lasted from [time] to [time] on [date], missing the [time] window for drone flights.

In addition to these requirements, the report also indicates that the officials from the National Security Agency (NSA) responsible for operating the equipment severely lack professional expertise. On the morning of the -th, the advance agent was unable to start the equipment. The agent contacted one of his colleagues and another NSA official, who introduced him to the technical support of the company that produced the equipment. They had several phone conversations over several hours, but the results were minimal. Finally, after , the advance agent was able to connect the equipment to the Ethernet cable on the Trump campaign audiovisual team's truck; by , the system began to operate. Due to the lack of a backup system, so far, "the NSA has no drone detection capability"—meaning they did not detect the drone that flew at .

The committee found that the advance personnel responsible for the task had received less than an hour of training related to the equipment; when asked how the device interacts with the mobile cellular network, he stated, "I don't know how it interacts with it. I believe it does. I don't know the technical aspects of how it communicates with it." He also admitted that using an external cable to connect the device was not standard procedure.

According to the committee, "Acting Director Lowe testified that if the system had started operating in the afternoon, U.S. Navy agents might have spoken with Crooks, and he might have decided not to carry out the assassination."

board's recommendation

The committee outlined five brief recommendations for Congress and the Secret Service to implement in the future. The first recommendation, titled "Planning and Coordination," suggests that Congress require the National Security Agency (NSA) to "clearly define the roles and responsibilities of NSA personnel responsible for advance planning of any protective event." More specifically, the committee recommends that the NSA improve coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and clearly define the roles and responsibilities of these agencies.

Second recommendation—"Accountability"—suggests that the National Security Agency "designate an individual responsible" for approving all security plans, including security perimeters, before each protection activity.

The third recommendation, titled "Communications," instructs the Department of Homeland Security and the Secret Service to "ensure that communications plans among federal, state, and local authorities (including first responders) are properly executed and should ensure record retention capabilities." The Commission explicitly states that this "proper" execution should include recording all National Security Agency radio transmissions during protective activities. The Commission also directs Congress to require the Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Agency to assess the measures the Secret Service "needs to take to ensure the comprehensive execution of communications plans with state and local partners" and to report to Congress "any measures taken" to address past failures and "ensure compliance" with future communications plans.

Fourth recommendation - "Intelligence" - suggests that the National Security Agency should deploy "additional resources, including counter-snipers" in all future outdoor protection activities. Additionally, the committee states that the NSA should ensure that all "appropriate agents" involved in future protection activities are "informed of relevant intelligence and threats against the protected individuals."

The committee's fifth and final recommendation—"Resources"—directs Congress to assess the budget and available resources of the National Security Agency. It also stipulates that the security requirements of the National Security Agency should be determined based on the level of threat—from environments with lower threat levels to national special security events requiring the highest security levels. The committee recommends that the National Security Agency allocate its assets and resources "based on the level of threat, rather than the position or title of the protected individuals."

Federal agencies lack compliance

The committee's report also detailed the failure of various federal agencies—including the Secret Service, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives—to comply with the committee's investigation.

According to the committee, both the Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security provided "heavily redacted or incomplete documents and materials" in response to record requests. Specifically, the committee requested information from the Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security regarding "planning, resources, intelligence, and related communications," as well as interview records of Secret Service officials related to the Butler rally. In response, the Secret Service only provided the committee with , pages of documents—significantly fewer than what the committee had requested. On , the committee wrote to Lowe expressing "concerns" about the timing of the document production and the extensive redactions in the documents they received. The committee stated that the department's response did not adequately address these issues.

According to the committee, the FBI only provided pages of documents related to the assassination attempt on 月 日. The committee reported that it has requested all forms, which are summaries of interviews conducted by the bureau, involving "all U.S. security forces personnel interviewed by the FBI" in connection with the assassination attempt on 月 日 and the Butler rally. According to from the FBI's Pittsburgh field office, as of the end of 月, the FBI has conducted approximately , interviews on this matter. The committee noted that on 月 日, the FBI stated it would release these interviews for non-public review on a "rolling basis," starting with interview records, including pages of classified and unclassified documents.

The committee also reported that it had requested an interview with an ATF agent allegedly present at the rally from Steve Dettelbach, the director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (). In response, the committee "received an informal briefing on the agent's presence at the rally," but despite the request, a transcribed interview with the individual has not yet been conducted.

The committee lists a comprehensive "other and unfinished investigative leads" at the end of this section of its report, which it plans to continue pursuing in the ongoing investigation. Overall, the committee is seeking information related to "the preparation and participation of federal law enforcement agencies in the rally on [date]"; the coordinated preparation of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies for the rally; the FBI's investigation into the assassination attempt and Crooks; the investigation of crime scenes on or after [date]; intelligence related to threats against presidential candidates and other senior officials prior to the [date] rally; requests for additional protective resources to the Trump campaign team, the guard detail, or any other personnel of the Secret Service; interviews with federal, state, and local personnel who are knowledgeable about the planning and security of the Butler rally; and so on.

The Secret Service, like other intelligence agencies, usually only makes headlines when things go wrong. But the responsibilities of the Secret Service are too important to be neglected—especially considering the recent lapses.

After the rally on the day of the month, some individuals began to take responsibility. U.S. Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle resigned days later. However, the failures of the Secret Service continued. Just nine weeks after the rally ended on the day of the month, another would-be assassin appeared to target Trump at his golf club in Florida. The gunman managed to extend his rifle from the bushes within yards of the former president. In late , a Secret Service agent assigned to Vice President Kamala Harris was suspended after being accused of sexually assaulting a Harris staffer in Wisconsin.

Are these mistakes the result of recent large-scale departures (including some "well-trained personnel"), or the result of reported issues with recruitment and training standards? It's hard to know. The problems uncovered by the committee may have existed for a long time, only becoming so glaringly apparent in the past few months.

But these potential mistakes are long-term issues. Meanwhile, the Secret Service must ensure the effectiveness of its short-term protection plans. Next month is crucial for the Secret Service. At any time, especially during a heated election season when threats to public officials reach a "decibel level that even the cosmos can hear," the Secret Service cannot afford any errors.