After Trump began his second term, which national leaders would visit the U.S. first became a significant issue closely watched by all parties. Following Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Indian Prime Minister Modi became the third foreign leader to visit the U.S. after Trump's inauguration. On a specific date in U.S. time, Modi started his two-day visit to the U.S. and planned to meet with U.S. President Trump on a specific day. Among the first three foreign leaders to visit the U.S., two are from countries in the Indo-Pacific region, indicating the Trump administration's emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region and also signaling a new direction for the U.S. "Indo-Pacific Strategy."

Modi's overtures and Trump's calculations. As a key player in the U.S. "Indo-Pacific Strategy," the relationship between India and the United States can be described as quite delicate. During Trump's first term, U.S.-India relations significantly warmed due to the strategic consensus on "jointly addressing the challenges posed by China," with Trump and Modi publicly displaying their affection through large-scale events. In Houston, USA, Trump and Modi "showed off their affection" in front of tens of thousands of people. However, behind the seemingly beautiful "brotherly love," there are also many frictions in U.S.-India relations, with Trump repeatedly accusing India of "taking advantage of the U.S." in trade on public occasions.

As Trump begins his second term, Modi has frequently extended "olive branches," aiming to "rekindle the relationship" with Trump and guide the development of bilateral relations over the next four years. Modi has presented a "grand package." Faced with Trump's resurgence, Modi has clearly leaned towards compromising with the U.S. on significant issues to avoid the "tariff stick." During Trump's first term, "America First" and "Make in India" clashed fiercely over tariff issues, with Trump repeatedly accusing India of being a "tariff abuser" and threatening to impose punitive tariffs on India. Before Modi's visit to the U.S., India announced plans to reduce tariffs on goods such as electronics, medical devices, and chemicals, and pledged to expand imports of U.S. energy and military equipment, attempting to use this as a "gift" to avoid Trump's "tariff stick."

Strengthening Military Cooperation. In addition to making proactive concessions in trade and economy, the Modi government has proposed increasing military purchases from the United States and strengthening U.S.-India military cooperation to gain favor with Trump. Recently, the Modi government announced plans to expand military procurement from the U.S., including high-end equipment such as the "Sea Guardian" drones, and has allowed U.S. warships to be repaired in Indian shipyards. Drones. Aligning with Trump's Immigration Policy. The Modi government is well aware that a tough immigration policy is one of the core selling points of Trump's domestic agenda. Unlike the passive resistance of some countries, India has chosen to actively cooperate with the United States, accepting all deported illegal immigrants. On a recent date, the first batch of deported Indian "illegal immigrants" returned to India on a U.S. military transport aircraft, marking the first deportation case of Trump's second term. Indian "illegal immigrants" deported by the United States.

Trump harbors "ulterior motives." Facing Modi's proactive overtures, Trump acts more like the "Party A" in a project collaboration, demanding both this and that from the Modi government. In essence, Trump's "ulterior motives" are: to make India spend more money and do more work, leveraging India to counter China. Trump is well aware that India is not only a crucial pawn in the U.S. "Indo-Pacific Strategy" but also a frontline position to contain China. However, with his businessman mindset, Trump has no intention of spending U.S. money on India, preferring instead that India foots the bill itself. Therefore, a significant part of Trump's discussions with Modi revolves around pushing India to increase its military spending and purchase more American weapons. In other words, Trump hopes Modi will "be a little follower, and bring his own provisions."

During the Trump era, the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" underwent new changes. In 2017, during his visit to Asia, Trump proposed the concept of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," making the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" the focal point of U.S. global strategy. This strategy aimed to enhance the United States' ability to integrate resources and coordinate actions in the Indo-Pacific region, establishing a U.S.-centric regional order with the core objective of containing China. During the Biden administration, the U.S. released the "U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report," deepened the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) mechanism among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, explicitly designated the Indo-Pacific region as a "priority theater," accelerated the implementation of the "Pacific Deterrence Initiative," and advanced the "Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Partnership." However, due to changes in the international landscape, the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" did not fully unfold during the Biden administration, and its practical outcomes fell short of U.S. expectations. With the onset of the Trump era, the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" has seen some new developments. Recently, the U.S. State Department removed the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" documents from the Biden era on its official website, further confirming this shift.

In terms of economic and trade relations, the U.S. shows no leniency towards its Indo-Pacific allies. Most of these allies have significant trade surpluses with the U.S. and face issues of tariff inequality. For Trump, these issues that disadvantage the U.S. are intolerable. Whether it is announcing a uniform tariff on all steel and aluminum imported into the U.S., pressuring Japan to increase its investment in the U.S., or demanding that India expand its military purchases from the U.S., the consistent theme is Trump's "America First" doctrine.

Militarily, the push is for allies to shoulder more responsibilities. Although Trump has continued mechanisms like the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue," his core strategy leans more towards separate negotiations with countries such as Japan and India, rather than advancing institutionalized multilateral cooperation. During his visit to the U.S. to meet with Trump, Shigeru Ishiba was explicitly asked by Trump to significantly increase Japan's defense spending, aiming to double it by the end of Trump's first term, with potential further increases. Similarly, before Modi's visit to the U.S., Trump repeatedly encouraged India to expand its purchases of American weapons and energy imports, attempting to more tightly integrate India into the U.S.-led security framework. Trump's actions indicate that the operation of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is gradually transforming into an unequal model where U.S. allies "exchange economy for security," reflecting Trump's "America First" logic of demanding allies to share defense costs. Under this model, U.S. allies are compelled to take on more responsibilities within the "Indo-Pacific Strategy," or face sanctions from Trump's "tariff stick."

In terms of objectives, China remains the primary target. Within the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, "countering China" has consistently been at the core of the agenda. It can be said that, whether under the Biden administration or the Trump administration, confronting China has always been an unavoidable topic for the United States. During Shigeru Ishiba's visit to the United States, both sides did not hesitate to make bold statements on issues related to China. The joint statement repeatedly hyped topics such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and declared that the U.S. and Japan would "stand united to counter China's economic aggression." During Modi's recent visit to the U.S., Trump's advisors also admitted that, although most discussions focused on U.S.-India bilateral relations, trade, immigration, and defense procurement, the issue of China would still permeate the entire meeting. In Trump's view, India is seen as a key player in replacing China's supply chain, with U.S.-India cooperation focusing on technology, military, and energy sectors to diminish China's influence. In the future, Trump may continue to strengthen the "Indo-Pacific Strategy," pressuring allies to join in, and intensifying pressure on China from all angles to build a geopolitical network aimed at containing China.

Although Trump's calculations are shrewd, it cannot be ignored that the interests and demands among the allies and partners of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" are not aligned. Although Shigeru Ishiba fulfilled his wish to visit the United States, he has frequently sent positive signals about Sino-Japanese relations since becoming Prime Minister; India has secretly purchased Russian military equipment, "hedging its bets" by pursuing a multi-polar balance strategy; Australia has repeatedly proposed strengthening economic and trade relations with China... All of this indicates that beneath the table of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy," the United States and its allies each have their own hidden agendas...