Before and after the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army

Historical experience in strengthening political work

Li Wenbin Ma Qiang

【Abstract】In the 1930s, to achieve the grand goal of joint resistance against Japan, the Chinese Communist Party agreed to reorganize the Red Army into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Simultaneously, to maintain the advanced and pure nature of the people's army, the Chinese Communist Party strengthened the political work of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army by implementing measures such as improving the leadership and command system, conducting ideological and political education, restoring political work systems, and summarizing historical experiences, achieving significant results.

【Keywords】Ethnic Conflicts | Red Army Reorganization | Political Work

After the outbreak of the September 18th Incident in 1931, the anti-Japanese and national salvation movement grew increasingly intense. In 1936, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng launched the Xi'an Incident, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan. In January 1937, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Third Central Executive Committee accepted the political proposition of the Chinese Communist Party for cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and a united front against Japan, marking the initial formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

I. The Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.

From the month of the year, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party held six rounds of negotiations in Xi'an, Hangzhou, Lushan, Nanjing, and other places on major issues such as the reorganization of the Red Army. Finally, on the date of the month of the year, the National Government Military Commission announced that the main forces of the Red Army were reorganized into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. On the date of the month of the year, the Eighth Route Army changed its designation to the 18th Group Army. In the month of the year, the Red Army guerrillas from eight southern provinces were reorganized into four brigades, forming the New Fourth Army.

II. Adverse Tendencies in Political Work During the Red Army's Reorganization

After the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, the cancellation of the political commissar and political organ systems posed significant challenges to political work, presenting a major challenge to the nature, purpose, and character of the people's army.

(1) Some Red Army soldiers found it difficult to understand the reorganization.

After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, after careful consideration of the situation, decided to set aside the deep-seated hatred with the reactionary Kuomintang in order to maintain the overall situation of the Anti-Japanese struggle and allow the People's Army to be reorganized. However, some Red Army guerrilla units found it hard to believe upon receiving the reorganization order, suspecting it to be a trick of the Kuomintang to lure them into surrender. In a certain month, Chen Yi went to the border between Hunan and Jiangxi to convey the Central Committee's directives on the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party for the common goal of resisting Japan, and to mobilize the guerrilla units to descend from the mountains for reorganization. He was suspected of being a "traitor" and was hung from a tree for three days and nights, narrowly escaping a mistaken execution. If it weren't for Red Army guerrilla fighters who descended the mountain and learned that the reorganization news was indeed true, the revolutionary pioneer Chen Yi might have been tragically killed by mistake.

During the Agrarian Revolutionary War period, countless outstanding commanders and fighters in the Red Army were killed by the Kuomintang, forging a deep blood feud with the Kuomintang reactionaries. Now, asking the vast number of Red Army soldiers to lay down their hatred and cooperate with the Kuomintang to resist Japan is indeed difficult to accept in terms of ideology.

(2) Some Red Army soldiers were blindly optimistic and suffered from rightist paralysis.

During the negotiation process, there were still some commanders who held rightist paralysis thoughts, misjudged the situation, and even took pride in accepting the Kuomintang's appointment. After the July 7th Incident, He Ming of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Fujian-Guangdong Border Region blindly believed in the deception of the Kuomintang reactionary army, had a mentality of complacency and underestimation of the enemy, led his men to Zhangpu County to accept reorganization, and was disarmed and divided on the spot by the Kuomintang reactionaries. After the incident, Mao Zedong was very angry and referred to such actions as the "He Ming Danger," stating, "Apart from the He Ming Danger, there has never been any incident of surrendering arms casually in the history of our Party." He demanded that commanders at all levels remain vigilant against the "He Ming Danger" while actively maintaining the united front of the anti-Japanese national salvation.

It has been proven that only by adopting the policy of both uniting with and fighting against the reactionary Kuomintang, and seeking unity through struggle, can we better maintain the Anti-Japanese National United Front and persist in the war to the end.

(3) The militaristic tendencies within the People's Army began to grow.

After the July 7th Incident, the CCP Central Committee agreed to the demands of abolishing the political commissar and political organs system and establishing political training offices modeled after the Nationalist Army, in order to expedite the deployment of the People's Army to the anti-Japanese front lines. However, after the political commissar and political organs system was abolished, the feudal militarist practices within the People's Army began to grow. According to Huang Kecheng's recollection: "Due to the abolition of the political commissar system in the troops, political work was significantly weakened, and it was the adjutants who became influential, with militarist practices beginning to spread." As a result of the weakening of political work, the reorganized Eighth Route Army showed a tendency to evolve into the corrupt Nationalist Army.

The emergence of the above-mentioned undesirable phenomena has significantly weakened the combat effectiveness of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, severely damaged the prestige of political work, and is also detrimental to maintaining the united front of the Chinese people against Japanese aggression, having a negative impact on the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to secure leadership in the War of Resistance against Japan.

III. Measures to Strengthen Political Work During the Red Army's Transformation into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army

To maintain the essence of the new people's army and to develop the people's army into a pillar of the Anti-Japanese War under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party implemented a series of measures against the aforementioned undesirable tendencies, achieving significant results.

(1) Establish and improve the leadership and command system that ensures the Party's absolute leadership over the People's Army.

After the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign, the Central Red Army, after the Long March, arrived in northern Shaanxi. Following negotiations with the Kuomintang, it was agreed that the Shaan-Gan-Ning base area would exist in the form of a Special Government Region of the Republic of China, while the Chinese Soviet Republic faded into the annals of history. Consequently, the Military Commission of the Central Revolutionary Committee, established on a certain date, became merely nominal. Therefore, at the Luochuan Conference in January 1937, it was decided to establish a new Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (referred to as the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party), with Mao Zedong as its secretary (actually titled chairman), as the highest military authority for the Party's leadership over the army. Additionally, the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party Forward Division and the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party New Fourth Army Division were established as dispatching agencies within the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, respectively, gradually establishing and improving the leadership and command system under the Party's absolute leadership in the new context of the Anti-Japanese War.

(2) Conduct in-depth mobilization efforts and ideological and political education

In response to various ideological misconceptions among Red Army soldiers during the reorganization process, the People's Army, in accordance with the directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and unified deployment, conducted in-depth mobilization efforts and ideological and political education. This primarily included education on the current situation, the policy of the united front against Japanese aggression, and the education on the principle of independence and autonomy, enabling the vast majority of commanders and fighters to clarify their fuzzy understandings. Through current situation education, the commanders and fighters were made aware of the changes in the primary and secondary contradictions at home and abroad, realizing that the aggression of the Japanese imperialists had brought the Chinese nation to the brink of national extinction. Through education on the united front against Japanese aggression, they recognized the significant meaning of the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the reorganization of the Red Army, understanding that only by setting aside past grievances and uniting to resist Japan could they have a chance to defeat a formidable enemy. Through education on the principle of independence and autonomy, the People's Army was reminded to guard against the "Heming Danger," to maintain its original character, and to avoid being assimilated by the Kuomintang army.

(III) Restoration of the political commissar and political organ systems that were temporarily suspended after adaptation.

After discovering the weakening of political work and the beginning of the spread of militaristic tendencies during his research in various units, Huang Kecheng immediately wrote a report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which attracted high attention from the Central Committee. Following Mao Zedong's approval, the Central Committee resolutely decided to reinstate the political commissar and political organ systems that had been temporarily suspended in the People's Army. In late January, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army appointed Nie Rongzhen, Guan Xiangying, and Zhang Hao (later replaced by Deng Xiaoping) as political commissars of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions respectively, and political commissars were appointed for each brigade and regiment. At the same time, to ensure that the fine traditions of the People's Army are permanently upheld, it was stipulated that "regardless of the nature of any unit, once incorporated into the Eighth Route Army's structure, the establishment of party organizations must be carried out within it, and its instructors, political instructors, and the main staff of various political organs must be party members, subject to party leadership; otherwise, it is better to leave positions vacant than to fill them inappropriately." The headquarters of the New Fourth Army and its subordinate brigades and regiments also established political departments (offices), strengthening the political work of the People's Army under the new situation of the Anti-Japanese War both organizationally and institutionally.

(IV) Summarizing the Historical Experience of Political Work in the People's Army

At the initial stage of the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan, Comrades Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and others also systematically summarized the historical experience of political work in the People's Army, clearly pointing out that the "central task is to transform the political spirit and political work of the army." Subsequently, in the article "A Talk with British Journalist Bettelheim," Mao Zedong fully and explicitly proposed the three principles of political work, namely the principles of unity between officers and soldiers, unity between the army and the people, and the principle of demoralizing the enemy and treating prisoners leniently. The three principles of political work were a fundamental marker distinguishing the new People's Army of this period from the old-style armies, and also an important political foundation for the People's Army to unite itself and defeat the enemy.

IV. Conclusion

After a series of measures to strengthen political work before and after the reorganization, the Red Army, when reorganized into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, still maintained the nature, purpose, and character of the people's army. During the Anti-Japanese War, the people's army under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party conducted over 125,000 combat operations against the enemy, annihilating more than 527,000 Japanese troops and over 1.18 million puppet troops. This severe blow to the Japanese invaders made the people's army the mainstay of the Anti-Japanese War.

references

Central Party Literature Press. Chronology of Mao Zedong (—). Central Party Literature Press, Beijing,.

Huang Kecheng. Memoirs of Huang Kecheng. Beijing People's Publishing House.

Editorial Committee for the Series of Military Historical Materials on the War of Resistance Against Japan in China. Series of Military Historical Materials on the War of Resistance Against Japan in China: Eighth Route Army Documents. Beijing: PLA Publishing House.

Mao Zedong. Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Volume II). Beijing People's Publishing House.

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Editor of this issue: Chen Luyang

This issue reviewed by: Lin Yingxi

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Article Source: "China Military-to-Civilian Magazine"

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