In recent years, especially since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, cognitive warfare has become a buzzword in the media, sparking widespread discussions.

In different contexts, cognitive warfare is replaced by information warfare, public opinion warfare, and propaganda warfare, and there is no unified understanding of it. Many Western countries have quietly implemented cognitive warfare at the practical level. The key point is that they also use cognitive warfare as a smear, throwing it onto other countries.

With the continuous emergence of new information technologies, the "basic foundation" of cognitive warfare is also undergoing changes...

1

The media is the main carrier, and the public opinion arena is the main battlefield.

Currently, there is no strictly unified concept of cognitive warfare among countries worldwide. Different nations and organizations have proposed various interpretations.

2024年6月13日至14日，北约成员国国防部长在比利时布鲁塞尔举行会议，北约成员国防长14日批准了一项旨在由北约协调对乌克兰军事援助和训练的计划。新华社记者 赵丁喆 摄

NATO believes that cognitive warfare involves activities conducted in synchronization with other instruments of power, aiming to influence, protect, or disrupt perceptions at the individual, group, or mass level to shape attitudes and behaviors, thereby gaining an advantage over adversaries. Cognitive warfare seeks to alter perceptions of reality, with human cognition becoming a critical domain of war.

In broad terms, cognitive warfare is a form of struggle designed to alter the thinking patterns of a target population, thereby changing their behavior. More concretely, cognitive warfare involves actions in the cognitive domain to influence the target group's observations, judgments, and decisions regarding a particular issue, event, or situation. It aims to deepen divisions within the target group, reduce morale, and undermine the opponent's ability to plan and organize actions.

The reason for referring to it as a form of struggle rather than a form of combat is significant, as cognitive warfare can occur both during wartime and in peacetime. It is not confined to the battlefield but permeates various sectors of society, including ideology, values, and culture.

The target audience here could be decision-makers, participants in the battlefield, or the general public. Influencing decisions may be direct or indirect. For instance, one might first influence public perception and then, through public pressure, indirectly influence decision-makers.

Since "cognition" often refers to the process by which people acquire, process, and apply information and knowledge, Western and Russian contexts also refer to this form of struggle as "information warfare" ( ).

On the international public opinion stage, the frequency of "information warfare" appearing far exceeds that of "cognitive warfare." In a sense, cognitive warfare is more academic, while information warfare is more popular. At times, propaganda warfare and public opinion warfare are also considered part of cognitive warfare, thereby becoming synonymous with it.

Of course, there is another form of "information warfare" ( ), which can be understood as "information operations," belonging to a type of combat style, and can be seen as a continuation and expansion of electronic warfare and cyber warfare.

Cognitive warfare is related to, yet distinct from, traditional forms of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. In a sense, cognitive warfare represents an extension and synthesis of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.

The propaganda war is a crucial component of cognitive warfare, but the scope of cognitive operations is broader. It not only alters the opponent's perception through propaganda and media but also influences their perception through other means.

Psychological warfare is also a crucial component of cognitive warfare. Through specific psychological tactics, it can alter the target population's perception of certain events, thereby significantly impacting the operational capabilities of combat personnel.

The implementation of cognitive warfare may be organized, meticulously planned, or it may be spontaneous and conscious, driven by shared values, interests, and ideologies. These organized cognitive warfare efforts and the spontaneous, conscious actions can complement each other.

The public opinion arena is the main battlefield of cognitive warfare. Media is a crucial channel for influencing cognition, making media-based cognitive warfare the most common form. The media here includes not only traditional media but also online media, social media, and so on.

位于莫斯科的“今日俄罗斯”电视台所属的“今日俄罗斯”国际通讯社总部夜景。（新华社/卫星社）

It is precisely because the media is a crucial channel for cognition and a major carrier of information that the crackdown on media platforms becomes an important part of cognitive warfare. For example, after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, many Western countries banned Russia's "RT" and "Sputnik News Agency" from broadcasting or operating locally, under the guise of "blocking Russia's information dissemination and public opinion offensive in the West."

Of course, cognitive warfare is not only conducted through the media but also includes other means of obtaining information. For example, communication systems can transmit and receive information, so communication tools naturally become carriers of cognitive warfare.

In the months leading up to the Russian military's planned operation, they sent short messages to the Ukrainian military via drones equipped with communication bases. Soldiers from the Ukrainian military's 128th Brigade received these messages on their phones, which stated that Russia had already deployed troops in the Donbas region and urged the Ukrainian military to leave the combat zone to save their lives. This somewhat resembles traditional psychological warfare.

For instance, feeding false information into the opponent's intelligence system is akin to conducting strategic deception in the field of intelligence.

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Spreading false information is a technical job

Cognitive warfare is often associated with disinformation. The key disinformation serves as a crucial means to mislead the opponent. We can observe that in conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Israel-Palestine conflict, the information released by opposing sides is often contradictory, and it is certain that at least one side is disseminating false information.

In the narrative of Western media, it is always the adversary conducting covert cognitive warfare. The West views many activities of Russian media as information warfare spreading disinformation. On Wikipedia, there is even a dedicated entry titled "Russian Information Warfare Against Ukraine."

This video screenshot released by the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations on the date shows damaged buildings in Lysychansk, Luhansk region, after an attack. Xinhua News Agency.

This narrative casts cognitive warfare, like intelligence warfare, as a dishonorable secret activity, shrouded in a "dirty cloak." Therefore, portraying the opponent's cognitive warfare also becomes part of cognitive warfare itself.

However, during the process of cognitive warfare, it is not advisable to frequently disseminate unreliable and un-authoritative information, especially obvious false information or easily disprovable messages. Otherwise, the target group will gradually become "immune," reducing the effectiveness of cognitive warfare and even producing counterproductive effects.

For instance, in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the war reports and achievements of both sides. Of course, it cannot be said that both sides' war reports are spreading false information, but these reports often lack visual evidence, consisting only of very abstract numbers, which are difficult to verify. Some of the achievements announced by both sides might even imply the elimination of the opposing side multiple times.

In this way, not only is it difficult to influence the other party's perception, but even third parties remain skeptical. For example, some Western countries support Ukraine, yet their media often refrain from quoting Ukraine's military achievements with absolute certainty.

Similar incidents have also occurred in the Middle East. The Houthi forces once claimed to have damaged an American aircraft carrier, plunging the U.S. Navy into a massive self-verification vortex. This news was eventually proven to be a "false alarm." As a result, when the Houthi forces later claimed to have damaged another U.S. surface vessel, it was difficult to achieve the same effect.

So, from this perspective, cognitive warfare is not simply about spreading false information. In fact, the West is a master at releasing false information. The cognitive warfare of Western countries often involves a mix of truth and falsehood, with falsehoods embedded within truths. They don't fully disclose the truth, nor do they explicitly state lies; these false messages are usually deeply concealed.

In this regard, Western media, which dominate public opinion, have an advantage. Western media, through long-term accumulation, have established unique information channels, frequently conduct exclusive source disclosures, and have formed a relatively complete and highly persuasive mechanism. This has enabled them to build influence and create a hypocritical persona of being "authoritative, free, and objective," providing cover for spreading false information.

These media often establish their "authority" by leveraging some exclusively disclosed "true news," even news that is unfavorable to their own side or allies. However, this mix of genuine and false information creates a "dilution effect," increasing the deception and disguise of the false news.

In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Western and Ukrainian media have gone to great lengths to demonize and stigmatize the Russian military, exaggerating Russian casualties, belittling the Russian military, and spreading various false information. During a certain period, Russia frequently "lost" generals, with even the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian military "dying" multiple times. Of course, these generals later "came back to life."

3

Truth? One-sided truth!

Cognitive warfare revolves more around the pursuit of truth.

Conducting cognitive warfare, the most fundamental aspect is to proactively set the agenda, promptly disclose the truth, expose the enemy's crimes, and prevent the spread of rumors detrimental to oneself.

This is a crowd heading north back home, photographed in the middle of the Gaza Strip, Palestine, on the date of month and year. Xinhua News Agency photo by Rizek Abdeljawad.

In the Israel-Palestine conflict, both sides have engaged in a battle for perception. The Palestinian side, including countries and organizations that sympathize with and support the Palestinian people, has released a large number of videos and images from the conflict zone in Gaza, revealing the truth. This has reinforced and solidified the perception that Israel is responsible for creating a massive humanitarian disaster, garnering widespread sympathy for the Palestinian side from around the world. Even Israel's allies, at least in public opinion, have criticized Israel's actions. This has put some pressure on Israel and the United States, forcing the U.S., which supports Israel, to impose certain restrictions on Israel.

Without this positive dissemination, the suffering of the Palestinians would be difficult for the outside world to know, and Israel would become even more unrestrained. Meanwhile, Israel is also publicizing the harm caused by Hamas to Israeli civilians during the earlier "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation, in order to justify its strikes against Hamas.

However, more often than not, cognitive warfare involves providing "one-sided truths," which is a gray area between truth and misinformation.

For instance, in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Western media released numerous videos, images, and analytical articles showing Russian tanks being destroyed, with ammunition detonating and turrets being blown off. They argued that these tanks had significant design flaws, with ammunition not being properly isolated, leading to catastrophic explosions and crew fatalities upon being hit.

This is suggesting that the Russian military's tank design does not prioritize defense or the lives of its personnel. The aim is to undermine the Russian military's confidence in their equipment and tanks, thereby eroding their morale. If such information were to spread widely among the Russian populace, it would influence public perception to varying degrees, increasing dissatisfaction with the relevant military authorities, including the defense industry. This pressure would inevitably be transmitted to the Russian defense industry and the military equipment research and development departments.

These videos are not fake, and the design of Russian tanks is indeed imperfect, but this is not the whole truth.

In fact, the tanks used by Ukraine, including its domestically produced main battle tanks and Russian tanks, are all derived from the Soviet Union, with identical layouts for similar tanks on both sides. The issues present in Russian tanks are also present in Ukrainian tanks, with no differences. Moreover, the various tanks provided by the West to Ukraine have not implemented a spaced ammunition design, meaning that if they are penetrated, ammunition detonation can still occur, such as with the "Challenger-".

However, Western media have remained silent on this matter, instead broadly claiming that Western tanks employ ammunition compartment designs, which are not well understood by the general public. Therefore, such news actually presents only a "partial truth," misleading the public.

There are many similar situations in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Numerous videos circulating online show Russian equipment being hit by Western-supplied precision-guided weapons, creating an impression that Russian equipment is outdated, vulnerable, and that the Russian military is both foolish and clumsy. Such dissemination can create a "broken window effect" for the Russian military.

If such information is widely disseminated within Russia, it will inevitably affect the perceptions and emotions of the Russian populace. At the same time, these messages will also have a certain impact on the public opinion of third countries, indirectly influencing the support of these governments for the conflicting parties.

But in reality, these videos only showcase the successful side of Western equipment, while more videos of failed attacks are intentionally hidden.

This is both a success of the cognitive warfare waged by the West and Ukraine, and a reflection of the shortcomings of the Russian side in this area. People can only learn about the combat effectiveness of the Russian military from the descriptions of Ukrainian soldiers. According to The Wall Street Journal of the United States, in a speech this year, William LaPlante, the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Materiel Technology Support, admitted that Russia has succeeded in interfering with precision-guided weapons. He said, "The Russians are really very, very good." This is clearly inconsistent with the information widely disseminated by Western media.

This one-sided truth, of course, also includes controlling and blocking the disclosure and dissemination of information unfavorable to one's own side.

In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ukraine strictly controls and censors the release of videos showing the strikes on its key targets, resulting in fewer opportunities for the outside world to see videos of the Russian military's successful strikes on deep-seated important targets in Ukraine. This creates an illusion that most of Russia's airstrike missiles and drones are intercepted or miss their targets.

In contrast, the Russian side does not do as well as Ukraine in this regard. Shortly after Ukrainian forces launched multiple significant attacks on Russian forces, the scenes of the attacks, and even the attack processes, were publicly shared on the internet by local residents and bloggers.

In the war of words between Israel and Iran, Israel also strictly prohibits its citizens from uploading footage of its bases being attacked, creating an environment for the Israeli government to make decisions without interference.

4

Emerging Technologies Worth Noting

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With the continuous emergence of new information technologies, the "basic framework" of cognitive warfare is also undergoing changes.

In the cognitive warfare of the information age, algorithms prevail over tactics. During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, various information favorable to Ukraine widely appeared on Western internet platforms, including social media and Facebook. Accounts supporting the Ukrainian military were more active, with numerous reports of Ukrainian military achievements circulating online, such as drones destroying Russian tanks and Ukrainian missiles destroying Russian air defense systems. With the support of Western media, Ukraine even launched a series of "deification campaigns," elevating some Western weapons to a divine status.

In contrast, videos and news about Russian military achievements are relatively less circulated. One reason is that the Russian side itself has released fewer relevant videos, and another reason is that Russian official media accounts and accounts sympathetic or supportive of Russia have been suppressed and blocked.

For instance, on social media, if an account supporting Russia publicly shares a video, even if the content is not particularly sensitive, the system will prompt that the video may be disturbing and will not autoplay, requiring manual clicking to play. This clearly limits its dissemination. In the "era of algorithms," it is actually not necessary to ban accounts; by making slight adjustments to the recommendation mechanism, the spread of such information can be suppressed.

Artificial intelligence will also have a significant impact on cognitive warfare, particularly generative AI. For instance, AI technology can now generate large amounts of text, images, and especially videos. It can also modify real videos to create deepfake videos. Currently, it is becoming increasingly difficult for us to discern deepfake content.

Some deepfake videos targeting key figures such as national leaders and military leaders, when used during specific operational phases, combined with other measures, may yield unexpected effects.

For instance, when Country A launches an armed attack on Country B, causing internal turmoil, the release of a deepfake video purporting to show the leader of Country B stating they are in a third country or calling on their citizens to cease resistance, combined with disruptions to local networks and television systems, could significantly impact the public perception in Country B. This would demoralize Country B, accelerate the collapse of its resistance, and lead to further social chaos.

Additionally, through certain techniques, infiltrating and influencing such large-scale AI models to make their responses on important issues exhibit certain biases can also affect public perception. When the public heavily relies on these models to understand the external world, it possesses the potential to sway public perception. This point should be particularly noted.

END

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Source: Outlook Think Tank

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